Here was the question over at Politico’s Arena yesterday:
The right ticked off. The left ticked off. A muddle in the middle. How did Obama get into this mess? How does he get out of it?
You can click here to see the various responses. In reading the answers, though, I was curious as to how more political scientists, especially those who study the American presidency, the politics of health care reform, or legislative politics more generally, might have responded, so I thought I would throw it out to the readers of The Monkey Cage as well. Is Obama in a mess now? Or is this somehow “typical” of how big policy reforms get made? If he is in a mess, does history or theory suggest any particular ways for him to get out of it?
To kick off the discussion, here was my answer (with the appropriate caveat that in my day job I study mass political behavior in post-communist countries!):
He gets out of it once a bill passes. As soon as something passes, the narrative will switch to how amazing it was that Obama actually pulled off healthcare reform, something that has bedeviled politicians for ages and even stymied the Clinton administration. At that point, the fact that there was opposition on the left and the right will make the success seem that much more impressive, as will the fact that administration has been active on so many fronts at once. No bill, though, and it looks like a failure. So I think that’s why you will probably see increasing flexibility on the part of the administration to make sure they pass something.
And as an aside, didn’t Obama run as a “post-partisan pragmatist”? If so, should we really be shocked that in perhaps the most complicated policy area that exists today, his attempt at reform is alienating the left and the right and constantly evolving? Maybe that’s what post-partisan pragmatism looks like. And maybe, just maybe, that’s the only way you get reform on an issue as difficult as healthcare reform today.
Of course, since I wrote that, the big news story today is that the White House is now considering trying to pass the bill without bipartisan support (see here and here).
Looking forward to your comments and thoughts.
{ 12 comments }
Hi Josh,
A few points…
1. In my research on presidents’ influence in domestic lawmaking, 1953-2004, “health” issues are significantly less likely to result in a new law moving in the president’s preferred direction, all else equal (the others policy domains were civil rights, education, community and housing, energy, social welfare, and taxes).
2. The reason, I think, is the legislative politics here are thorny. The high-stakes means a myriad of motivated citizens: doctors, nurses, insurance companies, small businesses, labor unions, and on and on. Adding presidential politics and today’s cable news world to the mix only further complicates matters. Thus it’s not hard to imagine lawmakers might not want to push this one through Kingdon’s “consensus mode of decision.”
3. That said, the combination of 1 and 2 are what make the president necessary in these kinds of cases. For it is only the president who can marshal the resources necessary to overcome inertia and, in fact, help forge a winning coalition. It is rarely easy, and never pretty, but nor is it trivial.
4. Finally, I’m with you that all this hand-wringing turns to more celebration in the stylized reporting after passage. Despite the ups and downs of the process, whereupon Ronald Reagan signed the landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986 into law, the corresponding New York Times article concluded that while others were involved, “…no one doubts that the President deserves primary credit and responsibility for the new tax system” (10/23/1986).
Thanks for letting me ramble.
Matt
I’m continually struck by just how hard it is to answer this question. Jon Stewart asked it another way: “Mr. President, I can’t tell if you’re a Jedi, ten steps ahead of everything, or if this whole health care thing is kicking your ass.” The announcement that the White House was pretty much going to ignore Republicans from here on was either a late, frustrated acknowledgment that the GOP isn’t interested in helping Obama or a clever maneuver to make Obama look like a centrist. The noises from Sunday that the WH was dropping the public option was either a tactical retreat or a way to embolden the progressive caucus so that, even if the public option gets dropped, the Blue Dogs have to make a lot of concessions to the left. The armed attendees at town hall meetings are either providing a rallying point for the right or dooming the GOP to minority status for years to come.
It seems safe to say that executive-legislative negotiations are messy, particularly when the executive branch is pushing to do something so big. It’s also safe to say that the media are focusing too much on the president’s strategy and personality in this process, when we know health care reform has eluded much more pugnacious presidents than him.
Yes. Basically, there’s no way to run for and win the Democratic nomination for president without making health care reform a priority, and there’s no way to (attempt to) pass it without unified opposition from the GOP, which in turn is going to make marginal Dems extremely worried…and since their votes are needed, any Democratic president is going to have to do things to make marginal Dems happy, leading to liberals getting unhappy.
And result in lots of people freaking out about how ugly the process seems, and can’t the president do something about it.
It’s like they never heard that thing about laws and sausages.
As far as I can tell, Obama and the Dems are doing a pretty good job:
http://plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2009/08/well-played.html
I’d agree with Josh’s point about Obama “getting out of it” once a bill passes…that being said, the first moves in the process seem, to me, to be the most important.
Obama learned the lessons of the 90′s too well, so he failed to be specific about the kind of plan he wanted. To reap the most political capital from the current proposal, Obama insisted on a scant few principles for a bill, letting Congress work out the details so that, presumably, the Executive could pick and choose its favorite (and most politically savvy) aspects of the plan.
Thus, in his town hall and grocery store meetings (and in subsequent radio addresses, even this week’s), Obama stressed the healthcare “problem” and referred to the healthcare reform he “proposed” rather than one version of a bill he was particularly in favor of. The upshot for the administration is that it can constantly revise its position, always choosing the most politically favorable specifics to highlight while eschewing the unfavorable ones. The downside is that the Exec’s policy “microphone”, so to speak, has become considerably smaller and that, without a definite Executive-backed plan (even though there were at least a few he could have chosen from)—it’s been very easy for opponents of the plan to cobble together all the worst parts of all proposals on the floor and advertise them as a consistent package which looks pretty awful (and thus spurs the confusion that organizations like FreedomWorks bank on). Thus the public debate is not merely about a selection between healthcare plans, but over whether any reform proposed might spell complete disorganization and disaster for every red-blooded middle-class citizen. The disorder and confusion being capitalized on by Republicans is also damaging for Obama’s larger reputation (and many of the democrats’ as well).
So I’m not really good at forecasting, but I’d say that unless the administration starts making some adjustments in its strategy at sponsoring and re-framing the current proposals (that means pick one, the best one, and start promoting its benefits in great detail), there’s more to lose than just this fight.
Health care per se hasn’t got Obama in a mess.
The Republicans see an opportunity to make Obama a lame duck even if it hurts the economy and Health care reform in the short run. It is like when Caesar stood before the Rubicon and said Alea Jacta Est. Obamas Rubicon is getting the Health care reform passed in congress, he has thrown the dice. If he passes it he can proceed with other reforms but if he fails he is as a political force basically dead i.e the Republican fervor to stop Health care reform by any means fair or foul.
At the moment his dice throw seems to have come up snake eyes.
(As an observation from one that think that Health care reform is a must I somewhat enjoy the crow Obama and the Democrats, Reid and Pelosi now have to eat. They called the Wall Street bankers greedy and selfish, implying they were criminals. Blamed everything on capitalism, deregulation and the Bush administration. These gross exaggerations is now coming back to haunt them in the Health care debate, the gloves are off and the Republican is using similar exaggerations and the same, close to outright lies as Obama and the Democrats used earlier this year. What comes around goes around.)
It strikes me that the Republicans made an error in letting the fringe do what they wanted to. They could have asked them to dial it down and I suspect they would have. The memo seems to have gone out this week. The townhall I attended today was quite a bit less hostile.
Obama is not in a mess. A good bill will get passed.
The whole notion that Obama and his closest advisors like Emmanuel, Orzag, Axelrod and co came up the river in a bubble I find unpersuasive. These are some of the most able political strategists in the country…..they game this….they discuss it endlessly……so the idea they didn’t know what Grassley was up to or what they’d be dealing with just doesn’t pass muster. When this process started they made a strategic decision to let congress write the bill and to strive for a bipartisan one if they could while keeping their reconciliation powder dry just in case. There was a remote chance a bipartisan bill could have emerged although I personally never thought so. Thus when the inevitable happens he’s given the Republicans ample opportunity to demonstrate they don’t want a bill of any kind whatever and provided himself with some cover when he finally starts to seriously attack them which he has scrupulously avoided so far. This is causing minor panic on the left who who get their panties in a twist at every latest headline from a media that is heavily invested in playing up the boxing match aspect of this. Mid September is clearly the cut off point for Republican game playing. I’d go back to reading the summer novel and check in during late September because we’re in kabuki land at the moment.
I got to you through the Daily Dish. You posit a very interesting argument, and you might be right. There are some things to consider, however.
Seniors have been mischaracterized by the press. “Don’t mess with my Medicare” shouts are from a group that gets some services through that government program and who must supplement it with private insurance. Seniors don’t even have regular check ups paid by Medicare. They are rightly afraid politicians will further erode Medicare’s inadequate coverage and/or they will have to pay more for the same or less. They will not be fooled.
Uninsured people who end up falling into the group who make too much for government assistance to pay for private insurance and who still cannot afford private insurance on their own, will not be impressed by “the fact that anything at all passed” argument.
People who are convinced that a public insurance plan option is essential will continue to form a backlash against Barack Obama. And an inadequate public plan will also leave the same unremovable taste in the mouths of people.
What Obama may have accomplished, health care “reform” or no such reform, is move American’s closer to their feelings for Social Security when it comes to health care insurance.
Agreed on the momentum switch upon passage comment. I’d go further and say the momentum will shift instantly once the bill passes the House and Senate (and will shift somewhat from the House vote alone which will prod the Senate along)… before Obama even signs the bill. The shift will more or less force conservative Dem Senators to shut up and deal w/ whatever comes back from conference. Voting for it before you voted against being proven to be a losing argument.
Zach,
I don’t think that’s correct. While the bill is in conference, it will be easy for reform opponents to continue to make, uh, creative arguments against provisions that may or may not be in the bill. In fact, I think it’s the time of maximum danger for marginal supporters of the bill (which is why, I think, that they pushed floor votes to after this recess). Now, supporters can easily claim to support the concept of reform but not the (fictional or otherwise) scary provisions that may be in it. During conference, supporters will have already voted for those scary things (including the fictional ones), so it will be harder to shift the blame.
Jonathan,
Spending in the stimulus bill was essentially at House levels in every area that mattered. The conference committee basically ignored all of the changes made by the moderate Senate negotiators except for including the AMT patch, which was inevitable anyway.
I don’t think arguments to parliamentary rules about bait-and-switch are simple enough to work for a GOP that can’t stick to a consistent message for its life. Some Republicans and even a few Dems might change their votes on principle, but won’t support a filibuster.
Obviously what comes out of conference depends on who’s in the committee, but I’d be very surprised to see the conference bill voted down. I recall individual Senators taking stands on conference reports… particularly Russ Feingold w/ the Patriot Act, but never enough aggrieved Senators to make a difference.
Zach,
I don’t think I explained what I meant very well.
I’m not arguing about whether a bill will survive conference (although it’s worth noting that there have been plenty of bills that died in conference or later; not everything plays out like the stimulus bill did). I’m talking about dangers to Members, not to the bill.
At any point in the process, it’s clear that opponents are capable of turning any real or fictional provision in any large bill (midnight basketball! putting new grass on the Mall in Washington! volcano monitoring! death panels!) into a bogeyman that isn’t worth the effort to defend, since the provisions are generally not central to the bill.
Right now, this poses a relatively small risk for Members of Congress, because they can safely denounce the hot-button provisions while supporting the bill.
After the bill is enacted and takes effect, the risk is relatively small (assuming the bill actually works, of course) because the thing isn’t in the news in the first place, and fictional provisions aren’t actually happening, so it’s hard to get much traction on new controversies.
But while the bill is in conference, opponents can continue to invent a variety of horribles, and now, Members have already voted for the horrible. Even if it’s deleted in conference, and even if the overall bill passes and is relatively popular, one can imagine a future ad based on early votes for horribles that didn’t wind up in the final bill (She’s so liberal that she even voted for the bill that included abbatoirs!).
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