bq. Were Republicans more likely to be elected governor in states without restrictions on corporate campaigning than in states with restrictions?
bq. Was control of governorship more likely to flip from Democratic in 2002-05 to Republican in 2006-09 where business was not restricted?
bq. Were Republicans better able to hold on to the governorship in 2006-09 in states where business campaigning was not restricted?
bq. Did Republicans have more control of state legislatures prior to 2008 where business campaigning was okay?
bq. Did Republicans have more control of state legislatures after 2008 where business campaigning was okay?
bq. Are states that lean Republican in presidential races (a quasi measure of the ideology/partisan culture of states) especially likely to have no restrictions on business campaigning?
bq. Are state and local taxes less progressive where business campaigning is okay?
bq. Are states where business can campaign likely to have good scores on business climate from the Tax Foundation in 2010?
bq. Did states where business can campaign improve their Tax Foundation business climate score between 2006 and 2010 more than states where they couldn’t?
bq. Are states where business can campaign likely to rank better on business climate from Forbes in 2009?
bq. Are states where business can campaign likely to rank better on the regulatory environment from Forbes in 2009?
bq. Is there a difference between the average Forbes business climate ranking for states with and without restrictions?
bq. Is there a difference between the average Forbes regulatory environment ranking for states with and without restrictions?
bq. Is there a difference between the average Forbes business costs (labor, energy, and taxes) ranking for states with and without restrictions?
bq. Is there a difference between the average Tax Foundation business climate score for states with and without restrictions?
The provisional answer to all of these question is “no.” The analysis comes from political scientist John Coleman at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (pdf). His findings dovetail with those of Lee Drutman and Nick Seabrook. As with their analyses, Coleman’s comes with necessary caveats, which he states in the conclusion. Nevertheless, as he writes:
bq. But these data, as they are, recommend some caution toward the most extreme statements about the effects of the Court’s decision [in Citizens United] on election and policy outcomes.