Good news! Sage Press has generously decided to ungate all of the Sage Press articles referenced by Erica Chenoweth in her recent series of posts on military interventions here at The Monkey Cage. They are now available free to all (for I believe the next 30 days) here:
I am delighted to announce the launch of a new journal, Research and Politics, of which I am one of the general editors together with Catherine de Vries and Bernard Steunenberg. Sage will publish the new journal.R&P is going to be quite different from most existing academic publications. The journal provides a venue for scholars to communicate rapidly and succinctly important new insights to the broadest possible audience while maintaining the highest standards of quality control. We will do so by publishing short (up to 4,000 word) articles that are published on-line on an open access basis. Quality control is assured through peer review and a large team of associate editors which consists of esteemed political scientists across the subfields. We strive for speedy publication through a quick review process and continuous publication (i.e. no need to wait for the next issue), although we will uphold limits to how many articles we publish.
We expect to attract a wide range of articles. We will surely publish articles that look very much like regular research articles, only shorter. But we also expect and hope to attract articles that are less easily placed in regular peer-reviewed journals. Indeed, we suspect that some articles that would contain valuable knowledge are currently not being written because they do not fit neatly in the straight jacket of what most journals expect or can deliver.
For example, the time lags in the regular publishing process may be a real obstacle for those who wish to publish predictions or cutting edge analyses of current events or policy debates. Open access should be crucial to these types of analyses, as one would wish to reach the broadest audience possible. A strict replication policy, peer review, and the active involvement of academic specialists differentiates this journal from public affairs journals. By adopting the norms and standards of academia and thus appealing to the incentives of academics, we hope to get more academics involved in public debates without sacrificing rigor.
What a great idea! Elsevier Press has decided to make the 5 most popular articles from Electoral Studies during the first half of the year available for free download through the end of October. (Caveat: I am on the Board of Editors of Electoral Studies, but had nothing to do with this decision.) Would love to see more political science journals adopting such a policy, and would be happy to give a similar shout out in The Monkey Cage if any publishers are interested.
Here are the five articles with links:
Although I am mainly reporting this as a public service announcement, it is also pretty interesting to note that four of these five article are on turnout (and the fifth is an article accompanying an extremely popular dataset), and two are meta-analyses of previous studies. Are we witnessing a renaissance of the study of turnout? A growing popularity of meta-analyses in political science?
Continuing our new series of collaborations with political science journals, we are pleased to present the following guest post from University of Georgia political scientist Ines Levin discussing her article “Political Inclusion of Latino Immigrants: Becoming a Citizen and Political Participation” that appears in the current issue of American Politics Research. In conjunction with this post, SAGE will make the article freely available to all for the next 30 days; you can download it here.
The ongoing debate on the Senate immigration bill raises important questions for political science. In particular, what are the consequences of providing a path to citizenship for the economic and political advancement of immigrants? Just as it is often taken for granted that legal status and citizenship contribute to economic mobility, the notion that acquisition of citizenship contributes to the political incorporation of immigrants is often taken as a self-evident truth. Acquiring citizenship is certainly necessary for the political inclusion of immigrants, since it is the only way for individuals to gain access to basic forms of political participation in a democracy, such voting and contributing to electoral campaigns. But is citizenship sufficient for ensuring broad political incorporation? If this were the case, one would expect naturalized immigrants to be more deeply engaged than their non-citizen counterparts when it comes to non-electoral community and political activities open to all immigrants. These questions are addressed in my current article in American Politics Research.
A naïve comparison of the behavior of naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants based on data from the 2006 Latino National Survey indicates that acquisition of citizenship might indeed stimulate involvement beyond the ballot box. While both naturalized and non-naturalized Latino immigrants are very likely to say that they would work with others through groups or organizations to deal with issues that need to be addressed, the naturalized are more likely to report that they participated in the activities of a group, tried to contact a government official, or volunteered at their child’s school. In particular, the naturalized are more likely to say that they participated in the activities of groups including non-Latino members or that they contacted non-Latino officials relative to their non-naturalized counterparts.
But the unequal involvement of naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants is not necessarily caused by differences in citizenship status. Immigrants who have and have-not acquired citizenship come from different countries (and also from different regions within the home country, in the case of Mexican immigrants), settle in different areas of the U.S., and have different levels of pre-immigration political involvement. Both types of immigrants also have unequal access to politically relevant resources long thought to affect political participation such as educational attainment, income, and English language skills. Moreover, the naturalized have usually spent more years in U.S. (and in their current homes) and are typically older. Differences like these might explain both observed inequalities in non-electoral participation and differences in citizenship status. Indeed, the probability of acquiring citizenship conditional on the above-mentioned attributes is considerably lower among the non-naturalized than among the naturalized, suggesting that the process of assignment to citizenship status is anything but random.
One way to address the question of whether differences in political engagement are driven by citizenship itself, or by differences between the kind of people who have naturalized and those who have not, is to “match” the research subjects on measures such as length of residence. After using propensity score matching to control for observable differences between naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants, inequalities in political participation are greatly reduced. While the naturalized are still more likely to participate in most non-electoral activities than similar non-citizens, differences are small and no longer significant. The exception is contacting government officials, although a sensitivity analysis indicates that differences in propensity to contact are highly sensitive to bias that could have been caused by differences in unobserved factors between both immigrant types.
In sum, when one compares similar naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants, the resulting evidence lends little support to the hypothesis that naturalization leads to greater political involvement. Although it seems intuitive that going through the naturalization process should lead to greater attachment to the American identity and principles – including a sense of the importance of fulfilling one’s civic duty – a number of factors might reduce the effectiveness of naturalization for making more involved citizens, including: absence of civic infrastructure in settlement areas, experiences of discrimination, and inadequate access to resources. As long as immigrants are exposed to some of these limiting factors, the provision of a path to citizenship might not be enough to ensure that the naturalization process produces civically engaged citizens who are capable of bearing participation costs.
Note: I thank Sean Ingham and Alex Street for their very useful comments on this blog post.
Continuing our new series of collaborations with political science journals, we are pleased to present the following guest post from University of Wisconsin Milwaukee political scientist Kathleen Dolan discussing her article “Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters?” that appears in the current issue of Political Research Quarterly. In conjunction with this post, SAGE will make the article freely available to all for the next 30 days; you can download it here.
As the latest round of speculation about Hillary Clinton’s intentions regarding the 2016 presidential race begin to heat up, we are reminded by some critics that she is just too darned old to be president. Of course, attacking a candidate’s perceived vulnerabilities is a tried and true element of politics. But negative attention to the age and appearance of a woman candidate has a certain resonance in our politics because it stirs concerns of sexism and condescension toward these women.
We can easily conjure up anecdotal examples of high-level women candidates who have been subjected to criticism and attacks because of their age (too young or too old), appearance (too beautiful or too plain), or family status (whether mothers or childless). Ask Sarah Palin, Jari Askins, or Kelly Ayotte what is it like for women at times on the campaign trail. For support, consult the extensive literature in political science that examines the gender stereotypes people hold about what women and men candidates are like and what they can successfully do in office. Research on female and male stereotypes often warns that these attitudes can work against women candidates if voters perceive them not to possess the “right” skills and abilities for office.
However, look closer and you will see that we have less evidence of the negative impact of gender stereotypes on women candidates than we thought. Much of the existing data comes from experiments and hypotheticals, rather than from measures of attitudes connected with actions toward real candidates in real contests. In 2010, in order to bring new data to bear on these issues, I conducted a survey of 3150 U.S. adults in 29 states, designed to gather information about abstract gender stereotypes, specific evaluations of candidates running for office, and vote choice. These data allow me to link the gender stereotypes people may (or may not) hold with their specific actions – candidate evaluations and vote choice – in these elections.
I find very little support for the concern that abstract gender stereotypes hurt, or help, women candidates when they run against men. For Republican women candidates, none of a range of policy and trait stereotypes is significantly related to any of the candidate evaluations voters make about their traits or abilities. That is to say that stereotyped ideas about women’s superiority on education issues or men’s greater leadership abilities had no bearing on evaluating the policy abilities or traits of the specific Republican women candidates in these House races. For Democratic women, the only negative impact of stereotypes is that respondents who see women as less able to handle “male” policies areas like the economy and military in the abstract evaluated the Democratic woman candidate in their House race as less well-suited to deal with these issues than her male opponent.
However, this limited impact for stereotypes on evaluations doesn’t translate into an impact on the thing that matters most to candidates – vote choice. Examining the impact of abstract stereotypes on vote choice alongside traditional political influences such as political party, incumbency status, candidate spending clearly demonstrates that stereotypes have no direct impact on vote choice. Stereotypes also have no indirect impact through candidate evaluations. Instead, the factors that predict whether a voter will choose a woman candidate for the House are the same things that predict vote for a man. Overwhelmingly, people vote for the candidate of their political party, regardless of the sex of the candidate. In every analysis, a shared party identification between the respondent and woman candidate was the most important influence in determining vote for a woman and no stereotyped attitudes were significantly related to vote choice.
Continuing our new series of collaborations with political science journals, we are pleased to present the following guest post from University of Western Washington political scientist Todd Donovan to discuss his article with University of Iowa political scientist Caroline Tolbert ”Do Popular Votes on Rights Create Animosity Toward Minorities?” that appears in the current issue of Political Research Quarterly. In conjunction with this post, SAGE will make the article freely available to all for the next 30 days; you can download it here.
Americans regularly make major decisions about minorities and minority rights via the purely majoritarian process of direct democracy. Conflict over the substance of these policies occasionally reaches the US Supreme Court, but effects of the process of direct democracy on perceptions of minorities receive little attention. My recent study of campaigns against same sex marriage (Minnesota Law Review), and research I’ve conducted with Caroline Tolbert published recently in Political Research Quarterly, highlight some concerns about the process. Campaigns against a minority right appear similar to campaigns against the minority itself, as campaigns target the minority as a threat to the majority.
Voters have banned the sale of land to Asians, repealed fair housing legislation, repealed school desegregation, prohibited undocumented workers from receiving public services, and repealed public affirmative action programs. Thirty one states – including California with Prop. 8 in 2008 – voted to ban same sex marriage. Beyond any policy effects, our study of public opinion found that the anti-marriage campaigns affected what people thought about lesbians and gays. We found animosity toward lesbian and gays increased in 2004 among religious people living in states where marriage was on the ballot.
When the constitutionality of these popularly enacted policies are challenged in court, the primary legal issues may involve how the laws are being applied, and 14th Amendment equal protection claims. These were at issue in Romer v. Evans, when the Court overturned Colorado’s voter approved law prohibiting “special rights” for lesbians and gays. This June, the Court largely avoided this when, in Hollingsworth v Perry, they decided that Prop. 8’s proponents lacked standing to appeal an earlier district court ruling.
Neither of these cases gave explicit consideration to effects of the process of direct democracy on a minority group. This may change next session, when the Court considers a Michigan initiative that restricted affirmative action. One issue in Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action is whether the initiative changed policymaking affecting a racial minority (university admissions policy is now made via the ballot box) in a way that burdens the minority’s ability to affect the policy. Our research suggests the effects direct democracy may go deeper – if campaigns against a pro-minority policy stigmatize public perceptions of the minority group that benefits from the policy.
Opinion polls suggest that if Prop. 8 were put before California voters today, same sex marriage would be approved. Indeed, same sex marriage was approved by voters in Washington, Maine, and Maryland in 2012. Given this rapid and recent change in attitudes, a campaign against same-sex marriage (and by extension, against lesbians and gays) today may not have the capacity to stigmatize as it did before. Yet this need not mean that there isn’t potential for campaigns over other policies that benefit a minority to stigmatize public perceptions of the targeted minority group. A July 2013 Quinnipiac poll found that nearly three-quarters of Americans felt that universities should not be allowed to use race as a factor in admissions. A 2011 poll found most respondents agreeing that Muslims “undermine American culture.” In the context of attitudes such as these, direct democracy campaigns may not only produce outcomes that constrain the rights and influence of minorities, but may also generate increased animosity toward the group.
Continuing our new series of collaborations with political science journals, we are pleased to present the following guest post from University of British Columbia political scientist Gyung-Ho Jeong to discuss his article “Congressional Politics of U.S. Immigration Reforms: Legislative Outcomes Under Multidimensional Negotiations” that appears in the current issue of Political Research Quarterly. In conjunction with this post, Sage Publications will make the article freely available to all for the next 30 days; you can download it here.
According to Gallup polls, less than a quarter of the American public supports expansive immigration policies, while more than three quarters of people prefer the status quo or more restrictive policies. However, as illustrated by the past legislation (and recent debates) over the legalization of undocumented immigrants and increased level of legal immigration, immigration reforms tend to produce legislative outcomes that are not consistent with public opinion. Why?
While the conventional view explains this gap by citing the dominant role of organized pro-immigration interest groups—such as business interests and ethnic groups—in immigration policymaking, in a current article in Political Research Quarterly I present an alternative view that focuses on the nature of immigration debates in Congress.
Examining the politics of immigration reform in 1986, Artistide Zolberg observed that the conflict over immigration created “strange bedfellows” that cut across the ideological alignment of left and right. The reason is that immigration affects two different sets of concerns: economic and social/cultural. Economically, immigration affects the supply of labor, creating conflicts of interest between employers and employees. Socially, immigration affects national identity, culture, and ethnicity, pitting social liberals against social conservatives. In this article, I take this multidimensionality of immigration politics as a starting point to explain the gap between public opinion and legislative outcomes. In short, I demonstrate that the multidimensionality of immigration debates has allowed minorities of legislators to increase their influence by alternately forming coalitions with different groups. This has contributed to the seeming gap between public opinion and legislative outcomes even when legislators were not captured by pro-immigration groups.
Continuing our new series of collaborations with political science journals, we are pleased to present the following guest post from Georgetown University political scientist Keir A. Lieber and Dartmouth College political scientist Daryl G. Press to discuss their article “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists” that appears in the current issue of International Security. In conjunction with this post, MIT Press will make the article freely available to all for the next 30 days; you can download it here.
Nuclear terrorism is often described as the single biggest threat to U.S. national security. Analysts and policymakers worry that a hostile state could surreptitiously transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile material to a like-minded terror group, thus orchestrating a devastating attack on the United States or its allies while remaining anonymous and avoiding retaliation. This fear served as a key justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it helps drive current arguments in favor of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program.
We assessed the risk of nuclear attack-by-proxy by exploring the likelihood that a state could sponsor nuclear terrorism and remain anonymous. The question of attribution is crucial because a leader could only rationalize such an attack – and the decision to entrust terrorists with a vitally important mission – if doing so allowed the sponsor to plausibly avoid retaliation. If a leader did not care about retaliation, he would likely just conduct a nuclear strike directly – using missiles or special forces for targets beyond missile range. Giving nuclear weapons to terrorist only makes sense if there is a high likelihood of remaining anonymous after the attack.
We undertook two approaches to assess the likelihood of attributing a nuclear terror attack. First, because there is no data on the aftermath of nuclear terrorist attacks, we use the ample data on conventional terrorism to explore post-attack attribution rates – focusing on high-casualty terror attacks. The data, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Moreover, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the territory of the United States or a major U.S. ally – 97% (36 of 37) for incidents that killed 10 or more people.
Second, we explore the challenge of tracing culpability from the guilty terror group back to its state sponsor. Leaders considering giving nukes to terrorists would have a strong incentive to select a group with whom they have a long, trusting relationship – in this case, members of the terror group would need to keep the source of the nuclear weapon a secret indefinitely – and one with a track record of successful operations and professionalism. But those two constraints greatly facilitate the task of tracing an attack from a guilty group to its sponsor. As Table 1 shows, there are few established terrorist groups who have state sponsors; each of them has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon.
Our overarching conclusion is that neither a terror group, nor a state sponsor, would remain anonymous after a nuclear terror attack. Attributing nuclear terror incidents would be far easier than is typically suggested; passing weapons to terrorists, therefore, does not offer countries an escape from the constraints of deterrence. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.
Continuing our new series of collaborations with political science journals, we are pleased to present the following guest post from Tufts University political scientists (and blogger for Foreign Policy magazine) Daniel Drezner to discuss his article “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)” that appears in the current issue of International Security. In conjunction with this post, MIT Press will make the article freely available to all for the next 30 days; you can download it here.
For the past generation, U.S. military hegemony has been a concrete fact of life in world politics. The coming austerity to the defense budget has triggered anxiety from some quarters of the U.S. national security community. Advocates for a large military argue that the world is safer and more prosperous today precisely because of the United States’ outsized security capacities and deep engagement with the rest of the world. Critics, however, have long questioned whether military preeminence yields the benefits claimed by proponents. Given the unchallenged military supremacy of the United States, some argue that is natural to target cuts in defense spending after a decade of dramatic budgetary increases. While these debates over the economic merits and demerits of military predominance are common in policy circles, there is less discussion about their theoretical and empirical foundations. What can international relations scholarship say about the relative economic benefits of military primacy?
This article evaluates whether the economic benefits of military preeminence and deep engagement are as great as advertised. This evaluation proceeds by analyzing the most plausible arguments put forward for how military primacy can yield economic returns – and then assessing what the scholarly literature and evidence can conclude about those causal mechanisms. There are three plausible pathways: The “geoeconomic favoritism” argument posits that private capital will gravitate towards the military superpower because it provides the greatest security and safety to investors. The “geopolitical favoritism” argument is sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the costs of hegemony. Finally, the “public goods” logic argues that a unipolar distribution of military power is most likely to lead the provision of global public goods that accelerate global economic growth and reduce security tensions. These public goods benefit the hegemon as much if not more so than other actors.
After reviewing the evidence, each of these arguments is less empirically persuasive than is commonly articulated in policy circles. There is little evidence that primacy yields appreciable geoeconomic gains. The private sector responds positively to a country’s military capability, but only up to a point; military primacy is hardly a prerequisite for attracting trade and investment. The evidence for geopolitical favoritism is also modest. Geopolitical favoritism does occur, but only during periods of bipolarity. Economic exchange is actually less correlated with security ties under conditions of unipolarity. The evidence for public goods benefits is strongest; military primacy does appear to be an important adjunct to the creation of an open global economy and a reduction in militarized disputes and security rivalries. Military supremacy is only one component of unipolarity, however. A decline in the hegemon’s economic power undercuts many of unipolarity’s posited benefits. It is only full-spectrum unipolarity that yields appreciable economic gains. At a minimum, therefore, this article suggests that the economic benefits from military predominance alone have been exaggerated in policy and scholarly circles. The principal benefits that come with military primacy appear to flow only when coupled with economic primacy.
There are clear implications for U.S. foreign policy and fiscal policy. When applying the lessons from this analysis to U.S. grand strategy, the prescription seems clear; an overreliance on military preponderance is badly misguided. Again, it is not that military power is useless, it is that the law of diminishing marginal returns has kicked in. The United States would profit more from investing in nonmilitary power resources than in more military assets. An excessive reliance on military might, to the exclusion of other dimensions of power, well yield negative returns. Without a revived economy – and the global recognition of a renaissance in American economic power – the United States runs the risk of strategic insolvency. The United States needs to focus primarily on policies that will rejuvenate economic growth, accelerate job creation, and promote greater innovation and productivity. If the U.S. economy is perceived to be rebounding, then the biggest economic benefits that have been hypothesized to flow from military predominance will be preserved. As policymakers must choose between maintaining a large military and taking steps towards fiscal solvency, the results in this paper point strongly towards deeper cuts in defense expenditures.
As of today, The Journal of Experimental Political Science (JEPS), which I am co-editing with NYU political scientist Rebecca Morton, is open for submissions! JEPS is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal published by Cambridge University Press, and is the official journal of the Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association.
We will be using the Editorial Manager system for accepting submissions, so those interested in submitting a paper should login here; you can also register to serve as a reviewer. Before doing so, please go through the instruction for contributors (available here, and also posted below the break). Please also note that if you are currently a reviewer for the AJPS, JOP, or a member of the Experimental Political Science section, you should be receiving an email within the next 24 hours with a login and password for the JEPS Editorial Manager website. If you wait until you have received that email, you won’t have to go through the process of registering for the JEPS site (although you will receive a new password).
If you have research that fits the journal, please do not hesitate to submit it for consideration for publication!