With the anniversary of last summer’s Russian-Georgian war coming up later this week, Russian-Georgian relations are getting more than their typical share of media attention at the moment (see for example here, here, and here). I’ll have more to say about my reflections on the war a year on out later this week, but for now just wanted to share a provocative post on Anatoly Karlin’s blog Sublime Oblivion that suggests a number of reasons why we might witness a second Russian-Georgian war in the not so distant future. Among the many points he notes are:
Georgia is the linchpin of the Caucasus. Securing a Russian-friendly government there will reinforce Russian control of gas flows from Central Asia to Europe, extend its influence over the Black Sea region and allow it to link up with its ally Armenia, which hosts a Russian military base.
Georgia is not a strong nation. It is riven by divisions that could be exploited, e.g. separatist-minded Adjara and Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakheti. Its economy is dependent on agriculture and the government budget relies on pipeline rents.
Many elements of the Russian military were disappointed at being ordered to stop before overthrowing Saakashvili. They would love to finish the job (and furnish the excuse).
There are a lot more arguments in the post, so worth a look for those who are interested.
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We might see a second war, but neither part can afford it. Russia wants energy influence, but mostly as a tool to bully the West, and it certainly wouldn’t afford to plunge Russian-Western relations to the bottom thanks to another war.
It seems to me as if it is a very one-sided (Russia-centered) view. If ‘near future’ does not mean ‘in the coming years’ (I would not dare to make predictions for that region over such a time period), then I don’t see why a second war should be imminent. Sakashvili probably learnt by now, that he will not get the support from the US he hoped for and the Gerogian Government will distrust a Democratic administration even more. They are probably smart enough to know that they cannot win militarily on their own.
Furthermore if Russia wanted to occupy Georgia, why did they retreat when they had tanks in Gori? What would they gain from a puppet governement, especially now as NATO-membership for Georgia seems very unlikely in the short and medium turn? I think it is much more useful to them to keep the situation in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia unclear, so they can use it as a negotiation token.
All in all the arguments made in the post seem not very plausible.
Thanks for the feedback. I responded to your comments here.
@Alex,
Why not? If it invades Georgia, which as above I gave a low probability of happening (10-20%), then the only nations to put economic sanctions on it will be the US and some of its closer allies. What’s the big deal? Trade with the Anglo-Saxon world, France, Sweden and Poland is unimportant; the likelihood that nations like Germany or Italy, with whom relations are much more important, will interfere with more than rhetoric, is next to zero. Nor does Russia depend on the West for credit, considering much of that system has collapsed and in any case largely withdrawn from emerging markets. There are valid arguments about why Russia will not initiate a new war, but this is not one, IMO.
@ali,
I think the Georgian attack was unexpected and Russia did not make the preparations to be able to exploit it in full, its gear in the region was old and the war showed the Russian forces to be ill-coordinated and rather incompetent. It also probably expected to be able to topple Saakashvili via other means in the months after the conflict, expectations that were not fulfilled.
I’ve pointed out what a Russian puppet government in Georgia will be useful for in the article:
“reinforce Russian control of gas flows from Central Asia to Europe, extend its influence over the Black Sea region and allow it to link up with its ally Armenia, which hosts a Russian military base”
Another point I will make here is that Russia won’t even be that isolated. Turkey would likely accept a partitioning of Georgia on the understanding it gets a sphere of influence over Adjara, and Armenia will be very happy too. The recent Russian-encouraged talks between Armenia and Turkey, aimed at reconciliation, should probably be seen in this light; as Russia and Turkey reaching a temporary geopolitical understanding. The signs are that Israel understands too (see Russian back-pedalling over the selling of S-300’s to Iran), and so does Iran (they don’t like Georgia and see it as an unwelcome US outpost in the region).
I’m a little late here, but have some comments.
It’s fun to predict war in the Caucasus, I understand, in part because if you wait long enough the war will come. It’s August, and that’s war season in Georgia, so it makes sense to look for it any year around this time until the mountain passes become untenable for crossing. So any year, August-October is a possible war time for the Caucasus.
I find the argument that Georgia is unstable because of latent separatism in Ajara and Samskhe-Javakheti simply ridiculous.
Ajara’s separatist hey-day was in 1992 and a week in 2004 when the corrupt leadership was chased into exile. Ajara’s separatist claim in 1992 was similar to others (Abkhazia/S.O.) because it was an autonomous republic and because it was culturally distinct — Muslim. Ajara’s legal autonomy was whittled away during the Shevy era and has been virtually centralized under Saakashvili. The fact that the leadership is personally selected by the presidential office only brings the region into the center, rather than the other way around. Moreover, the Muslim leadership that gave the Ajaran leadership (that is, Aslan Abashidze) support in the 1990′s not only supported Saakashvili versus Abashidze but has retired and been replaced by an explicitly anti-political mufti.
Samskhe-Javakheti, which does have a small separatist movement that was vigorous in the mid-1990s, has received a high proportion of attention from the Saakashvili government in terms of allocating dollars from the Millenium Challenge funds received by Georgia, as well as other infrastructural development. Saakashvili has placed personal representatives in both the high ethnic minority enclaves in Georgia, Samskhe-Javakheti for the Armenians and Kvemo Kartli for the Azeris, whose offices are located in the local government structures of the regions. This pulls Samkhe-Javakheti in particular closer to the center.
Georgia’s internal instability stems from poverty/unemployment, poor relations with Russia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. This is enough, really, without further disinformation.
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