(this is post #6 of 6 in a series on money and influence in politics)
Over the course of this week, I have been writing about money and influence in politics.
Today, I want to conclude by offering a few ideas on how we might improve the policymaking process and reduce any potentially distorting impact that lobbyists have.
As I see it, there are two factors that could potentially distort policymaking.
1)Government is very dependent on private lobbyists for information and expertise; and
2)Lobbyists overwhelmingly represent business, and there is a shortage of vigorous pluralist competition in Washington
So far, none of the recent lobbying reforms have addressed this.
The shortcoming of gift bans (a key part of the reforms adopted in 2007, in the wake of Jack Abramoff) is that they assume that quid pro quo corruption is the main problem. I see no problem with gift bans (as they help to create a slightly more arms-length relationship between government and lobbyists). But very few lobbyists these days rely on this kind of crude quid pro quo.
The shortcoming of lobbyist bans of the kind the Obama administration has adopted (preventing former lobbyists from joining the administration and limiting contact with lobbyists on certain issues) is that it stigmatizes lobbying and doesn’t value contributions that both former and current lobbyists actually can make.
I fear that attempts to stigmatize lobbying will only make it less transparent.
Stigmatizing lobbying also misses the point: There is nothing inherently evil about petitioning the government for redress of grievances. Most lobbyists are actually good, honest people. Some of them even represent causes I support.
What should we do, then?
First, we might wish to address the fact that increasingly, the preponderance of expertise and information on policy issues is coming from the private sector. I would argue there are three main ways to counter this:
1. Make it more attractive to build a career in government by improving pay and hours for Congressional staffers. Working on the Hill should be a desirable career goal, not a launching pad for a career in lobbying.
2. Increase funding for independent sources of expertise on Capitol Hill, including such organizations at the GAO, the CRS, and the CBO. The more resources these independent organizations have to develop expertise on a variety of topics, the less important private lobbying will be.
3. Create a National Organization of Experts. I’m envisioning here a loose network of academics who also serve as on-call experts on a variety of subjects. Here, also, is an opportunity to make social science a bit more relevant to the concerns of government (will this satisfy you, Senator Coburn? (probably not)). Members of Congress could put in requests for areas where they would like more expertise, and academics could compete for grant money in these areas, should they want to.
The second potentially troubling situation is the bias in the pressure system. There are simply more organizations representing business than potentially countervailing forces. This is a systemic problem. It has historically always been the case, and will likely to continue to be so (There are a many reasons why it will be easier for businesses to raise money for political action.)
My idea here is to develop some sort of public defender lobbying system – a federally-funded corps of well-trained lobbyists who can assist public interest organizations who can demonstrate that they are horribly outmatched on a given issue.
The rules of this obviously need to be worked out. (e.g. What would the threshold be for getting a public lobbyist? What kind of resources would be available?)
But just as public defenders help justice by ensuring that defendants who can’t furnish their own representation at least get professional help telling their side of the story, so public interest groups who are dwarfed by business groups (or can’t even get into the fight) ought to have some extra support to amplify their voice a little. If business lobbyists are confident they are acting in the public good, then surely they should not be worried about a little more competition?
These reform solutions are still admittedly inchoate, and so I’d particularly love some feedback.
Otherwise, this pretty much concludes my little guest-blogging series here at The Monkey Cage. Thanks for reading.
{ 17 comments }
The idea of having academics contribute is one I’ve had. I’d love to see an online tool for filtering feedback as well. For example, when they put a bill up for 72 hours lobbyists and academics can comment on it as in a wiki. Filter options could be used to view groups you want. For example a Senator wants to see what academics specializing in health policy and doctors have written on the bill. Filter options could be used to show only their comments and edits.
A publicly-funded lobbying corps is an interesting idea. To work well it would have to be funded more generously than many public defenders offices probably are.
Adding on LFC’s comment: A publicly-funded “lobbying corps” would also need a name that very cleverly hides the whole Your-tax-money-is-funding-lobbyists attacks that would inevitably come. Any suggestions anyone?
Lee, you say you “see no problem” with gift bans since lobbyists don’t rely on them. Do you think bans should be included, nonetheless? Also, forgetting quid pro quo issues and focusing on Members of Congress, wouldn’t a ban keep them from spending so much time at pay-for-access industry fundraisers?
Except that nothing you’ve shown so far persuades anyone except those already convinced that the multiplicity of business interests: 1) share the same interest, 2) should be opposed by labor/public interest when in fact labor/pi is often either irrelevant to the issue or sometimes on the same side as these interests.
This assumption that anything business supports should be automatically and reflexively opposed by someone in labor/pi is really odd. Where does this bizarre assumption come from? Ideology, I guess, because I don’t see the evidence for it.
With work no more persuasive than this coming out of ps, no wonder politicians want to eliminate funding.
I think it’s testimony to the insularity and ideological homogeneity within political science, and not the scholar at work, that a dissertation project can get this far without addressing such basic questions as have come up in these various blog posts.
Business may not always want what’s in the public interest, but public and private interest are not inexorably opposed. And since when is labor always advocating in the public interest? Their interests have always seemed pretty private and selfishly motivated to many observers.
To fail to even be aware that there is another way of viewing these questions other than through the author’s flawed assumptions is a pretty serious indictment of the narrowness and dare I say it, the irrelevance, of political science to the mainstream debate. The field just isn’t diverse enough to contribute credibly to that debate.
I think you’re exactly right about the need not to stigmatize lobbyists. I have been thinking for a while that some kind of public lobby is a sort of logical extension to the idea of public financing of campaigns. Even if public financing were to work out in the campaign field, there’s still all the time of the regular session when only a few organizations can afford to keep their representatives in contact with legislators on a regular basis. In practice, it’s hard to see how it could be worked out; perhaps I lack imagination.
On the provision of expertise, I wonder if you’re familiar with the career of Charles McCarthy? He’s one of the founders of modern legislative reference services, and his ideas for providing support to legislators extended even to creating a bill drafting service in Wisconsin (where he worked in the state library). It seems to have been a direct response to the issue of legislators knowing less about drawing up bills than the lobbyists and others who were supplying the expertise.
“With work no more persuasive than this coming out of ps, no wonder politicians want to eliminate funding.”
I hope you’re not suggesting that Tom Coburn is familiar with the work he proposes to de-fund! Making a show of trying to eliminate funding for grants within research agencies is actually a rather hackneyed stunt for congressional conservatives. It’s been done previously with NIH grants dealing with sex and with behavior, and with NSF grants in the environmental sciences, always unsuccessfully of course. It has absolutely nothing to do with the merit of the academic work involved. If political science has real issues, that’s purely coincidental to Coburn’s effort.
There are two ways to read the Drutman ‘evidence’. One way is to say that business doesn’t see labor and public interest groups (dub them pigs) as opponents because they are weak, underfunded and simply not there. Boo hoo hoo, poor labor/pigs, they need help. This is the Drutman story.
The other way to view it is to say that business has a multiplicity of small and technical interests, some big, but most very small that are of no major concern to labor, or that labor doesn’t choose to put any effort into for good reason. That seems at least as likely.
So if the latter is true, then fabricating an artificial opposition to reflexively fend off every request of every business lobbyist is just wasteful nonsense and could only come from an egghead, irrelevant, political scientist.
As for Coburn, one must ask why political science has such a bad name that it becomes a target or stunt for congressional conservatives? I suspect that it’s because there are hardy any non-liberal political scientists who are not beginning from basic assumptions such as:
Labor = GOOD, Public Spirited.
Business = BAD, Hostile to public interest
These assumptions are just taken for granted in this field. Unbelievable.
It’s the Drutman tone to so much political science that makes it an easy target. As for not knowing the content, who needs to? The content is totally predictable!
Lee can defend himself on the merits. But I’m amazed that so many of you are willing to dismiss Lee’s research on the basis of what he presents in a handful of blog posts. Don’t you think that the dissertation might — just might — tackle a few of the issues that you raise? Put it this way, if it’s something that you can think of in 2 seconds after reading a blog post, it’s probably something he’s thought about.
Before anyone else feels the need to spout off about Lee’s work — not to mention weirdly condemn the whole of political science because of it — I recommend actually reading the research he has posted on his website, to which he linked in comments to a previous post and is available at leedrutman.com.
Well, John, for weeks now people have been wondering what’s up Tom Coburn’s behind when it comes to political science.
I haven’t read all the work, but from the supposedly representative excerpts, here’s the problem:
You’ve got a field full of people whose ideological conclusions follow only when you make the leap to grant their equally ideological premises. Sorry, but that ain’t science.
A science doesn’t always reach the liberal conclusion. But the way research is set-up in political science, if the conclusion has any political relevance it all, it is liberal. Drutman is just a convenient example.
Now why do you suppose Tom Coburn and his ilk are so suspicious?
Political science, the way its done by present members of the field, is pretty much viewed as opinion dressed up in a few tables and numbers.
I think this is a correct way to put it.
Political scientists have a hard time writing to please their academic colleagues, the vast bulk of whom are liberals, and at the same time writing for a broader audience of mainstream policymakers whose views run the gamut from left to right.
Look at Gelman’s posts, for instance. Whenever he writes something that touches on a conservative theme, he falls all over himself clumsily apologizing for it. This is because his credibility among his political science buddies is at stake if he sounds too conservative — ironic given his statistical prowess and essentially positivist assumptions. He obviously isn’t self-conscious enough to see how silly this looks.
But then political scientists whine when people like the Tom Coburns out there dis them.
Policy schools have had somewhat better luck speaking to a broader audience of policymakers, and obtaining credibility and relevance, but their ranks are more diverse. And their political and policy relevant conclusions aren’t quite so predictable.
Alben: Since you “haven’t read all the work,” you don’t know the evidence and thus you can’t claim that Lee’s conclusions are driven by ideology. You’re the one whose opinions are unsupported by facts.
And just so you have one clear counter-example to your thesis that all political science reaches politically liberal conclusions: I spent the better part of the week after the election blogging about why Obama’s victory didn’t mean that there was some Democratic realignment afoot, nor did it mean that he had a mandate to pursue liberal policies. This was hardly a hospitable conclusion for liberals, but it is a conclusion well-supported by political science literature and evidence.
John, Like your occasional blog post is going to be the corrective for a field whose biases are so well-entrenched and established?
Imbalance? What would Drutman’s ratios look like if calculated for this field? Embarrassing. But I guess academia doesn’t need vigorous competition. Science doesn’t either.
Why does Drutman make the ridiculously one-sided assumptions he does? (Rah-Rah labor for the people; Boo-boo, business sucks) Because everyone who has trained him, all the ps lit he’s citing, has put forward very constrained views on the subject matter.
And ultimately his success in the field will depend on spouting a particular range of conclusions that will tickle the ears of the tenure reviewers.
John, Like your occasional blog post is going to be the corrective for a field whose biases are so well-entrenched and established?
Imbalance? What would Drutman’s ratios look like if calculated for this field? Embarrassing. But I guess academia doesn’t need vigorous competition. Science doesn’t either.
Why does Drutman make the ridiculously one-sided assumptions he does? (Rah-Rah labor for the people; Boo-boo, business is hostile to the public good) Because everyone who has trained him, all the ps lit he’s citing, has put forward very constrained views on the subject matter.
And ultimately his success in the field will depend on spouting a particular range of conclusions that will tickle the ears of the tenure reviewers.
Lee, thanks again for this series of posts on lobbying. Good job summarizing the extant literature and applying it to (and refuting) the popular and all-too-often uninformed discussion of lobbying and its reform. Your national org of experts idea is a good one, and reminds me of Rick Hall’s “modest” campaign finance reform proposal that would set up a non-profit to counter overly lopsided campaign spending in congressional races. Its appeal is that it would discourage lopsided spending, thus reducing the need to raise more and more money. In terms of lobbying spending, perhaps a non-profit organization, not funded by the government but instead by a non-ideological, non-partisan foundation, could act as a clearinghouse for experts to voice in on policy issues that are dominated by some interests (presumably business-oriented interests). The only problem I see is that many (most?) issues only attract the attention of one or two interest groups in a particular niche, so the bias is rooted in the fact that nobody but those select few have a stake in the debate (see Baumgartner et al 2009). Why would having public defender-like lobbyists even matter if there’s no “other side” to argue in these under-the-radar issues? It’s a good idea, but in practice I think it would be limited in its applicability due to the nature of niche policy making in Washington.
I would like to respond to several provocative comments and questions that have come up here.
Two lines of criticism have come up that I want to respond to:
1. I AM A MANICHEAN WHO THINKS LABOR IS GOOD AND BUSINESS IS BAD
One comment suggested that I think that:
“Labor = GOOD, Public Spirited.
Business = BAD, Hostile to public interest”
I do not make such a simplistic assumption and I’m not sure what I wrote that makes some folks think that I do. (Though I do detect a theory among some folks all political scientists are business-hating liberals)
What I think is important, and I hardly think this is controversial, is that there is at least rough parity in the representation that these groups have in Washington. I have faith in pluralism – that if there is balanced representation on both sides of an issue, something resembling the public interest will arise.
Business and labor have different missions. Labor is fundamentally concerned with employee wages and conditions. Business is fundamentally concerned with return to shareholders. “Public interest” groups, meanwhile, tend to be concerned with externalities of business, such as the environment or product safety or consumer protection.
Business groups tend to put a lot of faith in the market and think the best way to achieve the public good is to let businesses innovate and have government regulate lightly. Labor and “public interest” groups want a stronger government because they don’t believe that the market by itself yields adequate working conditions and corrects well for externalities
I would argue that any of these concerns/philosophies, taken to extreme, leads to an unproductive imbalance in the policies governing the economy. I would not advocate a politics dominated by labor and public interest groups in which business had miniscule representation as much as I would advocate labor and public interest groups having tiny representation.
2: THE DIVERSITY OF BUSINESS INTERESTS MEANS THAT PLURALISM IS ALIVE AND WELL
I will admit that the data I have presented here has tended to reify business, and it is true: the business community is incredibly diverse, and the interests of different industries and even companies within those industries are often incredibly diverse.
And yes, there is even some fighting among different industries. (The Time Magazine article I posted, for example, is about the fight between the generics and the pharmaceutical companies.)
But I would contend that on the issues on which business is opposed to labor and public interest groups transcend industry. But perhaps I am missing something: Are there certain industries that are advocating more environmental, consumer, or workplace safety regulations? If not, it just means that the countervailing groups are spread thin to compete with multiple industries.
As for the arguments about business lobbying on distributive issues, like earmarks and authorizations: I agree! There is a lot of business lobbying on these issues. Is it any coincidence that the number of earmarks is exploding, or the number of special exemptions in the tax code is expanding at an ever-increasing rate?
My bet: fewer business lobbyists would mean fewer earmarks. You don’t see public interest groups lobbying for them. In fact, many good government public interest groups are lobbying against them at a general level.
Also, John Kaz writes:
“The other way to view it is to say that business has a multiplicity of small and technical interests, some big, but most very small that are of no major concern to labor, or that labor doesn’t choose to put any effort into for good reason. That seems at least as likely.”
I agree! Business does have many small and technical interests. Some of which may not be of interest to labor per se.
But the cumulative impact of these unmonitored small and technical changes may be quite large, and the fact that nobody is asking questions about whether many these small and technical changes actually make sense seems somewhat troubling from a policymaking process standpoint.
Two other questions I would like to respond to:
Tim La Pira asks: “Why would having public defender-like lobbyists even matter if there’s no “other side” to argue in these under-the-radar issues? It’s a good idea, but in practice I think it would be limited in its applicability due to the nature of niche policy making in Washington.”
It’s true, there is a lot of niche policymaking in Washington. But I suspect a lot of niche policymaking could use a bit more public scrutiny. Take changes to the tax code or tariff adjustments, two common niche areas. If there were some public watchdog that did a public cost-benefit analysis on these issues, what would happen? My hypothesis is that if we brought more scrutiny to niche policymaking, we might find that many of these programs are little more than direct subsidies to particular companies or industries, with little accounting to see if the subsidy actually delivered the promised benefit.
David Cass asks: “Lee, you say you “see no problem” with gift bans since lobbyists don’t rely on them. Do you think bans should be included, nonetheless? Also, forgetting quid pro quo issues and focusing on Members of Congress, wouldn’t a ban keep them from spending so much time at pay-for-access industry fundraisers?”
Yes, I think gift bans are a good idea. And, David, I think you’ve hit on one of the main arguments for public financing of elections: It means members of Congress can spend more time legislating and educating themselves on issues and less time cold-calling for cash and sitting at fundraisers. (I think there are a lot of members of Congress who actually wish they had more time to do their own homework on what it is they are supposed to legislating on.)
Millard: I appreciate your close readings of my posts. However, I should remind you that intonation is notoriously difficult to convey in writing. My posts here and in my other blogs are designed to explore ideas (and possibly to entertain), not to push any political agenda.
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