“Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” (AP file)
The White House reportedly has enough votes in the U.S. House and Senate to sustain a presidential veto of legislation to nullify the Iran nuclear agreement, with the current count at 37 votes to preserve the deal in the Senate.
Yet President Obama is reportedly lobbying for Senate Democrats to filibuster* a bill to block the Iran deal in the Senate–which requires 41 votes–rather than allowing the bill to pass both chambers of Congress, reach the president’s desk for a formal veto, and then hold congressional votes to override the veto.
So what is the difference between death-by-filibuster and death-by-veto? In the end, the outcome is the same, but when the president’s party is in the minority in the Senate, it still filibusters. The fight over the Iran deal provides an opportunity to discuss why these filibusters still happen.
Here’s a quick list of possible reasons the Democrats might prefer to kill the Iran resolution by filibuster and, more generally, why the president’s party might prefer a filibuster to a veto.
1) Because the senators want credit for killing an unpopular bill. This is probably not the case with the Iran deal. Some polls show the deal is generally unpopular, although it may be more acceptable to voters who listen to both sides of the debate. But the slow revelation of Democrats’ votes–and several “no” votes–suggest that this is a difficult position for many of them.
2) Because a veto may hurt the party brand more than a filibuster. As Nolan McCarty explains here, his research with Tim Groseclose finds that vetoes generally hurt presidential job approval ratings. In this case, the White House is reportedly keen to avoid the weak result of preserving a major foreign policy action with the veto pen. In comparison, modern filibusters are relatively inconspicuous, with senators often claiming that their dispute is grounded in procedural concerns.
3) Because senators are better situated to negotiate over the details of a bill. If the presidential/minority party’s concerns with a bill can be satisfied by modifying its content, senators may be better able to extort these changes as a condition for passing the bill through the Senate. On the other hand, if a bill reaches the president’s desk and the President returns the bill with a veto message spelling out his or her demands, the publicity of the dispute may make it difficult for the majority party to back down. Or, the majority party may believe that it can can “win” by sending back the same bill as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal.
4) Because it affects the timing of the outcome. According to one report, the White House is keen to end the congressional debate on the Iran deal before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses the United Nations General Assembly later this month. In other scenarios, a quicker death-by-filibuster may expedite a bargaining sequence in which the majority party must first demonstrate to its base that it cannot achieve its preferred bill before it can compromise.
* “Filibuster” includes a scenario in which the Iran resolution requires 60 votes to pass. Absent the threat of a filibuster, a resolution requires a simple majority, which Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell would only give up to avoid a death-by-cloture outcome.
