A Field Experiment on the Internet’s Effect in an African Election: Savvier Citizens, Disaffected Voters, or Both?

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Abstract: While scholarship is already underway investigating when the Internet will (and will not) facilitate political behaviors and organization, this study makes a unique contribution to this effort by considering whether the Internet also influences the desire to organize in the first place. Through a randomized field experiment conducted in Tanzania in the months leading up to the 2010 presidential election, this study explores whether the Internet influenced individuals’ perception of the fairness of the election and recount. The history of protests, riots, and revolts precipitated by contested electoral results in nations transitioning to democracy render this an important consideration of the Internet’s capacity to alter citizens’ satisfaction with their government. Additionally, by employing a randomized field experiment, this study provides a direct test of the Internet’s causal effect on political evaluations. The findings reveal that the Internet did negatively influence individuals’ perception of the fairness of both the election and the subsequent recount.

Keywords: Internet, Elections, Africa, Public Opinion, Democratization; Information and Communication Technology; Voting
Egypt’s recent revolution showcased the Internet’s capacity to serve as a tool for political organization once citizens are moved to action. However, less attention has been afforded to the question of whether the Internet played a role in the months leading up to the protests—in terms of fomenting or, at least, focusing the discontent that eventually fueled the movement. Any consideration of this question necessarily begins with Khaled Said, an Egyptian businessman and activist who was literally pulled from an Internet café and publicly beat to death by two police officers in June of 2010. His crime? Disseminating video footage online of police officers engaged in corrupt acts. After his death, an anonymous human rights group created the Facebook page “We are All Khaled Said”, which posted mobile phone pictures of his bruised and battered face in the morgue to call attention to this injustice and to provide a venue for public discussion of the inhumane treatment of Egyptians by their government. Within weeks, 130,000 members joined the page and, by the time the movement began in earnest, this number had grown to more than 380,000 members. During the protests that gripped Egypt for nearly three weeks, this page continued to serve as a central platform for organizing and sustaining protest activities.

However, the question remains: to what degree was Facebook, and the Internet more generally, a central or necessary tool for marshaling public sentiment in the months leading up to the movement? From a scientist’s perspective, this question is impossible to answer definitively—first and foremost, due to the lack of a counterfactual. It is simply not possible to empirically prove the Internet played an imperative role in fomenting the discontent that ultimately resulted in the ouster of President Mubarek, because it is impossible to compare this outcome to that which would have occurred in a world without the Internet.
Past research has substantiated the Internet’s capacity to encourage political behaviors by individuals (Best & Keegan 2009; Johnson & Kaye 2003; Jennings & Zeitner 2003; Tolbert & McNeal 2003; Xenos & Moy 2007), as well as facilitate and streamline organization and mobilization by political groups and institutions (Bimber 2003; Shirky 2008). Anecdotes and case studies also abound, illustrating instances in which the Internet was harnessed to effect democratic ends (Chan 2005; Froehling 1997; Russell 2001a; Russell 2001b). However, it is also the case that several prominent studies have revealed a null effect of Internet use on the political behavior of individuals (Bimber 1998, 2001, 2003; Kroh & Neiss 2009; Quintelier & Vissers 2008). Moreover, it is also apparent that, in some instances, authoritarian governments can effectively control or even leverage the Internet to discourage, rather than promote, political activity (Kalathil & Boas 2001; 2003; Rodan 1998).

Taking this conflicting body of literature into account, Internet enthusiasts must temper proclamations of Facebook and Twitter Revolutions while scholars continue to unpack and investigate the factors that determine when the Internet will, and will not, produce tangible changes in political behavior and, perhaps, even outcomes. After all, revolutions occurred long before the Internet’s creation. Moreover, as evidenced by the number of the protest movements inspired by Egypt’s plight—which failed to effectively harness this technology to produce actual democratic gains—the Internet alone is no magic bullet.

So, the question becomes, when and where will the Internet tip the scales? As noted above, serious scholarship is already underway investigating when the Internet will (and will not) facilitate political actions and organization. However, this paper makes a unique contribution to this effort by considering whether the Internet also potentially influences the desire to organize in the first place. Specifically, based on the results of a field experiment conducted in Tanzania in the months leading up to the 2010 presidential election, I test whether
the Internet influenced individuals’ perception of the fairness of the election. The history of protests, riots, and revolts precipitated by contested electoral results in nations transitioning to democracy render this an important consideration of the Internet’s capacity to alter citizens’ satisfaction with their government. Since, the (dis)satisfaction that stems from citizens’ evaluations of their government’s officials, processes, and institutions is a central component of the cost-benefit calculus that may, in some instance, motivate individuals to act and organize.

In the following sections, I introduce the theoretical framework guiding this analysis, as well as the concept of window-opening—one of the primary mechanisms driving the Internet’s capacity to influence evaluations of a government’s performance. I then present the results from a field experiment conducted in Tanzania in the months before their 2010 presidential election. By conducting a randomized experiment in the field, this study fills an important gap in the extant literature by directly testing the Internet’s causal influence on political attitudes. The findings reveal that the Internet negatively influenced individuals’ perception of the fairness of both the election and the subsequent recount, substantiating the Internet’s capacity to provide information that alters citizens’ evaluations of their government’s processes and institutions.

**Theoretical Framework**

The Internet’s potential to influence political behaviors and outcomes hinges on its capacity to alter the cost-benefit calculus of civic behavior, as a result of making information and communication activities more efficient. As has already been widely noted in the literature, this capacity derives from the technological features that differentiate the Internet from its information and communication technology (ICT) predecessors. Specifically, this includes the Internet’s absence of geographic, time, and space constraints; its multi-point to multi-point and non-linear configuration; as well as its multifunctional nature. In brief, the relative absence of geographic and time constraints enables the Internet to transmit information—in the form of
written words, still images, video, and sound—more quickly, across greater distances. The unlimited space, non-linearity, and multi-point to multi-point configuration mean that the Internet offers an informational landscape that is more robust and multi-faceted than that provided by traditional ICTs. Finally, the Internet’s multi-functionality means that individuals can utilize this single technology for myriad activities, from watching their favorite TV show, to reading a blog, to paying their phone bill, to video chatting with friends overseas, often simultaneously. Each of these features enable the Internet to facilitate more efficient communication, information retrieval, and information dispersion—thus altering the cost-benefit calculus of civic behavior, since the majority of civic behaviors depend on some combination of these activities (Bimber 2003).

This does not guarantee, however, that the Internet will always reset this threshold point (at which the costs associated with a civic act no longer exceed the expected benefits) low enough to produce behavior that would not have otherwise occurred. Rather, whether the Internet actually motivates such behaviors will differ across types of civic acts, across political contexts, and across individuals. Additionally, it is not guaranteed that such Internet-motivated behavior, when it does occur, will always result in actual political change or, at least, a disparate political outcome from that which would have otherwise occurred. Rather, this will also hinge on a number of additional conditioning factors—particularly, the actions of a number of additional strategic actors with their own preferences and competing goals.

While the burgeoning literature has already begun the important task of trying to better understand and predict when the Internet will (or will fail to) generate political behaviors, organization, and perhaps even outcomes, there is one component of the Internet’s capacity to alter the cost-benefit calculus of civic behavior that has yet to gain much scholarly attention. This is how the Internet influences the expectations and evaluations that citizens have of their
government. This is an important component of the Internet’s capacity to encourage political behavior and organization since the more critical the evaluations of a government’s performance and the more dissatisfied citizens become, the greater the perceived benefits to be gained from political action.

The Internet’s capacity to provide information and communication, which encourages citizens to re-evaluate their governments, primarily travels through two specific avenues—the Internet’s mirror-holding and window-opening functions. In short, by providing a broader and more extensive array of information, the Internet holds up a mirror for users to better discern and reflect on how their government is actually performing. Second, the global nature of the Internet also opens a window for individuals to better view how democracy functions in other countries, particularly the high-functioning democracies that are most visible on the Internet. This provides users with a more realistic and globally-consistent scale by which to make comparative evaluations about their own government’s performance. (Please refer to Bailard 2011 for a more detailed discussion of mirror-holding and window-opening.) Accordingly, the Internet’s potential to influence how individuals evaluate the performance of their government hinges on both its capacity to provide a more robust set of information upon which to base an evaluation (i.e. mirror-holding), but also to alter the criteria or expectations that individuals use in the course of arriving at those evaluations (i.e. window-opening).

While both mechanisms are central components of the Internet’s capacity to influence evaluations, this paper focuses specifically on the Internet’s mirror-holding function. Clearly, censorship, poverty, and cognitive limitations preventing individuals from consuming the web in its entirety—not to mention the presence of fabricated information—preclude the Internet from imbuing citizens with a complete and perfect mirror image of their government. It will, however, relay a superior reflection, both in terms of size and depth, than that which traditional
media will typically provide. Accordingly, the Internet improves the capacity of citizens in developed and developing democracies, and even authoritarian nations, to make more accurate and informed evaluations of their governments. And, it is these evaluations that may, over time, alter citizens’ incentives to act politically.

Note that the potential effect of mirror-holding will often be the most discernible for incipient “developing” democracies and authoritarian states—thanks, in part, to the fact that they are the most likely to have tightly controlled traditional news media. To be sure, it will often be the case that the Internet is also tightly controlled in these countries. However, it is the relative comparison that matters. Due to the defining features of the Internet delineated above, censorship of the Internet will be less efficient and successful for governments than censorship of the traditional media. Therefore, while Internet users in these countries will have substantially less access to information about their own governments compared to individuals living in countries with uncensored Internet, relative to a world without the Internet, the Internet still provides decidedly more information to these citizens than would otherwise be the case.

Additionally, since these individuals are living in nations with weak or non-existent democratic practices, the information that does slip through the cracks will be substantially more likely to reflect negatively rather than positively on the government. Essentially, since these governments are, in fact, often repressing political behavior, entrenched in corruption, and violating human rights, it is logical to assume that the information that does slip through the cracks will reflect some element of this reality. This is supported by the number of anecdotes highlighting instances in which “politically sensitive” information slipped through the cracks in countries with even the most successful of Internet regulatory policies. For example, “Despite censorship of news, the Internet in China often disseminates forbidden information and
opinions through e-mail, instant messaging, blogs, and bulletin board forums or through political expressions disguised as non-political comments.” (Lum 2006, pg. 2)

Taking this into account, I predict that the Internet will encourage individuals to evaluate the fairness and impartiality of the Tanzanian presidential election more critically than their peers without the Internet. This is because the Internet will provide a different and more robust set of information and perspectives regarding the election, compared to that provided by the traditional media. While Tanzania’s traditional press is relatively more unfettered than most African countries, according to widely accepted measures of press freedom, there is still ample room for improvement. Reporters without Borders (2010) ranks Tanzania’s degree of press freedom as 41st out of 178 countries as of 2010. Moreover, Freedom House (2010) still designates Tanzania as a Partly Free (as opposed to Free) country. Accordingly, the Internet should provide individuals with a different and more critical range of information and perspectives regarding the election compared to the traditional press—shaping their evaluations accordingly.

**Election Background**

Despite featuring the most competitive electoral race in several years—including a five-day recount demanded by the opposition after initial results were contested in light of voters’ names being excluded at polling stations and insufficient voting materials—incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete ultimately won a second term with nearly 62% of the vote. According to the official report published by the Tanzania Election Monitoring Commission (TEMCO), the 2010 election included relatively peaceful campaigns, thanks in part to both restraint showed by supporters, political parties that endeavored to curb the enthusiasm of their supporters, as well as the presence of police officers that effectively further helped keep the peace. Nevertheless, there were also reports of physical conflict between supporters of different
parties, non-adherence to campaign timetables, and inequitable campaign spending and leveraging of other advantages, such as using state resources for campaign purposes, on behalf of the incumbent. The subsequent recount lasted for five days, during which time the country experienced minor, dispersed rioting. While government officials pointed to unfamiliarity with recount guidelines and “the lack of mastery” of the new computerized counting system, these delays stoked voters’ fears that the recount was rigged, which in some cases led to violent skirmishes between police officers and protestors (TEMCO 2010). In sum, although a vast improvement over previous elections, the 2010 election still fell decidedly short of the threshold required to be deemed a fully free and fair election.

It is also relevant to note that Uchaguzi deployed 2000 official monitors, 30,000 trusted sources, and solicited reports from average citizens in order to aid in monitoring this election. Uchaguzi is an online platform through which text messages and emails sent from the field, often from average citizens, are used to map and aggregate information about events—from wildfires, to hate speech to incite violence, to electoral abuses. This information is aggregated and displayed online in (virtual) real-time. A review of the posts made to Uchaguzi during the election mirror and multiply the offenses noted in the TEMCO report. Examples of these posts include “Campaign intimidation of female candidates”, “Voters names missing from voter register”, “Purchasing of voters cards”, and “Media biased in reporting election campaigns (sic)”. This means that voters had access to concrete, real-time information via the Internet regarding the election in the days leading up to and following Election Day.

Procedure

My research assistant and I recruited subjects in person at several congregation points throughout the community of Morogoro, a town of more than 200,000, which lies about 120 miles west of Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania. These congregation points
include professional and trade schools, secondary schools, the main bus station, hair salons, and markets. Over a period of seven days, we collected more than 200 names and mobile phone numbers from interested individuals. Although there was a high degree of mobile phone penetration in the community, individuals without phones could still sign-up with the phone number of a friend, family member, or neighbor. We then used a random number generator to randomly assign 70 individuals to the experimental group (i.e. Internet group), 70 individuals to the control group, with the remainder assigned to serve as alternates when members selected for the experimental or control groups could not be reached or no longer wished to participate.

By employing random assignment, this experiment provides a strong and direct test of the causal relationship shared by Internet use and political attitudes—allaying a common concern regarding the extant literature, which tends employ analyses of survey data to test the correlative relationship shared by Internet use and various political attitudes and activities. Additionally, by conducting this experiment in the field, in a developing democracy, in the months leading up to an actual election, this approach also minimizes the external validity concerns that tend to accompany classic laboratory experiments.

After random assignment, we called members of both groups and asked them to meet us at one of the two Internet cafes enlisted to serve as sites for this experiment: Valentine’s Internet Café and Daus Internet Cafe. After reading the consent form and indicating their consent, we asked the participants to fill out pre-surveys, for which they were paid 3000 TZS (equivalent to 2 USD). These pre-surveys were relatively brief and contained only one question pertaining specifically to satisfaction with the Tanzanian government. In addition, the pre-survey contained a range of questions on other topics intended to mask the true focus of the study, including questions about Tanzanian hip hop music and the national football team. After completing the pre-surveys, the participants in the Internet group were set up with accounts at
their assigned Internet café, where I had pre-paid for each individual to receive 75 hours of Internet time to be used over the next two months. I also hired two additional assistants to offer participants in-depth tutorials on Internet use, including how to navigate from one page to another, conduct searches, and set up email accounts. Participants in the control group were not given Internet access at this time, but they were informed that they would be contacted again in two months, at which point they would receive an equitable amount of free Internet use.

Over the next two months, we made no effort to direct how the participants used the Internet. Nor did we electronically monitor their Internet use. We avoided such oversight in order to minimize external validity concerns and to avoid infringing on privacy boundaries. However, the owners of the Internet cafés did record the amount of Internet time that each individual used. After the two month period concluded, my assistant and I contacted individuals in both the experimental and control groups by telephone and offered 3,000 TZS (2 USD) to complete the post-treatment survey. Of the 140 original participants, 63 members of the Internet group and 64 members of the control group were successfully reached and then completed the post-treatment survey.

According to the café owner’s records, members of the Internet group spent an average of 42 hours on the Internet during the treatment period, with a standard deviation of 33 hours. Self-reports gathered through the post-treatment survey paint a picture of how these individuals used the Internet. 95% of the participants reported that they had an email address, 64% reported that they had a Facebook account, and 64% reported reading blogs while online. 61% of participants reported that they “mostly” used the media to look for information and news, 32% reported that they “mostly” used the Internet for social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, etc.), and 13% stated that they “mostly” used the Internet for entertainment (e.g. to watch videos on Youtube, to listen to music, etc.). Finally, 15% of participants stated that they followed
election information regularly on the Internet, 22% stated they followed election information sometimes.

Turning to whether participants mostly visited Tanzania-specific, Africa-specific, or Western websites, the majority of participants preferred to traverse websites from a wide range of sources. Only 17% of the participants reported that they mostly frequented Tanzania websites and 23% indicated that they mostly visited non-Tanzanian sites, with the remaining 60% stating that they preferred to visit both Tanzanian and non-Tanzanian websites. Moreover, only 14% of individuals reported that they preferred to exclusively frequent Western-based websites and 18% reported a strong preference for African-based websites, while 65% indicated that their Internet diet regularly consisted of both Western and African websites.

The fact that over one-third of the participants specifically sought out information about the election online, and nearly two-thirds reported mostly using the Internet to gather news and information, should somewhat assuage doubts regarding individuals’ desire or likelihood to be exposed to information about their own government’s activities while online. Moreover, the amount of political information that is communicated incidentally or though through heuristics should also not be taken for granted. Quite simply, one need not actively seek out political information to be exposed to it—particularly online, where individuals often “bump into” news after going online for another purpose (Horrigan 2006). Moreover, public opinion research has confirmed the tendency for political information to be communicated through entertainment-oriented sources, as a result of piggy-backing (Baum 2003). Consider one such anecdote from this experiment, in which a young woman clad in a full abaya (i.e. buibui) spent over an hour scouring a website of Western women’s apparel. It does not take much of a leap of imagination to surmise that this woman was exposed to more information than simply how women in Western countries dressed differently.
Results

Commensurate with the expectations of random assignment, members of the Internet group and control groups did not differ significantly from one another in demographic terms. The average age of the participants in the experiment was 25-years old (standard deviation = 10 years); their education was completed, on average, at the age of 21, which is approximate to some “senior” secondary school or professional training (standard deviation = 3 years); 21% reported some form of current part-time or full-time employment and 73% were current students, and 67% were male. Clearly, the demographic profile of participants in this experiment tended to be younger, more male, and more educated than the Tanzanian population at large. However, these demographics are highly reflective of the actual demographic profile of “early users” in developing nations (Christensen & Levinson 2003), thus promoting the external validity of this study by sharing the same demographic profile as actual early Internet users in developing nations.

Turning to whether the Internet negatively influenced participants’ evaluations of the presidential election, using a two-sample t-test, members of the Internet group were 15%-age points less likely to believe that the election was conducted fairly and impartially (p-value ≤ .04). This does not necessarily mean that they were more likely to state definitively that the election was conducted unfairly, however. Rather, individuals in the Internet group who were not willing to state that the election was fair were roughly equally likely to answer “Don’t Know” (33%) as state that the election was actually unfair (25%). Nevertheless, it is clear that members of the Internet group were less certain of the fairness and the impartiality of the election compared to their peers in the control group. (Please see Table 1.)

As for perceptions of the recount, in this instance it was the case that members of the Internet group were significantly more likely to believe that the recount was conducted unfairly
when compared to the control group, by 12%-age points (p-value ≤.06). (Please see Table 2.) Of additional interest, attitudes about the fairness of the recount were largely correlated with Facebook use. Facebook users were 19%-age points more likely to believe that the recount was not conducted fairly and impartially compared to non-Facebook users in the Internet group (p-value ≤.06). However, they were also 24%-age points more likely to declare that the recount was fair (p-value ≤.04). In other words, Facebook users were much more likely to have a concrete opinion in either direction, and therefore less likely to answer “Don’t Know” compared to non-Facebook users—specifically, 43%-age points less likely (p-value ≤.01).

Returning to perceptions of the election itself, the difference between Facebook users and non-Facebook users traveled in only one direction—individuals with Facebook accounts were consistently more likely to believe the election was conducted unfairly compared to non-Facebook users, by 15%-age points (p-value ≤.09). Clearly, there are demographic and attitudinal characteristics that likely influenced which individuals in the experiment’s Internet group created a Facebook account. Therefore, it may be the case that it was these characteristics, in combination with using the Internet in general, which drove this effect—as opposed to Facebook use specifically. However, the finding that, among the same group of Facebook users, perceptions of the fairness of the recount were polarized while attitudes about the election were not raises interesting questions regarding the unique space that Facebook may occupy in online communication.

For example, consider the timing of the follow-up questionnaire as one potential explanation for the divergent evaluations of the fairness of the recount and election among Facebook users. The collection of the post-treatment surveys took approximately one week and began the day after the recount concluded and Kikwete was officially declared the winner. It may be the case that the information and discussion regarding the recount was still in flux due
to the shorter timeframe, and therefore had yet to coalesce around a specific perspective, as may have been the case for information about the election. On the other hand, it may be the case that the recency and the saliency of the recount, and the discontent and agitation that it was still promoting, rendered Facebook the appropriate venue for the online discussion and airing of doubts and anger from supporters of the respective parties and candidates.

Before leaving the discussion, it may be further illuminating to consider the effect of the Internet on closely related attitudes. For example, did Internet use highlight the deficit of available information through traditional outlets? This conjecture is supported by the finding that members of the Internet group were 9%-age points less likely to indicate that they trusted the Tanzanian news media (p-value ≤ .07). Sticking with the consideration of trust, however, it does not appear that distrust of the traditional news media necessarily extended to government institutions—the differential in how much trust members of the Internet versus control groups placed in the political parties and the government in general fell well outside the range of statistical significance. Substantively, the Internet group was, on average, slightly less trusting of the parties (-7%-age points), but more trusting of the government in general (11%-age points).

What is interesting, however, is that members of the Internet group were significantly more likely to trust the Tanzanian police force—by 12%-age points (p-value ≤ .1). Recall that the police force played a central and visible role during both the election and recount, in terms of making sure that the election was conducted fairly—including arresting individuals caught with multiple vote cards—but also in quelling the protest and violent outbreaks in the days before and after the election. This has interesting implications, therefore, for how the police force’s activities during the election may have been captured and highlighted online.

Finally, on a relatively less optimistic note, compared to the control group, members of the Internet group were 11%-age points less likely to vote (p-value ≤ .09). Taking into account
that they were also less likely to believe the election was conducted fairly and impartially, this suggests that—although the Internet may have equipped these individuals with more robust information upon which to base their evaluations of the integrity of the election—this supposed democratic boon may carry a negative side effect. In this case, it appears that Internet users who became more aware of electoral abuses, potentially also became less likely to believe that their vote mattered as a consequence. After all, the belief that an election is not being conducted fairly can produce two very divergent responses—while some people may respond by protesting and taking to the streets, others may simply throw up their hands and stay home. Perhaps, then, both Internet cynics and enthusiasts have it partially right, and—as suggested by the conflicting body of extant literature—the Internet will prove to be a double-edged sword for democracy and democratization.

**Conclusion**

Based on the results of a randomized field experiment in Tanzania in the months leading up to the 2010 Tanzanian General Election, Internet use significantly diminished individuals’ perception of the fairness and impartiality of both the election and the subsequent recount. This suggests that the Internet’s potential to precipitate civic activity not only travels through its capacity to reduce the costs of political organization once individuals are moved to action. Instead, the Internet can also alter the cost-benefit calculus of civic behavior by expanding the range of information individuals have regarding their government’s actual performance. And, those instances in which the Internet induces citizens to develop more negative evaluations of their governments’ performance may translate, in some cases, into increased perceived benefits from political action and organization.

However, as indicated by the finding that members of the disaffected Internet group were also less likely to vote suggests that the Internet’s potential to alter the cost-benefit
calculus of civic behavior may, in other instances, actually decrease individuals' propensity to engage in certain political acts. Therefore, while the mirror-holding and window-opening functions of the Internet alter individuals' evaluations of their government and political system, it is not always the case that these evaluations will produce tangible changes in political behavior and organization. Moreover, when it does, there is no guarantee that this political behavior and organization will always be oriented toward positive, more-democratic ends. As such, it is the imperative of researchers to continue to uncover and test the factors that determine when and where the Internet will alter evaluations, as well as when and where these evaluations will result in actual political behavior and organization. Unpacking all of the factors conditioning this relationship will undoubtedly continue to prove a complex and consuming endeavor, but doing so will better-position the discipline to predict when and where the Internet will succeed in tipping the scales in favor of political action.

Works Cited


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Table 1. Two-sample t-test of the difference in the percentage of individual that believed the election was conducted fairly and impartially

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>% Believed Election Fair</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>95% Conf. Interval</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control group</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45 to 69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internet group</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29 to 55</td>
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<td>Difference</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2 to 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Probability (Internet group < Control group) = 96%
p-value = .04
Table 2. Two-sample t-test of the difference in the percentage of individual that believed the recount was NOT conducted fairly and impartially

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>% Believing Recount Fair</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>95% Conf. Interval</th>
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<td>5.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-26 to 3</td>
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Probability (Internet group < Control group) = 94%
p-value = .06