

**The Democrat-Military Gap:
A Re-examination of Partisanship and the Profession**

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“I was referred to yesterday as the President’s witness. I thought I was the committee’s witness. I would like to point out that I am neither a Democrat nor a Republican. I think it would be improper if I were, in my position.”
– *General of the Army Omar Bradley*

Introduction.

In the fall of 2002, retired General – and opponent of the Iraq War – Anthony Zinni criticized several hawks within the Bush Administration, focusing on their lack of military experience. After naming a number of prominent military men who had expressed concerns about the proposed operation, Zinni remarked, “It’s pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way and all the others who have never fired a shot and are hot to go to war see it another way.”¹ Although Zinni’s decision to utter this statement publicly was somewhat controversial because he was serving as the Bush Administration’s special envoy to the Middle East at the time, the content of his remarks simply reflected the conventional wisdom: military experience fundamentally shapes one’s views about how and when to use military force.

This paper challenges that conventional wisdom. It argues that previous studies about the presence of an ideological gap between soldiers and civilians – the ‘Civil-Military Gap’ – have paid insufficient attention to the findings of the behavioral research tradition within the field of American politics, particularly with respect to the importance of partisan identification, attitude formation and political ideology. The behavioral literature consistently has demonstrated that an individual’s party identification forms early in life, that it is remarkably stable over time, and that it shapes how one sees virtually all aspects of political life (Berleson, et. al 1954; Campbell et. al 1960; Converse 1964; Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004). This paper argues that the failure to adequately situate the study of the ‘Civil-Military Gap’ within this behavioral tradition has led previous scholars of civil-military relations to mischaracterize both the nature and the causes of the existing opinion gap.

Although the Profession of Arms campaign has not directly examined questions of partisanship and political ideology, an understanding of the nature and causes of attitudinal differences between civilian elites and military leaders clearly is relevant to the state of the profession.² By focusing centrally on the importance of partisan identification, I will argue that the existing attitudinal gap is far better described as a ‘Democrat-Military Gap.’ I will demonstrate that the ‘Civil-Military Gap’ described in the extant literature represents a classic case of omitted variable bias; when comparing the attitudes of civilian elites and senior military officers while conditioning on party identification, a different picture of the gap emerges. Although there are an exceptionally large number of Republican officers (and a very small number of Democratic officers) within the senior ranks of the U.S. military, there are few systematic differences between Republican military officers and civilian elite Republicans. The attitudes of Democratic officers within the military, however, differ sharply from the attitudes of Democratic civilian elites across a number of issue areas. My analysis suggests that these differences result primarily because the overwhelming majority of Democratic officers in the military are moderate Democrats, with very few liberal Democrats in the senior ranks.

¹ Salinero, Mike. 2002. “Gen Zinni Says War with Iraq is Unwise.” *Tampa Tribune*, 24 August 2002, p. 1.

² *An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms* (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, Training and Doctrine Command, 2 December 2010).

I also will suggest that officer selection and attrition can explain the high levels of conservatism and Republicanism within the senior ranks of the officer corps. Although I lack the panel data necessary to make definitive conclusions regarding the effects of military socialization, I demonstrate that Democrats enter the officer corps at much lower rates than do Republicans; additionally, I show that the most liberal junior officers typically leave the military before reaching the senior ranks of the military. My estimates suggest that this attrition process accounts for almost all of the variation between the aggregate partisan identification and political ideology statistics of junior and senior officers. Nevertheless, I cannot identify definitively why Democrats enter the military at such low rates and leave at such high rates. Finally, I offer evidence indicating that claims of a rapidly growing gap since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) have been exaggerated, even with respect to the ‘Republicanization’ of the officer corps.

This paper proceeds in four stages. First, it briefly reviews the scholarly literature on the ‘Civil-Military Gap’ as well as the behavioral literature on partisan identification; in doing so, it identifies several ways in which the literature on civil-military relations does not align with our current understanding of partisan identification and the formation of political attitudes. Second, it re-examines the evidence for the ‘Civil-Military Gap’ in light of the literature on party identification. Third, it considers the possible theoretical alternatives that could explain the high-level of conservatism and Republicanism within the senior officer corps before examining the existing evidence on this issue. It concludes with a discussion of policy implications and areas of for future research.

The Gap in the Previous Studies of the Civil-Military Gap

In many ways, the idea of a civil-military divide seems obvious. According to Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, members of the military immerse themselves in a “set of beliefs, traditions, and experiences that those outside the military do not share.”³ The intense environment that surrounds military service, the prolonged exposure to a unique culture, and the carefully designed professional military education system must shape the worldview of soldiers, especially those soldiers and officers who serve for extended periods of time. Even scholars who do not view a potential gap as normatively problematic generally concede that the nature of military institutions and the particular demands of military service should lead to civil-military differences. How could military experience not influence one’s views regarding the use of force?

Following the Cold War, members of the media began to focus on what they called the ‘Civil-Military Gap.’ In reality, the idea of a gap was nothing new. The civil-military relations literature long had argued that there were clear and important differences in the attitudes of civilian and military leaders (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Betts 1977). Members of the media also had frequently reinforced the idea that there was a fundamental civil-military divide. Nevertheless, at the end of the Cold War, a number of commentators began to focus on the increase in the number of clashes between civilian policymakers and senior military leaders over defense and foreign policy issue as evidence that the gap between soldiers and civilians had widened.⁴

In 1997, for example, Thomas Ricks chronicled a group of young marines that he claimed had become extremely alienated from civilian society during boot camp, framing the anecdote as evidence of a troubling cultural divide that had emerged between the military and society. Moreover, he argued that the military had become ideologically out of step with the mainstream of American society and that the officer corps, in particular, had become isolated from American

³ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴ See, for example, Mandelbaum 1996; Weigley 2001; Ricks 2002a, 2002b; Dowd 2002; Hastings 2010; and Mackey 2010.

culture (Ricks 1997a, 1997b). Ricks' popular work and the broader concern about civil-military conflicts during the Clinton years inspired a renewed scholarly focus on the idea of a gap between civilians and the military.

Previous Studies of Officer Attitudes, Ideology, and Partisan Identification

Since Ricks published his book, political scientists and sociologists have attempted to identify the nature of the civil-military gap and the factors that might shape it. A number of studies have confirmed that senior military officers identify themselves in exceptionally high numbers as both conservative and Republican (Holsti 1998; Feaver and Kohn 2001, Dempsey 2010, Urben 2010) and that partisan identification among officers has increased since 1976. The largest and most-comprehensive study, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) "Project on the Gap Between and the Military and Civilian Society," concluded that, in general, the views of senior military officers were more conservative than those of the civilian elite, but not more conservative than society at large (Feaver and Kohn 2001).

Although many scholars have identified the large numbers of Republicans within the senior ranks of the military, they rarely have focused on partisan identification or attitude formation as major issues of inquiry.⁵ Instead, political scientists often have highlighted the aggregate differences in the attitudes of elite civilians and senior military officers on questions about how and when the United States should use military force (Holsti 1998, 2001; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). This analysis essentially has resulted in a restatement of the conventional wisdom. According to Feaver and Gelpi, "something deeper than personalities or partisanship is at issue – a basic civil-military divide on how force should be integrated into American foreign policy."⁶ Nevertheless, there has not yet been a systematic attempt to analyze the 'Civil Military Gap' in light of the behavioral literature regarding party affiliation and attitude formation.

Partisan Bias and the Civil-Military Gap

Traditional characterizations of partisanship focus on the predictive power of party identification in American elections (Campbell et. al 1960). However, the centrality of partisan identity in American politics reaches far beyond voting behavior; partisanship is a dominant factor in explaining not just how people vote, but also how they interpret politics in general. In the classic formulation, Americans identify with a political party early in their lives, most commonly as a loyalty acquired from their parents. Partisan preferences tend to form during adolescence before becoming more stable over one's lifetime (Jennings and Markus 1984; Sears and Funk 1999). Party loyalty thus contributes to an individual's identity and provides a set of foundational principles that the individual usually maintains throughout her life (Berleson, et. al 1954; Campbell et. al 1960; Converse 1964; Green and Palmquist 1990, 1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). In doing so, party identification thus furnishes answers to a wide range of questions: "Who am I? ... What should I believe? What is the nature of reality? What should be done, what should not be done?"⁷ Thus, partisanship provides a framework for the perception and evaluation of the political world (Campbell et. al 1960; Bartels 2002).

In the *American Voter*, Campbell et. al (1960) argued that party identification serves as a "perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan

⁵ Several studies stand out as exceptions; see Desch (2001) who focuses on possible causes of 'Republicanization,' Dempsey (2010) who identifies that the partisan composition of the Army as a whole is more diverse than many had previously believed, and Urben (2010) who examines the stability of party affiliation within the officer corps.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Miller and Shanks (1996), p. 121.

orientation.”⁸ A substantial body of research has confirmed that partisan bias shapes the way individuals interpret and integrate facts into their political attitudes and opinions (Bartels 2002, Taber and Lodge 2006, Gaines et. al 2007; but see Gerber and Green 1999). Taber and Lodge (2006), for example, utilized survey experiments to examine the relationship between partisan bias and opinion updating. They found that strong partisans make every effort to maintain their existing opinions by seeking out confirming evidence, arguing against information that does not fit their preconceived notions, and attributing more strength to arguments that were consistent with their beliefs. Similarly, Gaines et. al (2007) found that partisan bias played a significant role in shaping the interpretations – and subsequently the opinions – of citizens about the handling of the Iraq War. Moreover, they found that those who were “better informed more effectively used interpretations to buttress their existing partisan views.”⁹

In contrast with the literature on political partisanship, civil-military relations theorists instead have tended to see partisanship among military officers not as an organizing framework to understand political life, but rather as an obstacle to the development of a professional military willing to subordinate itself to the interests of civilian leaders (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1960, Kohn 1997, Feaver 2003). As a result, there have been essentially no attempts to seriously consider how partisanship might shape officers’ interpretations of their experiences within the military.¹⁰ Although a number of studies about the ‘Civil Military Gap’ have controlled for partisanship, none have considered the possibility that an officer’s partisan bias might directly influence the way he interprets his experiences within the military. In other words, Democrats and Republicans might face many of the same things during their time as military officers, but they might interpret these experiences in vastly different ways. Thus, it is possible that an officer’s experiences within the military will only serve to reinforce his existing partisan affiliation and political preferences.

Perhaps even more importantly, previous analyses of the ‘Civil Military Gap’ have failed to differentiate between the attitudes of civilian elites who are Democrats and the attitudes of those who are Republicans. In the context of American political institutions, this oversight is extremely problematic for a simple reason: partisan politics shapes the structure of American civil-military relations. An undifferentiated mass of the ‘military’ does not give advice to an undifferentiated mass of ‘civilians.’ Instead, individual officers interact with civilian politicians from each of the two major political parties. Thus, any attempt to understand the nature of a ‘Civil-Military Gap’ must account for the central role of party affiliation in shaping the attitudes of both senior military officers and civilian elites. It also must pay close attention to the attitudinal differences between Republicans and Democrats. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the empirical literature by testing the Civil Military Gap hypothesis while conditioning on party affiliation.

Hypothesis Development

Previous analyses of the Civil-Military Gap have tested the gap hypothesis by comparing the mean attitudes of civilian non-veterans with the mean attitudes of civilian veterans and senior military leaders. However, each of these groups consists of a very different mix of partisans (see Table 2.1). Thus, aggregating these attitudes might lead to differences in attitudes simply because of the different distribution of partisans within each group (Simpson 1951; Blyth 1972). Although mean comparisons of civilian leaders and military officers may at first glance make one think that

⁸ p. 133.

⁹ Gaines et al 2007, p. 957.

¹⁰ Recently, Urben (2010) conducted an important study on partisan stability within the Army officer corps. She found that officers’ partisan affiliations and political ideologies were stable; service in the Army and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan had no significant effect on either variable.

there are civil-military differences, this relationship may be spurious. These differences instead simply may be due to the partisan composition of each sample. In order to adequately test the gap hypothesis, we need to refine our hypotheses and tailor our empirical strategy to account for these known partisan differences.

If the Civil-Military Gap hypothesis is correct, we would expect there to be substantive and

Table 2.1: Party Identification in the 1998-99 TISS Survey

	Percent selecting each option		
	Senior Military Leaders	Civilian Veterans	Civilian Non-veterans
Democrats	7.2% (46)	24.8% (75)	41.6% (268)
Independents	16.0 (103)	24.5 (74)	18.3 (118)
Republicans	64.8 (416)	44.7 (135)	28.8 (186)
Other and None	12.0 (77)	6.0 (18)	11.3 (73)
Total	100 (642)	100 (302)	100 (645)

Note: Differences between groups significant at the 0.001 level; percentages calculated within columns.

systematic differences between different the various civil-military categories (non-veterans, veterans, and military officers) within the same party. For example, we should expect Republican non-veterans to hold different opinions regarding the use of force than do Republican veterans or Republican military officers. In contrast, similarities between the attitudes of respondents from the various civil-military categories within the same party would be evidence against the gap hypothesis. Thus, my analysis in the next two sections will focus on testing the following restatements of the Civil-Military Gap hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Senior military leaders and civilian veterans will have substantively different opinions regarding foreign policy goals than do civilian non-veterans who identify with the same political party.

Hypothesis 2. Senior military leaders and civilian veterans will have substantively different opinions regarding restrictions on the use of force than do civilian non-veterans who identify with the same political party.

Hypothesis 3. Senior military leaders and civilian veterans will have substantively different opinions regarding economic policies and social values issues than do civilian non-veterans who identify with the same political party.

Hypothesis 4. Senior military leaders and civilian veterans will have substantively different opinions regarding their perceptions of civilian society and military culture than do civilian non-veterans who identify with the same political party.

Methods and Data

In the next section, I will test the expectations of the gap hypothesis using survey data collected by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS). The TISS study targeted three distinct

populations: 1) civilian elites, 2) senior military officers, and 3) the mass public. My analysis will focus only on civilian and military elites because they are far more likely to have a direct influence on the foreign policy decision-making process and because many of my variables of interest are not available in the mass civilian sample.¹¹

The civilian elite sample was selected primarily from *Who's Who in American Politics*, but was supplemented with several targeted subsamples. The military elite sample focused on senior military officers at the Pentagon and the military's senior service colleges. Researchers conducted the survey primarily via mail, but they also distributed surveys to military officers at the designated institutions. Drawing on Feaver and Gelpi (2004), I distinguish between three types of respondents: 1) civilian elite non-veterans, 2) civilian elite veterans, and 3) senior military officers.¹²

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 display the breakdown of PID and political ideology within each of the categories. More senior military officers identify themselves as Republicans and conservatives than do either group of civilians. Civilian veterans also are more likely to identify themselves as Republicans and conservatives than are civilian veterans; nevertheless, combining the two civilian groups yields a much more balanced distribution of partisans, with 37 percent of civilians identifying as Democrats and 34 percent identifying themselves as Republicans.

Following previous studies of the Civil-Military Gap, I will begin my analysis by comparing across groups utilizing a variety of methods including bar charts, distributional graphs, and cross-tabulations; in almost all cases, my initial analysis replicates the methods used in previous

Table 2.2: Ideological Self-Identification in the 1998-99 TISS Survey

	Percent selecting each option		
	Senior Military Leaders	Civilian Veterans	Civilian Non-veterans
Very Liberal	0.3% (2)	3.1% (9)	12.6% (75)
Somewhat Liberal	3.6 (23)	17.4 (51)	25.3 (150)
Moderate	27.9 (176)	29.3 (86)	30.1 (179)
Somewhat Conservative	54.6 (345)	40.1 (118)	23.4 (139)
Very Conservative	13.6 (86)	10.2 (30)	8.5 (47)
Total	100 (632)	100 (294)	100 (594)

Note: Differences between groups significant at the 0.001 level; percentages calculated within columns.

¹¹ For analysis of the enlisted ranks of the Army, see Dempsey (2010). Dempsey's central finding is that the Army as a whole is far less politically homogenous than previously thought even though the senior ranks of the officer corps are disproportionately conservative and Republican.

¹² Feaver and Gelpi (2004) identify five categories. I excluded two categories from my analysis: 1) elite civilians currently enrolled in a professional military education program, and 2) officers in the Reserves or National Guard attending professional military education programs. Both groups are extremely small, and it is less likely that they would have a direct effect on the foreign policy process. I also ran all of my analyses while including respondents from both categories, but their inclusion did not substantively or significantly affect my results.

studies.¹³ After comparing across the civil-military categories, however, I then condition on party as well as civil-military category. Additionally, I utilize multivariate regression analysis to examine whether observed differences persist even when controlling for a variety of demographic characteristics or other confounding variables. Although this analysis would not erase differences between groups, it would allow us to make more informed inference about the potential causes of observed differences between groups. The design of previous surveys makes it difficult for us to assess whether selection or socialization cause attitudinal differences; nevertheless, later in the paper, I will return to this question and highlight evidence that suggests that selection into, and out of, the officer corps may be the primary factor in causing the differences observed in the next section.

Dependent Variable

The primary variable I am trying to explain is the aggregate attitudinal differences between senior military leaders and civilian leaders who have never served in the military. Following Holsti (1998, 2001) and Feaver and Gelpi (2004), I utilize a number of issue scales in order to better capture underlying political attitudes regarding the use of force, economic and social issues, and perceptions of civilian society and military culture. In almost all cases, I utilize issue scales and coding rules that previously had been used in the literature on the Civil-Military Gap. My subsequent analysis will focus primarily on four issue areas: 1) Foreign Policy Priorities and Goals, 2) Restrictions on the Use of Military Force, 3) Economic and Social Values Issues, and 4) Perceptions of Civilian Society and Military Culture.¹⁴

Foreign Policy Attitudes and Goals

In order to analyze individuals' attitudes on foreign policy priorities and goals, I utilize two sets of scales that have been prominent in the civil-military relations literature. First, I use the multidimensional Militant Internationalism (MI) and Cooperative Internationalism (CI) scales introduced by Wittkopf (1990) and applied to the study of the civil-military gap by Holsti (1998, 2001).¹⁵ The MI scale represents a perspective on international affairs that emphasizes "a conflictual world in which expansionist powers represent a major threat to the United States."¹⁶ The MI scale is constructed as the mean of respondents' support for seven questions about the following topics: 1) the importance of containing communism, 2) the importance of maintaining superior military power, 3) the validity of the domino theory, 4) Russian foreign policy goals, 5) the role of the CIA, 6) using military force to prevent aggression, and 7) Chinese foreign policy gains (for exact question wording, see Appendix 1).

¹³ I chose primarily to present bar charts and cross-tabulations because of their clarity and their prevalent use in the literature. Although distributional graphs are not included in this paper due to space constraints, this analysis yielded substantively similar results; they are available upon request.

¹⁴ For all questions with three responses (not including 'no opinion'), the respondents' answers were coded as follows: very important = 1, somewhat important = 0.33, and not important = -1. For all questions with four responses (not including 'no opinion'), I coded the answers as follows: strongly agree = 1, agree somewhat = 0.33, disagree somewhat = -0.33, and disagree strongly = -1. All missing data and 'no opinion' responses were coded through multiple imputation using the Amelia II software package. Holsti treated no opinion responses as '0' on a scale running from -1 to 1 and Feaver and Gelpi coded 'no opinion' responses as '3' on a 5-point scale. I also conducted the analysis using Holsti's (1998, 2001) and Feaver and Gelpi's (2004) coding rules and obtained substantively similar results for all dependent variables.

¹⁵ Wittkopf and Holsti typically have extended their analysis to include a two-by-two table, consisting of four categories: hard-liners, internationalists, isolationists and accommodationists. For a more detailed description of this process, see Wittkopf (1990) or Holsti and Rosenau (1993) or Holsti (1997). I also conducted this analysis and found it to be consistent with the Democrat-Military Gap thesis offered in this paper.

¹⁶ Holsti (1998), p. 17.

In contrast to MI scale, the Cooperative Internationalism scale emphasizes a foreign policy dimension that focuses on the importance of multilateral cooperation and international institutions. The CI scale is based on questions related to the following seven issues: 1) helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries, 2) combating world hunger, 3) strengthening the UN, 4) fostering international cooperation, 5) promoting human rights, 6) gaining UN cooperation in international disputes, and 7) and giving economic aid to poorer countries (See Appendix 1 for exact question wordings).

Restrictions on the Use of Force

My second issue area examines attitudes on how to use military force with an emphasis on whether or not political restrictions should be placed on the use of force. Following Feaver and Gelpi, I focus on several questions related to the ‘Powell Doctrine’; however, I also analyze several questions regarding the appropriate role for civilian policymakers and senior military officials during the use of force decision process. To construct the Powell scale, I combine two questions related to two key tenets of the Powell Doctrine: 1) military force should be used only in pursuit of total victory, and 2) military force should be used quickly and massively rather than gradually (See Appendix 1). Additionally, I examine the responses to three questions regarding the use of military force separately: 1) civilian officials should have the final say on the decision to use force, 2) civilian officials should have the final say on what type of military force to use, and 3) during wartime, civilian leaders should let the military take over running the war (See Appendix 1 for exact question wording).

Economic and Social Values Issues

In addition to examining foreign policy questions, I also consider economic policy and social values. In this case, I rely primarily on a question about support for income redistribution and a social policy scale developed by Holsti (2001; see Appendix 1 for question wording). In order to code the economic policy variable, I assumed that economic liberals would favor taxation for the purposes of income redistribution while economic conservatives would oppose it. For the Social Values scale, I included questions on the following topics: 1) school busing, 2) abortion, 3) women’s societal role, 4) school prayer, 5) gay teachers, and 6) the death penalty (see Appendix 1). I assumed that liberals would support an active government role to redress past discrimination, a ban on the death penalty, and government action to protect abortion rights and gay rights.

Perceptions of Society and Military Culture

My final dependent variable relates to attitudes regarding civilian society and military culture. I analyze two questions separately. The first question asks respondents whether the decline of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of society; the second question asks whether the military receives more respect than it deserves (See Appendix 1). Since there are a number of other ways to analyze this issue with the existing TISS data, I also briefly will mention several possible extensions or other areas for analysis during my discussion.

Key Independent Variables

Military Status of Respondent

The military status of respondents has been the primary explanatory variable in the empirical literature on the Civil-Military Gap. For my analysis, I created three dummy variables to represent respondents from each of the following categories: 1) *Military Leader*, 2) *Civilian Elite Veteran*, and 3) *Civilian Elite Non-veteran*. For the variable, *Military Leader*, I coded respondents who reported that they currently were serving on active duty in the military as ‘1’, and coded this variable as ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, for *Civilian Elite Veteran*, I coded all respondents drawn from the civilian elite sample who reported prior military service as a ‘1,’ and coded it ‘0’

otherwise. Finally, the *Civilian Elite Non-veteran* variable is omitted from all regression analysis so that these respondents can serve as the baseline comparison category.¹⁷

Partisan Identification of Respondent

Several previous studies of the gap hypothesis have included Party ID as a control category. My analysis includes dummy variables for several partisan categories. I created several dummy variables, *Democrat*, *Independent*, and *No Party*. I also created a *Republican* dummy, but this variable is omitted from all regression analysis as the baseline comparison category.

Interaction between Military Status and Partisan Identification

Finally, I introduce several interaction terms intended to determine whether the evidence for the Civil-Military Gap hypothesis holds up when comparing respondents across each military group within their respective partisan categories. For Military Leaders, I created the following interaction terms: *Military Leader x Democrat*, *Military Leader x Independent*, *Military Leader x No Party*. Similarly, I created *Veteran x Democrat*, *Veteran x Independent*, *Veteran x No Party* for Civilian Elite Veterans.

If the Civil-Military Gap hypothesis holds generally, interpreting these coefficients should be fairly straightforward. We would expect the coefficient on the variable, *Military Leader*, to be statistically significant; additionally, none of the coefficients on the interaction terms would be statistically significant. The interpretation would be that a gap exists between Republican Military Leaders and Republican Civilian Non-veterans; moreover, we could infer that a similar gap exists between the Military Leaders and Civilian Non-veterans within the other partisan categories. If the coefficients on *Military Leader* and all of the interaction terms are not statistically significant, then we can infer that there is no general Civil-Military Gap within a given issue area. The same logic applies when comparing Civilian Elite Veterans with Civilian Non-Veterans.

However, if any of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant, we must sum the coefficients of the relevant Military Status Variable, the relevant Party ID Variable, and the appropriate interaction term. Take a Democrat Military Leader, for example. In order to identify the total effect of being a Democrat Military Leader (compared to being a Civilian Elite Republican), we would sum the coefficients on the following variables: *Military Leader*, *Democrat*, and *Democrat x Military Leader*. If we wanted to compare a Democrat Military Leader to a Civilian Elite Democrat, we would compare that total to the coefficient on *Democrat*. The same logic holds for Civilian Veterans and for each of the Party ID categories.

Control variables

Although my primary interest relates to the effects of Military Status and Party ID, demographic factors are, in many cases, correlated with these variables. As a result, it will be useful to examine whether any observed differences simply are a result of demographic characteristics or whether a respondent's Military Status or Party ID have an independent effect. Thus, I included the following control variables: *Age*, *Gender* (coded 1 for females and 0 for males), *Education*, *Minority* (coded 1 for blacks and Hispanics; 0 otherwise), and *South* (coded 1 for respondents who identified they originally were from the South, and 0 otherwise). Consistent with previous research, I expect that an increase in *Age* and being from the *South* will be positively correlated with more 'conservative' attitudes. In contrast, I expect that women, minorities, and more

¹⁷ As noted previously, I removed all respondents from Feaver and Gelpi's (2004) categories, 'Civilian PME' and 'Military Reserves' from my data set because they were not central to my analysis. However, I also conducted all my empirical tests while including both categories and obtained statistically and substantively similar effects.

educated individuals will hold more ‘liberal’ attitudes in general; as a result, I expect their coefficients to be negative in all regression models.

I also include an additional variable, *Military Social Contact*, to represent the amount of contact a respondent has with members of the military. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) found that including such a variable “accounts” for what they found to be an otherwise statistically significant Civil-Military Gap in attitudes regarding the use of force. Feaver and Gelpi admit that respondents might report regular contact with military officers because they already have attitudes similar to those serving in the military. Nevertheless, they suggest that – since this variable’s inclusion eliminates the Civil-Military Gap in their regression analyses – regular “socializing with the military may serve to bring the attitudes of civilian elite nonveterans in line with those of active duty military elites.”¹⁸

Thus, I follow Feaver and Gelpi and include a *Military Social Contact* scale by combining questions 28-30 on the TISS survey. These questions seek to measure how much contact civilians have with members of the military in their social lives or at work. Finding that this variable is statistically significant does not necessarily lead to a finding that there is, in fact, a Civil-Military Gap. However, if including *Military Social Contact* does eliminate an otherwise statistically significant finding, it may imply that this variable predicts attitudinal differences. These differences may result either because people with a certain set of beliefs choose to associate with the military or because contact with the military changes people’s attitudes through a process of socialization.

Empirical Findings: The Democrat-Military Gap *Foreign Policy Attitudes and Priorities*

I begin my analysis by examining differences in foreign policy attitudes and priorities through the use of both the MI and CI scales as well as the Realpolitik and Interventionist scales. Consistent with many previous analyses of the Civil-Military Gap, I present a series of figures that represent the respondents’ mean answers on each of the scales (which all range from a minimum possible response of -1.0 to a maximum possible response 1.0).¹⁹ Larger differences between the mean responses for each group can be interpreted to represent a larger attitudinal ‘gap.’

Figure 2.1 presents the results of the mean responses on the Militant Internationalism scale broken down by the military status categories. As we can see, there is an apparent ‘gap’ between Civilian and Military Respondents; additionally, a difference of means test indicates that the ‘gaps’ between Civilian Elite Non-veterans and Civilian Elite Veterans and Military Leaders, respectively, both are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Virtually all previous empirical evidence of the Civil-Military Gap is based on a methodological approach similar to the one used to create Figure 2.1

Next, Figure 2.2 presents the same responses, now conditioned on respondents’ reported Party ID. As we see in Figure 2.2, a much different picture emerges. Among the Civilian Elite Non-veterans, there is a statistically significant and substantively much larger gap between the means of both parties (0.42) than the gap we observed between Civilian Non-veterans and Military

¹⁸ Feaver and Gelpi (2004), p. 34-35.

¹⁹ In all cases, I have created my scales so that they range from more ‘liberal’ responses (values of -1.0) to more ‘conservative’ responses (values of 1.0).




Figure 2.1: Mean scores on the Militant Internationalism Scale by civ-mil category.



Figure 2.2: Mean scores on the Militant Internationalism Scale by civ-mil category and party.

Leaders (0.17) in Figure 2.1. Moreover, the difference in means test between Civilian Non-veterans and Military Leaders is neither substantively large nor statistically significant. However, among Democrats, differences between Military Leaders and Civilian Non-veterans are substantively large (0.23) and a difference of means test is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, Military Independents are no different than Military Democrats, though they are different from elite Civilian Non-veterans (0.12) with a p-value of less than 0.01.

A similar pattern emerges in Table 2.3, which presents a series of regression models that control for the demographic factors discussed above. Model 1 presents a test of the Civil-Military Gap hypothesis that controls for Party ID, but that does not examine differences within parties. As expected, we do observe a Civil-Military Gap in Model 1 with the coefficient on *Military Leader* both positive and statistically significant; however, this apparent gap disappears when we include the *Military Social Contact* variable. Similar to the analysis in Figure 2.2, Model 2 examines differences between civil-military categories within the same party. Model 2 identifies no statistically significant gap between Republican Military Leaders and Republican Non-veterans; however, the interaction terms *Military Leader x Democrat*, *Military Leader x Independent*, *Veteran x Democrat*, and *Veteran x Independent* are all positive and statistically significant. Thus, when we combine these coefficients with the large and statistically significant coefficients on *Democrat* and *Independent*, respectively, we do identify substantively large and statistically significant differences between Military Leaders and Civilian Non-veterans among Democrats and Independents. We also identify differences between Civilian Veterans and Civilian Non-veterans among both Democrat and Independent identifiers.

As hypothesized by Feaver and Gelpi, however, it could be that this attitudinal gap is related to the level of contact that Civilian Non-veterans have with the military. Nevertheless, even when controlling for *Military Social Contact*, which is positive and statistically significant in Model 2, these results remain. Thus, while it does appear that contact with the military is correlated with more ‘militant’ values regarding the use of force, it is difficult to determine whether this effect is the result of socialization or selection. It could be that this effect is the result of a process of socialization due to continued contact with service members. It also might be that individuals who are supportive of a more aggressive foreign policy choose to work in the defense industry where they would have more contact with military officers; unsurprisingly, this variable is highly correlated with both military service and with self-identification as a DOD employee. In either case, the coefficient (0.05) on the *Military Social Contact* variable is much smaller than the coefficient on *Democrat x Military Leader* (0.21). As a result, even if this result is driven by socialization, we would expect that increased civilian and military contact would only have a marginal in mitigating the size of the gap.

Assessing whether or not these findings are substantively large requires some subjectivity. However, one can begin by comparing the relative sizes of my findings with those of previous studies. The partisan gaps identified in Model 2 are much larger than the civil-military gaps identified in Model 1. Among Democrats, the change from a Military Leader to a Civilian Non-veteran leads to a predicted mean shift of 11.5 percent on the MI scale. Additionally, the predicted mean shift when changing from a nonveteran Republican to a non-veteran Democrat is nearly 19 percent on the MI scale. Both of these predicted mean shifts are much larger than the 4.5 percent mean shift resulting from the apparent Civil-Military Gap in Model 1. In all cases, these gaps are substantively much larger than the previously identified Civil-Military Gap.

TABLE 2.3: Civilian and Military Attitudes on the MI and CI Scales

	MI Scale		CI Scale	
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Military Leader	0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
Civilian Elite Veteran	0.08*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.04)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Gender	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Education	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Minority	0.10*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
South	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Democrat	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.38*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.03)
Independent	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.04)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09** (0.04)
No Party	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.05)	0.07** (0.03)	0.10** (0.05)
Military Social Contact	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Military Leader x Democrat		0.21*** (0.06)		-0.13** (0.06)
Military Leader x Independent		0.14*** (0.05)		-0.04 (0.05)
Military Leader x No Party		0.08 (0.07)		-0.04 (0.06)
Veteran x Democrat		0.10* (0.06)		0.08 (0.06)
Veteran x Independent		0.14** (0.06)		0.02 (0.06)
Veteran x No Party		0.07 (0.10)		-0.07 (0.10)
Constant	0.11 (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.42*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)
R ²	0.20	0.21	0.16	0.17
(N)	1542	1542	1542	1542

*** = $p < 0.01$, one-tailed test; ** = $p < 0.05$; * = $p < 0.10$.

Figure 2.3 displays a similar result for the Cooperative Internationalism scale. Once we account for the partisan distributions within each civil-military category, most of the differences between Republican Military Leaders and Republican Non-veterans vanish. The difference of means tests between Republican Non-veterans and Republican Veterans and Military Leaders, however, were both statistically significant with p-values of 0.08 and 0.03, respectively. Although this result does offer weak evidence of a Civil-Military Gap on the CI scale, the Republican gap is not substantively large, especially when compared to the partisan differences. Moreover, when controlling for other demographic factors using multivariate regression in Table 2.3, the coefficient for *Military Leader* is no longer statistically significant. Once again, partisan differences largely dominate variation in the civil-military status of respondents on the CI scale; among Republicans and Independents, Military Leaders, Civilian Elite Veterans and Non-veterans hold attitudes similar to one another once we control for other demographic factors. The only exception again is within the Democratic Party. Although the attitudes of Democrat Civilian Veterans and Non-veterans are not statistically different, there is an attitudinal gap between Military Leaders and both groups of Civilian leaders.



Figure 2.3: Mean scores on the Cooperative Internationalism Scale by civ-mil category.

The pattern we observe in Figures 2.1-2.3 and Table 2.3 will re-emerge repeatedly throughout the following analysis.²⁰ Differences between Military Leaders and Civilian Non-veterans within the Democratic Party persist while differences between the same groups on the Republican side disappear. Previous failures to account for the underlying partisan distributions within each Civil-Military category have led scholars to make flawed inferences about the nature and causes of attitudinal differences between civilian and military leaders because they did not account for partisan differences within each civil-military category. When we do account for partisan

²⁰ To conserve space, I will not reproduce figures similar to those in Figure 2.1 and 2.3. In all cases (with the exception of the Economic policy scale), I was able to identify the apparent 'Civil-Military Gap' when not accounting for Party ID.

differences, however, a more nuanced and accurate picture emerges. There is no Civil-Military Gap regarding the use of force; there is, instead, a Democrat-Military Gap.

Restrictions on the Use of Military Force

The differences between partisans and the size of the Civil-Democrat Gap become even more substantial when we examine restrictions on the use of military force. Figure 2.4 again displays a wide gap between Elite Civilian Republicans and Democrats on questions that attempt to gauge support for the Powell Doctrine.²¹ Moreover, we observe no substantive or statistically significant differences between Republican groups, but we do observe statistically significant variation between Non-veteran Democrats and Senior Military Democrats (p-value < 0.001).




Figure 2.4: Mean scores on the Powell Doctrine Scale by civ-mil category.

A similar pattern emerges when we examine individual questions regarding restrictions on the use of force (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Although 54.4 percent of Democrat Non-veterans agree that civilians should “have the final say on what type of military force to use,” only 28.3 percent of Senior Military Democrats report agreement (p-value < 0.01). However, the percentages of respondents agreeing with this statement among Republican Non-veterans and Military Leaders are not statistically different at 31.7 and 27.2 percent, respectively. On the question of whether civilian leaders should let military leaders “take over the running of the war,” Republican Non-veterans are the most willing to agree, with 65.6 percent of respondents reporting that they ‘agree

²¹ This measure may not, in fact, actually be capturing a respondents’ level of support for the Powell doctrine since it does not include any questions regarding exit strategies, public support, or clear goals; instead, it may simply be measuring preferences over the amount of military force to use in a given situation. Nevertheless, I am comfortable assuming that responses to the types of questions mentioned above would be highly correlated with the questions I included and chose to utilize Feaver and Gelpi’s (2004) terminology.

strongly’ or ‘agree somewhat’ while only 12.7 percent ‘disagree strongly.’ The idea that civilian non-veterans would be more willing than senior officers to let military leaders take over running a war seems counter-intuitive. One possible explanation for this result has to do with the timing of the TISS survey. Since the TISS survey was conducted in 1998-1999, shortly after Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Republican leaders may have been particularly sensitive to President Clinton’s decision against the use of ground troops.

Table 2.4: Civilian Officials Rather than Military Officers Should Have the Final Say on What Type of Military Force to Use: Responses by Civil-Military Category and Party ID

	Senior Military Democrat	Veteran Civilian Democrat	Non-veteran Civilian Democrat	Senior Military Republican	Veteran Civilian Republican	Non-veteran Civilian Republican	Total
Agree Strongly	5 10.9%	11 14.7%	58 21.6%	46 11.1%	17 12.6%	26 14.0%	163 14.5%
Agree Somewhat	8 17.4%	25 33.3%	88 32.8%	67 16.1%	32 23.7%	33 17.7%	253 22.5%
Disagree Somewhat	19 41.3%	26 34.7%	80 29.9%	140 33.7%	48 35.6%	65 35.0%	378 33.6%
Disagree Strongly	14 30.4%	13 17.3%	42 15.7%	163 39.2%	38 28.2%	62 33.3%	332 29.4%
Total	46	75	268	416	135	186	1126

Note: Percentages calculated within each column.

Table 2.5: In Wartime, Civilian Leaders Should Let the Military Take Over Running the War: Responses by Civil-Military Category and Party ID

	Senior Military Democrat	Veteran Civilian Democrat	Non-veteran Civilian Democrat	Senior Military Republican	Veteran Civilian Republican	Non-veteran Civilian Republican	Total
Agree Strongly	7 15.2%	12 16.0%	18 6.7%	88 21.2%	33 24.4%	44 23.7%	202 17.9%
Agree Somewhat	16 34.8%	19 25.3%	70 26.1%	139 33.4%	55 40.8%	78 41.9%	377 33.5%
Disagree Somewhat	10 21.7%	19 25.3%	78 29.1%	113 27.2%	26 19.3%	41 22.0%	287 25.5%
Disagree Strongly	13 28.6%	25 33.3%	102 38.1%	76 18.3%	21 15.6%	23 12.7%	268 23.8%
Total	46	75	268	416	135	186	1126

Note: Percentages calculated within each column.

Table 2.6 reports the results of the multivariate regression models for the Powell Doctrine scale and on the “Military Runs Wars” question.²² In both cases, the effect of being a Democrat compared to being a Republican is large and statistically significant. Republicans are, on average, less likely to support restrictions on the use of military force than are Democrats. Once again, there is no general ‘Civil-Military Gap,’ but there is a difference between Civilian Non-veteran Democrats and Military Leaders who identify as Democrats. Thus,

²² Although not reported, I obtained similar results when I conducted a regression analysis for Q48B regarding who should have the final say on what type of military force to use.

TABLE 2.6: Civilian and Military Attitudes on Restrictions on the Use of Force, Economic and Social Issues

	<i>Powell Doctrine</i>	<i>Military Runs War</i>	<i>Economic Issues</i>	<i>Social Issues</i>
Military Leader	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)
Civilian Elite Veteran	0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.04)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Gender	-0.06 (0.04)	0.10** (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)
Education	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Minority	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.13** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.03)
South	0.06* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	0.05*** (0.02)
Democrat	-0.44*** (0.05)	-0.47*** (0.07)	0.66*** (0.06)	-0.46*** (0.03)
Independent	-0.19*** (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.08)	0.23*** (0.07)	-0.31*** (0.04)
No Party	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.10*** (0.10)	0.42*** (0.09)	-0.21*** (0.05)
Military Social Contact	0.09*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.01)
Military Leader x Democrat	0.19** (0.10)	0.32*** (0.12)	-0.35*** (0.11)	0.25*** (0.06)
Military Leader x Independent	0.13 (0.09)	0.37*** (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	0.22*** (0.05)
Military Leader x No Party	-0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.12)	0.11* (0.06)
Veteran x Democrat	0.06 (0.10)	0.17 (0.12)	0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.05)
Veteran x Independent	0.13 (0.10)	0.14 (0.13)	0.05 (0.12)	0.13** (0.06)
Veteran x No Party	-0.03 (0.16)	0.00 (0.20)	-0.28 (0.18)	0.03 (0.09)
Constant	0.44*** (0.12)	0.34** (0.15)	-0.55*** (0.14)	0.19*** (0.07)
R ²	0.14	0.08	0.18	0.33
(N)	1542	1542	1542	1542

*** = p < 0.01, one-tailed test; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10.

there appear to be significant differences between partisans both on when to use military force and how to use military force. Similarly, an attitudinal gap exists between Senior Military Democrats and Civilian Democrats in terms of foreign policy priorities and restrictions on the use of force.

Economic and Social Values Issues

On questions regarding the use of force, the attitudes of Democratic Military Leaders are, on average, the most similar to Civilian Independents, not Civilian Democrats. This trend continues for both economic and social issues. Figure 2.5 and Table 2.6 display the results. Once again, when controlling for other demographic factors, the attitudes of Civilian Republicans and Military Republicans are statistically different on the social and economic welfare question (see Table 2.6). The same also is true for Independents and those who do not identify with a party. In contrast, there does appear to be a gap between Democratic Civilian and Military leaders on questions related economic policy. Among Democrats, the change from a Military Leader to a Civilian Non-veteran leads to a predicted mean shift of 17 percent on the social welfare and taxation question.




Figure 2.5: Mean score on Economic Issues question by civil-military category and party.

On questions related to ‘Social Values’ issues, such as abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty, the familiar pattern re-emerges. Figure 2.6 and Table 2.6 display these results. Democratic Military Leaders are much more conservative on social issues than are Democratic Non-veterans; in fact, in this case, the attitudes of Democratic Military Leaders are closer to those of Republican Non-veterans than those of Democratic Non-veterans. We also observe a gap when comparing the attitudes of Independent Military Leaders (and those with no party affiliation) to similar Civilian Non-veterans. Once again, however, there is no gap among military status groups within the Republican Party.

In this case, however, using the Social Values scale may mask some differences between Civilian and Military Republicans, especially on two questions. When responding to a question about whether homosexuals should be barred from teaching in schools, 55 percent of Military Republicans stated that they “Agree [d] Strongly” or “Agree[d] Somewhat” compared to only 40 and 41 percent who responded similarly among both Civilian Veterans and Civilian Non-veterans, respectively. Similarly, there also was a statistically significant difference between Republican Military Leaders and Civilian Republicans on the issue of whether to ban the death penalty with Civilian Republicans more likely to favor such a ban than Republican Military Leaders (16 percent compared with 8 percent). In all other cases, mean responses were not statistically different between Civilian and Military Republicans.




Figure 2.6: Mean score on Social Issues scale by civil-military category and party.

On the Democratic side, however, the mean responses of Civilian Non-veterans and Military Leaders were statistically different (p -values < 0.01 in all cases) on every question. For example, 18 percent of Military Leaders agreed with the “barring homosexuals from schools” statement compared with 13 percent and 10 percent of Civilian Veterans and Civilian Non-Veterans, respectively. As on the use of force issues, one’s Party ID is the best predictor of a respondent’s attitudes regarding ‘Social Values’ issues; however, Democratic Party ID appears to matter even less for Military officers with respect to their attitudes on issues such as abortion, women’s role in society, homosexuality, and the death penalty.

Perceptions of Civilian Society and Military Culture

In addition to examining differences in attitudes regarding the use of force, much of the previous work on the ‘Civil-Military Gap’ has focused on perceptions of civilian and military culture. As Tables 2.7 and 2.8 suggest, however, the variation between civilian and military leaders that previously has been identified in the literature also primarily appears to be a result of differences

in the partisan distributions of the comparison groups.²³ When presented with the statement that a “decline in traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our Society,” approximately 93 percent of all Republican respondents in each of the three Military Status categories selected “Agree Strongly” or “Agree Somewhat.” Among Democrats, however, more than 80 percent of Military Leaders agreed with the statement compared to only 48 percent of non-veterans (p-value < 0.001). Nevertheless, Democratic Military Leaders do appear to be relatively less supportive than Republicans; the modal response for Democratic Military Leaders is “Agree Somewhat” while the modal response for all Republican categories is “Agree Strongly.”

Table 2.7: The Decline of Traditional Values is Contributing the Breakdown of Our Society: Responses by Civil-Military Category and Party ID

	Senior Military Democrat	Veteran Civilian Democrat	Non-veteran Civilian Democrat	Senior Military Republican	Veteran Civilian Republican	Non-veteran Civilian Republican	Total
Agree Strongly	12 26.1%	16 21.3%	47 17.5%	244 58.7%	85 63.0%	121 65.1%	525 46.6%
Agree Somewhat	25 54.4%	20 26.7%	78 29.1%	141 33.9%	39 28.9%	51 27.4%	354 31.4%
Disagree Somewhat	4 8.7%	21 28.0%	62 23.1%	27 6.5%	8 5.9%	11 5.9%	133 11.8%
Disagree Strongly	5 10.9%	18 24.0%	81 30.2%	4 0.9%	3 2.2%	3 1.6%	114 10.1%
Total	46	75	268	416	135	186	1126

Note: Percentages calculated within each column.

On the question regarding “respect for the military,” there appears to be a general consensus that the military does not receive more respect than it deserves. In fact, no more than 13 percent in any group stated that the military received more respect than it deserved. Nevertheless, Republicans and Democrats do disagree on whether the military receives less credit than it deserves. For all Republican groups, the modal response is to select “less respect;” for all Democrats, the modal response is “about as much respect.” Within each party, there is no statistical difference between the responses of each of the military status groups.

Table 2.8: The Military Gets More Respect Than it Deserves: Responses by Civil-Military Category and Party ID

	Senior Military Democrat	Veteran Civilian Democrat	Non-veteran Civilian Democrat	Senior Military Republican	Veteran Civilian Republican	Non-veteran Civilian Republican	Total
More Respect	1 2.2%	5 6.7%	34 12.7%	3 0.7%	3 2.2%	4 2.2%	50 4.4%
About as Much	27 58.7%	52 69.3%	167 62.3%	179 43.0%	43 31.9%	78 41.9%	546 48.5%
Less Respect	18 39.1%	18 24.0%	67 25.0%	234 56.3%	89 65.9%	104 55.9%	530 47.1%
Total	46	75	268	416	135	186	1126

Note: Percentages calculated within each column.

²³ Although not reported, the results of my multivariate regression confirm this analysis.

The TISS survey also offers a number of other potential questions with which to compare the attitudes across partisan and military groups. In all of the cases that I examined, respondents' Party ID dominated. Although there were a few questions on which individuals' military status appeared to have more of an effect than others, the total effect of one's military service was much smaller than the effect of one's Party ID.²⁴

Previous findings regarding the 'Civil-Military Gap' hypothesis do not hold up when we account for political parties. When comparing the attitudes of civilian elites and senior military officers while conditioning on party identification, a different picture emerges. Although there are an exceptionally large number of Republican officers (and a very small number of Democratic officers) within the senior ranks of the U.S. military, there are few systematic differences between Republican military officers and civilian elite Republicans. The attitudes of Democratic officers within the military, however, differ sharply from the attitudes of Democratic civilian elites across all issue areas that I examined.

The findings above also are consistent with the hypothesis that ideological sorting has occurred at different rates within the two parties (Levendusky 2007; Sniderman, Tomz, and VanHouweling 2008). Table 2.9 displays the ideological self-identification of respondents by civil military category and party. Among Republicans, 'correct' ideological sorting (conservatives who identify as Republicans) is high across all categories with respondents sorted properly more than 75 percent of the time. Moreover, the differences between civil-military categories are not statistically significant. Among Democrats, however, there is a clear break between civil-military categories. Democratic Military Officers are much less likely to identify themselves as liberals than are Democratic civilian elites. Although there are some Democrats among the senior ranks of the officer corps, most are moderate Democrats. Thus, this evidence suggests that a cleavage exists among Democratic elites over foreign policy issues, but not among Republican elites.²⁵

Table 2.9: Ideological Sorting, by Category

	Senior Military Democrat	Veteran Civilian Democrat	Non-veteran Civilian Democrat	Senior Military Republican	Veteran Civilian Republican	Non-veteran Civilian Republican	Total
Liberal	23.9% (11)	51.3% (38)	68.7% (182)	1.2% (5)	6.0% (8)	3.3% (6)	22.5% (250)
Moderate	58.7% (27)	37.9% (28)	26.8% (71)	17.4% (72)	13.5% (18)	20.3% (37)	22.7% (253)
Conservative	17.4% (8)	10.8% (8)	4.5% (12)	81.4% (336)	80.5% (107)	76.4% (139)	54.8% (610)
Total	46	74	265	413	133	182	1113

Note: Percentages calculated within each column.

²⁴ Military groups appeared to have no significant effect on respondents' assessments of civilian political and military leaders. However, on questions regarding the value of certain aspects of "military culture and benefits," civilian respondents of both parties underestimated the value relative to military officers. In particular, military officers valued early retirement, post housing, and other military benefits more than civilians (though partisan differences remained with the responses of Republican civilians much closer to those of military officers than those of Democratic civilians). A similar pattern emerged over a question regarding whether society would be better off if it "adopted more of the military's values and customs."

²⁵ I also conducted all my regression analyses displayed above while including a control for ideology along with the standard party dummies. Even without including my interaction terms, the inclusion of variables for both party and ideology is sufficient to eliminate the civil-military gap findings.

One possible criticism of the above analysis is that the limited number of Military Leaders in the sample who identified themselves as Democrats (46) also presents an obstacle to reliable inference. This criticism may be valid; we therefore should be somewhat skeptical of my findings with respect to the differences between Democrat Military Leaders and Democrat Non-veterans. Nevertheless, it is unclear how a larger sample of Democrats would effect the much more relevant point that even with an adequate sample of Military Republicans, there are no substantive differences between the mean attitudes of Republican Military Leaders and Republican Non-veterans (and Veterans). Moreover, the attitudinal gap between Elite Civilian Democrats and Military Republicans is even larger than we previously believed. Thus, because of the disproportionate number of Republicans within the senior officer corps, it still is fair to focus on the more accurate and relevant description of a Democrat-Military Gap.

What are the Causes of the ‘Democrat-Military Gap’?

Why, then, are there so many more Republicans than Democrats in the senior ranks of the officer corps? And why are the attitudes of the few military Democrats more moderate than those of their elite civilian counterparts? There are at least two possible theoretical explanations: socialization and selection.

Based on the survey evidence presented above, socialization may seem like an improbable explanation. Nevertheless, it is possible that military training and experience could have different effects on individuals, depending on their initial political preferences. For example, military socialization processes might cause a liberal or moderate officer to become more conservative but they also might cause an extreme conservative to become more moderate, leading officers to converge toward moderately conservative attitudes and affiliation with the Republican Party. In contrast, it also is possible that the high levels of conservatism and Republicanism within the senior ranks of the military are due to self-selection, either because of individual preferences or because of institutional pressure or bias. Officers with conservative political preferences may enter at higher rates, and/or leave at lower rates, than officers with liberal preferences. It also is possible that socialization and selection processes both operate simultaneously.

To date there have been few attempts to examine the relative effects of socialization and selection on members of the officer corps, primarily because of the difficulty of conducting a long-term panel study with military officers over the course of their career. However, scholars have conducted several short-term panel studies with cadets at the United States Military Academy (USMA) and the United States Naval Academy (USNA), examining their value formation. This literature consistently has found that self-selection plays a significant role in determining the values of cadets entering the academies (Hammill, Segal and Segal 1995; Bachman, Blair, and Segal 1997; Stevens, Rosa, and Gardner 1994; Franke 1999; Snider, Priest, and Lewis 2001) and that, “even in their first year, cadets are more similar in their values to career-oriented military personnel than to citizen soldiers or their civilian peers.”²⁶

Several of these studies also identified some shifts in values and changes in personality over time though they concluded “military academy socialization...may not ‘create’ a new value set for the individual...as much as it clarifies and solidifies those values that the new cadet brings to the academy”²⁷ (Priest, Fullerton, and Bridges 1982; Stevens, Rosa, and Gardner 1994; Franke 1999). Nevertheless, these surveys were unable to determine whether these effects were, in fact, due to the cadets’ military experience because similar changes sometimes were identified in university

²⁶ Quoted in Snider, Priest, and Lewis (2001), p. 251.

²⁷ Stevens, Rosa, and Gardner (1994), p. 481.

settings (Stevens, Rosa, and Gardner 1994). Additionally, none of these surveys asked questions regarding partisan affiliation or political preferences.

Recent cross-sectional surveys, however, have asked military officers some questions that may allow us to make somewhat reliable inference regarding the relative effects of selection and socialization. Urben (2010), for example, conducted a large-scale, random sample survey of more than 4,000 active duty Army officers. She finds little evidence to suggest that officers possess different determinants of political attitudes than do members of the general public. Consistent with the findings of the broader American politics literature, Urben also finds that Army officers have stable partisan affiliations and political ideologies, which are unaffected by combat deployments and service in the Army. The next section will extend Urben’s analysis to suggest that self-selection into, and out of, the officer corps alone can adequately explain the partisan composition of the senior officer corps.

Opting In and Opting Out

Conservatives and Republicans enter the officer corps at significantly higher rates than do liberals and Democrats (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11). Although we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that an intense socialization process dramatically influences partisanship during pre-commissioning training, the ideological and partisan distribution of active duty lieutenants generally is consistent with previous surveys of USMA cadets and ROTC students at Duke University (Cummings, Dempsey, and Shapiro 2005; Snider, Priest and Lewis 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001). Nevertheless, there still are fewer conservatives and Republicans among the junior ranks of the Army officer corps than there are among its senior ranks. What accounts for these differences?

Table 2.10: Party ID of Army Officers (Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey, 2009)

	Democrat	Independent	Republican	No Party/ Other
Lieutenants	23.68% (153)	14.86% (96)	52.94% (342)	8.51% (55)
Captains	21.44 (226)	14.52 (153)	55.89 (589)	8.16 (86)
Majors	15.94 (158)	13.52 (134)	63.38 (628)	7.16 (71)
Lieutenant Colonels	14.21 (114)	15.46 (124)	65.58 (526)	4.74 (38)
Colonels	11.05 (41)	17.79 (66)	65.77 (244)	5.39 (20)
Total (N = 3,864)	17.84 (692)	14.85 (573)	60.33 (2329)	6.99 (270)

Several recent surveys have demonstrated that junior officers who identify themselves as Democrats are both less likely to state that they want to pursue a full military career (Dempsey

2010) and more likely to leave the military after their initial military commitment (Urben 2010).²⁸ Since Urben’s survey includes a question that asks officers whether they are “in the process of separating from the Army or planning to separate from the Army in the next six months,” we can use these responses to estimate attrition rates and project the composition of the senior officer corps if it were determined only by attrition. Then, we can compare this “projected senior officer cohort” to the existing sample of senior officers. In order to do so, we only need to know the size of an incoming cohort of lieutenants and the approximate size of a cohort of senior officers after regular attrition.

Table 2.11: Political Ideology of Army Officers (Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey, 2009)

	Very Liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Very Conservative
Lieutenants	1.40% (9)	7.49% (48)	9.36% (60)	29.64% (190)	19.50% (125)	26.21% (168)	6.40% (41)
Captains	0.95 (10)	5.99 (63)	8.27 (87)	28.61 (301)	21.39 (225)	27.47 (289)	7.32 (77)
Majors	0.81 (8)	3.34 (33)	7.80 (77)	25.43 (251)	25.23 (249)	29.79 (294)	7.60 (75)
Lieutenant Colonels	0.62 (5)	3.75 (30)	5.99 (48)	23.72 (190)	22.10 (177)	35.58 (285)	8.24 (66)
Colonels	1.08 (4)	2.97 (11)	5.95 (22)	21.08 (78)	24.05 (89)	34.32 (127)	10.54 (39)
Total (N = 3,851)	0.93 (36)	4.80 (185)	7.63 (294)	26.23 (1010)	22.46 (865)	30.20 (1163)	7.74 (298)

I based my projections on the manpower estimates provided by the Congressional Research Services in 2006.²⁹ This data enabled me to identify the approximate size of an incoming junior officer cohort (4250 second lieutenants), the approximate size of that same cohort after 18 years of military service (1750 lieutenant colonels and colonels), and the approximate number of officers who would leave military service before 18 years (2500). I used the partisan breakdown from Urben’s analysis to estimate the total number of partisan identifiers in the “Initial Officer Cohort” and the “Senior Officer Cohort.” Next, I estimated the partisan breakdown of the officers who would leave the Army before they reached 18 years of service. Since Urben asked individual officers whether they were leaving the service in the next 6 months, I was able to estimate the number of partisans leaving as a percentage of the total junior officer attrition in the category, “Attrition Rate.”³⁰ For example, among the junior officers who reported that they were leaving

²⁸ These findings also are consistent with the TISS finding that Democrats are somewhat less likely to characterize their experience in the military as positive than are Moderates and Republicans (Feaver and Kohn 2001) and that they feel less comfortable talking about politics at work (Urben 2010).

²⁹ I based my estimates on U.S. Army officer projections from FY2008 available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33518.pdf>. I assumed that an initial entry cohort of lieutenants consisted of approximately 4250 officers and I assumed that a senior officer cohort consisted of a group of 1750 lieutenant colonels with approximately 18 years of service in the Army. The years of service assumption is somewhat inconsequential, however, since more than 90 percent of pre-retirement attrition occurs prior to 10 years of service.

³⁰ The attrition percentages listed are based on the number of junior officers (lieutenants and captains) with less than 10 years of service who report that they are separating or planning to separate in the next six

Table 2.12: Party ID Projection for Senior Officers Based on Entry Rates and Loss Rates

	Initial Officer Cohort	Attrition Rate	Projected Senior Officer Cohort	Senior Officer Cohort	Difference
Democrats	24.0% (1020)	35.0% (875)	8.25% (145)	13.0% (228)	-4.75% (-83)
Independents	15.0% (637)	12.0% (300)	19.25% (337)	16.0% (280)	3.25% (57)
Republicans	53.0% (2253)	44.0% (1100)	66.0% (1153)	66.0% (1155)	0% (-2)
No Party	8.0% (340)	9.0% (225)	6.5% (115)	5.0% (88)	1.5% (27)
Total	100% (4250)	100% (2500)	100% (1750)	100% (1750)	

Table 2.13: Political Ideology Projection for Senior Officers Based on Entry Rates and Loss Rates

	Initial Officer Cohort	Attrition Rate	Projected Senior Officer Cohort	Senior Officer Cohort	Difference
Very Liberal	1.0% (64)	4.0% (64)	0% (0)	0.5% (18)	-0.5% (-18)
Liberal	8.0% (319)	12.0% (290)	2.0% (40)	3.5% (61)	1.5% (-21)
Somewhat Lib.	9.0% (382)	10.0% (247)	7.5% (133)	6.0% (102)	1.5% (31)
Moderate	29.0% (1233)	28.0% (703)	29.0% (533)	23.5% (403)	5.5% (130)
Somewhat Con.	21.0% (892)	22.0% (537)	19.0% (343)	22.5% (403)	-3.5% (-60)
Conservative	26.0% (1105)	22.0% (558)	31.0% (555)	35.0% (613)	-4.0% (-58)
Very Conservative	6.0% (255)	2.0% (62)	11.5% (205)	9.0% (157)	2.5% (48)
Total	100% (4250)	100% (2461)	100% (1808)	100% (1750)	

months. I also conducted the same analysis for officers serving fewer than 8 and 12 years, and obtained similar results.

the Army in the next 6 months, 35 percent of them identified themselves as Democrats. Finally, I subtracted the “Attrition Rate” estimates from the “Initial Officer Cohort” to produce the “Projected Senior Officer Cohort” and compared it with the “Senior Officer Cohort” based on Urban’s data. I used a similar procedure to produce estimates for officers’ self-reported ideology.

By way of fair warning, however, there are several reasons why such an analysis might be problematic. First, it does not account for generational or cohort effects that could occur if different kinds of officers enter the military in response to historical events. Second, the attrition rates could be biased since the survey was conducted in 2009, in the midst of on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Democrats were leaving the military at higher rates simply because of their opposition to these wars, the results would be biased in my favor. Since the survey was conducted after the drawdown in Iraq had begun during the presidency of Barack Obama, I expect that this bias will be minimal. Additionally, the data only include responses from active duty Army officers. Since it is possible that socialization and selection processes operate differently in the various services, these results may not be generalizable to the entire officer corps. Nevertheless, these simple projections may be able to provide a baseline to understand the magnitude of selection effects, at least in the Army.

Tables 2.12 and 2.13 present the results of these projections for partisanship and ideology, respectively. Attrition rates alone do an excellent job of projecting the composition of the officer corps, especially for partisanship. The percentage of Republicans in my “projected senior officer cohort” is identical to the percentage of Republicans in the survey sample at 66 percent. However, I slightly over-estimate the percentage of Independents and slightly under-estimate the percentage of Democrats. For political ideology, this simple selection model also performs well, though not quite as well as the model for party. In this case, I over-estimate the percentage of Moderates by 5.5 percent and under-estimate the percentage of Conservatives by 5.0 percent. This small difference plausibly could be explained by known differences in political ideology associated with increasing age. Since we know that, on average, members of the general population become more conservative as they get older, we would expect a similar effect among military officers; military socialization is, of course, another possible theoretical explanation. Nevertheless, even without accounting for the effects of age or military socialization, entry rates and attrition rates together do a good job explaining both the partisan and ideological composition of the senior officer corps.

These projections offer insight into, and a plausible explanation for, both dimensions of the Civil-Democrat Gap. First, they demonstrate how self-selection into, and out of, the military can account for the large percentages of conservatives and Republicans in the senior officer corps. Second, they explain why we might expect to see differences between senior military officers who are Democrats and elite civilian Democrats. If the most liberal officers leave the military before they reach its senior ranks, only moderate Democrats will remain. As a result, we would expect senior military officers to have more moderate beliefs than would their more liberal counterparts. Finally, these simple projections also suggest that military experience may not play a significant role in shaping one’s political attitudes; instead, they suggest that certain types of individuals simply are more likely to enter, and stay in, the officer corps.

Is the Democrat-Military Gap Growing?

Holsti (1998) argued that the Civil-Military Gap grew rapidly between 1976 and 1996. But given that we actually face a Democrat-Military Gap, has it grown? And, if so, how much and how quickly has it grown? Obviously, a full treatment of this subject would require a project of its own. Nevertheless, while conducting my analysis, I did notice several things worth highlighting.

Together, they suggest that the Democrat-Military Gap may have grown much less over the last few decades than one might assume.

Table 2.14: Party Identification: Military and Civilian Leaders in the FPLP Surveys of American Opinion Leaders, 1976-96.

Group	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
Republicans						
Military	33%	46%	53%	59%	61%	67%
Civilians	25	28	30	29	30	34
Democrats						
Military	12	10	12	9	6	7
Civilians	42	39	40	41	42	41
Independents						
Military	46	40	29	27	26	22
Civilians	31	30	27	27	24	22
Other and None						
Military	9	4	5	5	6	4
Civilians	2	4	3	2	3	3

First, much has been made of Holsti's finding that Republican Party identification rose from 33 percent to 67 percent among senior officers between 1976 and 1996 (while Democrats declined from 12 percent to 7 percent; see Table 2.14). During the same time, however, officers' responses regarding their political ideology remained overwhelmingly conservative at levels greater than 60 percent (see Table 2.15). Additionally, Desch (2001) has demonstrated that Civil-Military differences on individual survey items did not increase, even as the partisan composition of the officer corps changed. Thus, it is not clear that the preferences of senior officers were shifting significantly even as they were becoming more likely to identify themselves as Republicans.

Table 2.15: Ideological Identification of Senior Officers

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Sample Size
1954*	27	NA	70	213
1976**	16	23	61	493
1980	4	24	72	167
1984	8	17	76	122
1988	4	19	77	156
1992	4	27	69	151
1996	3	31	65	108
1998-99***	5	27	67	237
2004****	9	23	68	242

* Survey of Pentagon Staff (conducted by Janowitz).; ** FLPL Surveys (1976-1996); *** TISS Surveys; **** Citizenship and Service Survey; Note: Surveys utilize different methodologies and should be used only for a rough comparison.

Second, in both 1976 and 1980, but not subsequently, the FPLP survey included two questions regarding one's party identification. The first question asked Party Identification while the second asked whether a respondent leaned toward either party. Holsti's analysis dropped all party

leaners. However, if we include party leaners for 1976 and 1980, the partisan composition of the senior officer corps looks very similar to the composition today. In 1976, 67 percent of respondents identified with (or leaned toward) the Republican Party compared to 15 percent who identified with (or leaned toward) the Democratic Party. In 1980, 72 percent of respondents leaned toward the Republican Party while 20 percent leaned toward the Democratic Party.³¹ Moreover, the responses of Republican Party identifiers and Republican Party leaners are neither substantively nor statistically different when compared on the MI and CI scales described earlier in the paper.³² Once again, this evidence suggests that officers' preferences have not changed significantly despite many claims that the advent of the AVF has significantly altered the composition of the officer corps. Instead, it indicates that the major change is that 'Independent' officers who previously 'leaned toward the Republican Party' increasingly have identified themselves with the Republican Party.

But if officers' political preferences did not change significantly between 1976 and 1996, why did they increasingly begin to identify with the Republican Party? One possibility is that senior officers simply began to sort themselves into the appropriate parties as political leaders became increasingly polarized over time, mirroring trends among the greater public (Levendusky 2009; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). It does appear that conservative senior officers increasingly sorted themselves into the Republican Party between 1976 and 1996, at least in terms of open partisan identification; nevertheless, the sorting explanation does not, by itself, provide a compelling theoretical explanation for why there were so few partisans in the senior officer corps in the first place.

Another possibility is that the norm of non-partisanship began to break down over time as new laws following the Vietnam War encouraged military officers to vote. In 1973, the passage of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act removed the major impediment that prevented members of the military from voting by requiring states to accept absentee ballots from service members. The Act ensured that soldiers and military officers would be provided both an opportunity to register and to vote.

The passage of this law also coincided with the beginning of the perceived break in the military professional ethic of non-partisanship. Prior to its passage, there was a strong tradition of senior military officers who vocally encouraged a non-partisan ethic, including General George Marshall, who believed that professional military officers should not even vote; however, with the passage of the UOCAVA, Congress and the DoD actually began to encourage voting among members of the military. The Act was updated in 1986 and embraced fully by the Department of Defense when the Pentagon set a target for the military to produce 1.2 million voters by election day (Gellman 1992). It seems unsurprising that military officers who held conservative beliefs would increasingly identify themselves with the Republican Party when given more opportunities to do so. Although we cannot show that the UOCAVA caused military officers to abandon the norm of non-partisanship, it is one plausible explanation.

Recent research also indicates that military officers are not especially politically active, though they do report voting at higher rates than do members of the general population (Dempsey 2010; Urben 2010). Nevertheless, the finding that politicization is not increasing as rapidly among the

³¹ Since the 1976 FPLP survey targeted a different population than later surveys, I only included officers over the age of 30 in my estimates for that year. The 1976 FPLP survey was conducted at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey and generally surveyed younger officers who were lower in rank than those at the War Colleges used from 1980 until 1996.

³² Due to space constraints, I excluded these graphs from my analysis.

officer corps as some had thought does not imply that there are not still potential normative concerns; in fact, it may suggest that these concerns are even more significant than we previously believed. A number of scholars have documented how military advice and bureaucratic maneuvering may have hindered civilian control of the military at various points since World War II, especially during Democratic Administrations (Brodie 1973; Sagan 2003; Herspring 2005). In other words, the Democrat-Military Gap may not be an entirely new phenomenon; nevertheless, increasing polarization among political elites may be exacerbating its effects.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that there is only a Civil-Military Gap in a limited sense, at least when comparing civilian and military elites. Although there are differences, on average, between civilian elite leaders and senior military officers, these differences disappear among Republicans when we condition on an individual's partisan identification. There are an exceptionally large number of Republican officers (and a much smaller number of Democratic officers) within the senior ranks of the U.S. military, but there are few systematic differences between Republican military officers and civilian elite Republicans. The attitudes of Democratic officers within the military, however, differ sharply from the attitudes of Democratic civilian elites. In other words, there is no 'Civil-Military Gap;' there is only a 'Democrat-Military Gap.'

In this paper I also have suggested that both aspects of the Civil-Democrat Gap – the large number of Republicans and the attitudinal differences between military and civilian Democrats – can be explained by officers' decisions to select into, and out of, the military. Democrats enter the officer corps at much lower rates than do Republicans; they also tend to leave the military before reaching the senior ranks of the military. Moreover, I offered evidence indicating that claims of a rapidly growing gap since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) have been greatly exaggerated, even with respect to the 'Republicanization' of the officer corps. The 'Democrat-Military Gap' has existed for decades.

Nevertheless, the root causes of this gap are still unclear. Why do liberal officers choose to enter the officer corps at low rates and choose to leave at such high rates? While it is possible that these high levels of attrition are the result of social pressure or discrimination, it also is possible that liberal officers simply don't have a taste for the tasks or requirements of military service. These officers may prefer to pursue a more autonomous lifestyle, free from the constraints of the strict military hierarchy.³³ Future research is needed to help us better understand the determinants of officers' decisions to leave the officer corps.

This paper also suggests that scholars of civil-military relations should pay more attention to the existing literatures in the field of American politics. Although there are reasons that civil-military relations may differ from other issue areas, there often are many similarities. American political institutions play a key role in structuring the selection of senior military leaders through the establishment of military hierarchy and senior appointments; additionally, institutions such as political parties and national elections determine which political leaders will interact with the nation's military leaders. Scholars may be able to apply insights from the broader appointments and bureaucratic control literatures to help us deepen our understanding of civil-military relations as a unique subset of American politics.

³³ See, for example, Kane (2011) who argues that the pervasive risk-averse, bureaucratic personnel structure of the military causes innovative and entrepreneurial officers to leave the military and join the private sector. If these personnel systems disproportionately affect liberals or Democrats, even inadvertently, they could be contributing to the Democrat-Military Gap.

Of course, this paper has done little to identify whether the Democrat-Military Gap truly matters for the Army profession or for U.S. foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, it does raise many relevant questions for military professionals and for the study of civil-military relations in general. Among the most important of these questions is this one: can a partisan officer corps maintain legitimacy with all of society, and not just with one segment of the population? Although 81 percent of the American people report that they have confidence in the U.S. military as an institution, this confidence is substantially lower among liberals than among conservatives (66 percent compared to 90 percent).³⁴ As American political debate continues to polarize along ideological and partisan lines, scholars and professionals must resist the temptation to ignore issues of partisanship and political ideology; rather, they must seek to better understand the underlying causes of this partisan disparity.

³⁴ Jeffrey Jones, "Americans Most Confident in Military, Least Confident in Congress," 23 June 2011. available online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/148163/americans-confident-military-least-congress.aspx>.

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Questions Included in Scaled Independent Variables

Militant Internationalism (MI) Scale (Seven questions, alpha = 0.72)

Specific question wordings from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 1. "Here is a list of foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal: 1) very important, 2) somewhat important, 3) not important, or 4) no opinion."

Q01F: "Containing communism."

Q01J: "Maintaining superior military power worldwide."

Question 2. "This question asks you to indicate what your position is on certain propositions that are sometimes described as lessons that the United States should have learned from past experiences abroad: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion."

Q02A: "There is considerable validity to the 'domino theory' that when one nation falls to

aggressor nations, others nearby will soon follow a similar path."

Q02C: "Russia is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals."

Q02D: "There is nothing wrong with using the CIA to try to undermine hostile governments."

Q02E: "The U.S. should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any

expansionist power."

Q02G: "Any Chinese victory is a defeat for America's national interest."

Cooperative Internationalism (CI) Scale (Seven questions, alpha = 0.74)

Specific question wordings from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 1. "Here is a list of foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Please indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal: 1) very important, 2) somewhat important, 3) not important, or 4) no opinion."

Q01A: "Helping to improve the standard of living in less-developed countries."

Q01C: "Combating world hunger."

Q01D: "Strengthening the United Nations."

Q01E: "Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems such as food, inflation

and energy."

Q01H: "Promoting and defending human rights in other countries."

Question 2. "This question asks you to indicate what your position is on certain propositions that are sometimes described as lessons that the United States should have learned from past experiences abroad: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion."

Q02B: "It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes."

Q02F: "The U.S. should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home."

Powell Doctrine Scale (Two questions, alpha = 0.45)

Specific question wordings from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 2. "This question asks you to indicate what your position is on certain propositions that are sometimes described as lessons that the United States should have learned from past experiences abroad: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion."

Q02I: "Military force should be used only in pursuit of the goal of total victory."

Q02J: "Use of force in foreign interventions should be applied quickly and massively rather than by gradual escalation."

Restrictions on the Use of Force

Specific question wordings from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 48. “This question asks for your opinion on a number of statements concerning relations between the military and senior civilian leaders: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion.”

Q48B. “In general, high ranking civilian officials rather than high ranking military officers should have the final say on what type of military force to use.”

Q48D. “In wartime, civilian government leaders should let the military take over running the war.”

Economic Variable

Specific question wording from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 5. “This question asks you to indicate your position on certain domestic issues: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion.”

Q05K. “Redistributing income from the wealthy to the poor through taxation and subsidies.”

Social Values Scale (Six questions, alpha = 0.69)

Specific question wordings from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 5. “This question asks you to indicate your position on certain domestic issues: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion.”

Q05A. “Busing children in order to achieve school integration.”

Q05E. “Leaving abortion decisions to women and their doctors.”

Q05F. “Encouraging mothers to stay at home with their children rather than working outside the home.”

Q05G. “Permitting prayer in public schools.”

Q05I. “Barring homosexuals from teaching in public schools.”

Q05L. “Banning the death penalty.”

Perceptions of Society and Military Culture

Specific question wordings from the TISS survey are as follows:

Question 8. “This question asks you to indicate your position on certain domestic issues: 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) strongly disagree, or 5) no opinion.”

Q08A. “The decline of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society”

Question 31. “Thinking about the way most Americans view the military, would you say the military gets more respect than it deserves, less respect than it deserves, or about as much respect as it deserves?”