The introduction of UK legislation to create fixed-term (5 year) Parliaments is, assuming it becomes institutionalized, a major constitutional reform. But in the short term it is also an enforcement mechanism for the current coalition. The proposed legislation would prevent the Prime Minister from unilaterally deciding to dissolve Parliament and hold a new election – and it would prevent a narrow vote of ‘no confidence’ from doing the same thing. Instead, this would require a supermajority vote in the House of Commons—set at 55%.
That number is notable. After all, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats between them hold, er, 56% of the Commons. So—the LDs are protected in that the Tories can’t dissolve Parliament out from under them in hopes of gaining a majority in their own right. The Tories are protected in that the LDs can’t collude with Labour and the smaller parties along those lines, since that collusion could at best comprise 53% of Commons seats, even making unrealistic assumptions about Northern Irish DUP votes.
Instead, “we will all go together when we go…”
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I’m not sure I understand how this will work. Is there anything to stop a majority of MPs from voting away the supermajority requirement and dissolving parliament? What happens if 51% of MPs vote in favour of a motion of non-confidence?
This seems an incredibly shabby use of constitutional innovation– to enforce your coalition.
“Is there anything to stop a majority of MPs from voting away the supermajority requirement and dissolving parliament?”
Nothing, Parliament is still supreme. (All the more reason to join the rest of the world and have a Constitutional Convention).
“What happens if 51% of MPs vote in favour of a motion of non-confidence?”
Then a new government will have to be formed from the same Parliamentarians. No election.
“This seems an incredibly shabby use of constitutional innovation— to enforce your coalition.”
To be fair, the Liberal Democrats did want fixed term Parliaments anyway.
What I can’t understand is why the L-Ds didn’t hold out for a German style “constructive vote of confidence”; i.e. fixed terms and no government unseated by a no confidence vote unless a majority backs an alternative government. The Tories wouldn’t have much to lose by going along with this. Given how Labour hates the L-Ds, it would be hard to see their coalition falling this way. However, it could give Clegg his one chance to be PM, provided the cards fell just right.
This arrangement, tho, doesn’t seem to hold much promise of anything for the L-Ds unless their bench revolts en masse and backs Labour instead. And that may be why Cameron would have balked. He’s probably going to have to make some truly tough decisions directly and he might not trust Clegg’s hold on the troops.
“Is there anything to stop a majority of MPs from voting away the supermajority requirement and dissolving parliament?”
There is one thing: the House of Lords. The upper house couldn’t block a repeal of the fixed term law indefinitely, but it could block a dissolution of parliament for a year. And a year is a long time in politics.
“This seems an incredibly shabby use of constitutional innovation— to enforce your coalition.”
Every party is behaving opportunistically in this. The Lib-Cons have chosen a supermajority figure that suspiciously corresponds to the size of their current majority in parliament.
But Labour are being hypocrtical because they promised a fixed term parliament in their own manifesto, and have previously introduced a fixed term assembly in Scotland, with an even larger, 67% supermajority rule.
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