My post on defection and collaboration is running behind schedule as I experience the administrative joys of planning a move, but in the meantime I wanted to highlight a couple of interesting pieces on Afghanistan.
The first is Thomas Ruttig’s “How Tribal are the Taleban?” Ruttig examines the social base of the Taliban and argues:
“The combination of vertical (religious/ideological) and horizontal (tribal) structures gives the Taleban movement a high degree of cohesion while maintaining organizational elasticity.”
and
“There is no organized or recognizable ‘moderate ’(or any other ‘political’) ‘faction’ in the Taleban to counterbalance the ‘religious’ hardliners.”
Local networks maintain the Taliban’s social embeddedness on the ground, but instead of these local communities becoming rival centers of power, the religious-clerical ties between key commanders pull them together into a more unified, interlocking whole. If Ruttig is right (Giustozzi suggests greater decentralization, though not fragmentation, here), this suggests that efforts to split the Taliban may be more difficult than US policymakers would hope. As unsavory as it will be, some kind of deal with the Taliban may end up happening, especially if Pakistan has its way.
This interview with Rory Stewart (author of the amazing The Places in Between) on Afghanistan is also worthwhile. He cautions that:
“The only way in which we could move beyond the counter-insurgency theory, or the hundred other theories which buttress and justify the Afghan war, is by rejecting their most basic underlying premises and objectives. Instead of trying to produce an alternative theory (on how to defeat the Taliban, create an effective, legitimate and stable Afghan state, stabilize Pakistan and ensure that al-Qaida could never again threaten the United States) we need to understand that however desirable such things might be, they are not things that we—as foreigners—can do.”
This is a reminder to scholars studying international interventions that it’s not just the policies and capabilities of the UN, US, or NGOs that matter (even if they are easy and/or pleasant to study): the incentives and perceptions of local political actors are essential to explaining outcomes.
{ 1 comment }
“This is a reminder to scholars studying international interventions that it’s not just the policies and capabilities of the UN, US, or NGOs that matter (even if they are easy and/or pleasant to study): the incentives and perceptions of local political actors are essential to explaining outcomes.”
Well said, and an essential fact. Too often failures of intervention are attributed to the wrong interventionist policy, rather than the fact that local actors, who have more skin in the game and must take a longer view, are ultimately the final arbiter of victory and defeat. Counterinsurgency, like any other foreign intervention (peacemaking/diplomatic mediation, foreign aid etc) can shape the situation and help at the margin, but but in the end the counterinsurgent is no kingmaker.
Comments on this entry are closed.