John Quiggin emails me with a question.
I need to look at the following question: do systems with high levels of campaign expenditure show weaker or stronger advantages for incumbency. My intuition, based almost entirely on the US is “stronger”, but I thought someone might have looked at this more systematically.
I’m unqualified to answer this question (not that this always stops me …) – what do people who are more familiar with this literature have to say?
{ 4 comments }
I don’t know anything about the comparative literature, but there is quite a bit in the American lit. In a somewhat older article, Abramowitz (JOP, 1991) finds that the increase in campaign costs is a big factor in the decline of competition (and increase in the incumbency advantage) in US House elections. Also check out some of Jacobson’s articles (just search for “campaign spending”–there are a lot.)
It’s also worth considering how campaign finance affects candidate quality–namely, that large war chests might scare off quality challengers. See Cox & Katz (AJPS 1996), but also see Epstein & Zemsky (APSR 1995) and Goodliffe (AJPS 2001, LSQ 2007). It seems things have been heading in the “no” direction, but I wouldn’t call it quite settled and there seems room for some additional opinions.
Hope that helps some…
Andrew
Andrew’s comment gives me an opening for some shameless self-promotion. Thanks Andrew. I’ve got a recent JOP (2008) piece which finds that warchests do deter challengers from running. I think my model specification is an improvement over prior ones, but then I’m biased. Read it and decide for yourself!
Palda and Palda (1998)* wrote about campaign expenditures in the legislative elections in France that show quite surprising results: higher expenditures actually work in favour of the challengers and against the incumbents: “Simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved, incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals. (…) These results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition”.
So, yeah, the American context may be misleading in discussing this question.
* http://www.springerlink.com/content/v623938824x72162/
Thanks to Henry for posing this, and to all the respondents (so far!). As usual, it looks as if the empirical data is mixed, but at least there’s something.
Jeff, would you be able to send me a copy of your paper?
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