Stirrings in Russia? Protest and the Economy

by Joshua Tucker on February 3, 2010 · 1 comment

in Comparative Politics

2010_Kalingrad.jpg

The popular perception of Russia these days is of a largely autocratic country with a fairly docile mass public. But as I have written previously, the Putin era shares a not just passing resemblance with the Brezhnev era: economic prosperity (or at least economic growth) was offered up as a trade-off for allowing political power to remain exclusively in the hands of the Kremlin. We all know how that ultimately worked out for the Soviet Union, but to date any discussions of a replication in Putin’s Russia have seemed premature. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth noting that figures released earlier this week show that the Russian economy contracted by 7.9% in 2009, the worst the economy has performed since 1994, which includes the economic collapse following the 1998 ruble default that did so much damage to the credibility of Yeltsin’s reforms.

While last weekend’s Anti-Kremlin protests in Moscow followed the traditional recent pattern of small numbers of protesters and a forceful response by the Russian policy, a protest in Kalingrad, a far-Western Russian region that is located between Poland and Lithuania, took an unexpected turn when between upwards of 10,000 people joined the protest, and, perhaps even more unexpectedly, was widely reported on in Russian newspapers (although largely ignored on TV). The photo above is from the protest, and the sign mocks the ruling United Russia party by saying “United Russia – United Against Russia”. For those interested in more analysis, see this post on the always excellent Power Vertical blog at RFE/RL.

{ 1 comment }

Daragh McDowell February 4, 2010 at 10:57 am

Slight correction to the translation of the sign – It actually reads ‘United Russia – United Against Russians’ using the civic description for Russian citizens ‘Rossiyanin’ rather than the ethnic ‘Russkii.’

I think the comparison of the Putin era to the Brezhnev era is interesting, certainly in terms of the social contract. But it should be remembered that a lot of the growth during Brezhnev’s tenure was artificial, hence the joke ‘they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.’ Whatever his ills, Putin has definitely overseen a significant rise in living standards amongst the great mass of the people. Arguably we’re even seeing the nucleus of a genuine Russian ‘middle class’ forming. I don’t know what the long term effects of the financial crisis will be for Russia, but they do seem to have weathered it better than expected. Coupled with the effective end of economic subsidisation in the ‘near abroad’ states they might be on a much more sound economic footing.

Additionally, I still haven’t seen much in the way of organised opposition to the regime outside the rather sad ‘Other Russia’ coalition. Medvedev’s think tank just came out in favour of radical democratic reforms and renewed political competition. I doubt they’ll find a very receptive audience, but even a bit of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ could keep the regime significantly more vital than Brezhnev’s calcified politburo.

Comments on this entry are closed.

Previous post:

Next post: