[Source: Nuclear Weapon Archive.]
This piece, in yesterday’s New York Times, is subtitled “Atomic insiders say that the weapon was invented only once, and its secrets were spread around the globe by spies, scientists, and the covert acts of nuclear states.” Regarding the latter, the piece notes China’s willingness to aid in proliferation, as well as France’s. But the authors of the two books the piece focuses on can only “speculate” on why they do so.
Here is a more systematic answer, from Georgetown political scientist Matthew Kroenig. He asks why would states share their nuclear secrets, noting that it seems puzzling to do, since the resulting nukes could one day “threaten the supplier’s existence.”
He finds that states do so for strategic reasons:
First, because nuclear proliferation constrains states’ ability to use conventional military power to their advantage, the more powerful a state is relative to a potential nuclear recipient, the less likely it is to provide sensitive nuclear assistance. States do not wish to impose constraints on themselves.
Second, precisely because nuclear proliferation constrains states’ military freedom of action, however, states are more likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to states with which they share a common enemy. By providing sensitive nuclear assistance to these states, a nuclear supplier can impose strategic costs on rival states.
Finally, because superpowers, states with global force projection capabilities, are threatened by nuclear proliferation anywhere in the international system, they pressure other states in an attempt to prevent sensitive nuclear transfers. States that are vulnerable to superpower pressure are less likely to provide sensitive nuclear assistance.
International institutions also matter; signatories to the Nuclear Non-Prolilferation Treaty are also less likely to supply assistance. By contrast, economic motivations appear to matter little, which counters the speculation in the NY Times piece that France helped Israel because of “substantial commercial ties.” These findings come from a large-scale dataset that tracks nuclear assistance from 1951-2000.
There are lots of interesting implications:
…as China modernizes its military forces and begins to think about projecting force abroad, it is likely becoming more concerned that nuclear proliferation in distant regions could constrain its military might. This consideration may be contributing to the decline in sensitive nuclear exports from, and a heightened attention to nuclear nonproliferation in, Beijing.
…policymakers should beware of the end of security alliances. States that depend on a superpower to provide for their security are less likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a number of states without a superpower patron. North Korea, for example, may be at risk of providing sensitive nuclear assistance in part because it can do so without antagonizing a powerful protector. Officials must recognize that nuclear umbrellas can reduce the supply of, as well as the demand for, nuclear materials and technology.
The piece, forthcoming in the American Political Science Review, is here.
{ 4 comments }
The picture is a reminder to watch “Dr. Strangelove” again.
This is an interesting post and I’ll be sure to take a look at his article. But, I wonder about his assumption that “states do not wish to impose constraints on themselves.” Perhaps I misunderstand his point (which could be very likely given that I have not yet read his article) but there seems to be a significant amount of evidence that states do actually–at least in some situations–wish to impose constraints on themselves (and actually do so quite readily). The international campaign to ban landmines is one example (and a security-based one, which may therefore make it more significant). The Geneva Convention is another. Imposing constraints and making other such credible commitments is one crucial way in which states attempt to resolve some of the problems of uncertainty and risk in the international arena. Therefore, it seems this may be an odd assumption to make, especially (or potentially) in regard to nuclear weapons. Let me explain further. George Modelski and Patrick Morgan (and Martin and Ikle), in an article called “Understanding Global War,” (1985) make (among many other interesting points) a thought provoking point about nuclear weapons and deterrence (hopefully you don’t mind if I quote them). They state, “An equally worrisome feature of deterrence in practice, therefore, is the difficulty of envisioning how we can ever move to dispense with it. The unavoidable preoccupation with war-fighting capabilities and scenarios means that strategic stability is a worrisome, delicate thing that arms limitation might disrupt, and the obvious tendency at work ‘is to build nuclear weapons ever more firmly into the international system’ (Martin, 1980). As Ikle says, with a touch of anguish, the international order ‘is so constructed that it cannot move toward abolition of nuclear weapons. It demands, as the necessary condition for avoiding nuclear war, the very preservation of these arms’ (Ikle, 1973).” Thus, it may be possible, that the only way to avoid nuclear war (and I think it is fairly safe to assume that in general states would like to avoid nuclear war) is to allow proliferation of these weapons. I don’t mean that proliferation brings security a la Kenneth Waltz’s arguments about balance of power concerns, but instead (as noted by the quote above) that perhaps by imposing the constraints of nuclear deterrence upon themselves, states achieve their goal of avoiding nuclear war (and essentially take nuclear weapons off the table). This assumes that states allow proliferation and impose these constraints on themselves not because they are suicidal or stupid, but because they are rational. Proliferation is obviously not the primary way states prevent nuclear war and there are strategies states clearly prefer to this one. I am merely noting that some scholars appear to have argued that it may play some role and the idea that states share nuclear secrets, even when doing so may “threaten the supplier’s existence,” may not be as puzzling as Kroenig assumes–in fact, creating this kind of condition may be precisely what the state is trying to do, as a rational actor attempting to avoid nuclear war. This is of course a rather risky way of avoiding nuclear war (and is based on an assumption–that states do not want nuclear war–that I suppose we have to at least theoretically assume could break down depending on the conflicting parties and the conditions of their conflict). And, even if nuclear proliferation was the only way to prevent nuclear war, states should have a very real concern about accidental firings or accidental explosions of nuclear weapons–because accidents happen.
I skimmed the paper. It looks well argued.
I am puzzled by his emphasis on relative power as opposed to the common enemy and pact variables. Its seems that relative power is less important than his data demonstrates.
Also, while he is wise not to define power-projection as possession of aircraft carriers, Soviet power-projection as he defines it — ability to fight a conventional ground war– was never all that great. I would not use that variable, as he does, to explain Russian nuclear sales to Iran v. Soviet tight controls.
Thank you for your interest in my research. I am writing on John’s invitation to respond to this interesting set of comments.
The reason I focus on the differential effects of nuclear proliferation on states with different levels of conventional military power is because that is the key insight from which all three hypotheses are derived. It is only because proliferation constrains powerful states, that states can provide sensitive nuclear assistance to impose costs on enemy states. And, it is only because the international system’s most powerful states, superpowers, are so threatened by nuclear proliferation, that they pressure thier friends and allies not to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology.
The argument that states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to contribute to international peace is an interesting one and, as the author notes, similar to the “proliferation optimist” argument put forward by Kenneth Waltz and others. The problem with this argument, and the optimism/pessimism debate, is that it can’t explain variation. Why do some states provide sensitive nuclear assistance, but others don’t? The debate about whether proliferation is good or bad for international stability, doesn’t tell us whether some states may be less threatened by nuclear proliferation and, therefore, more inclined to promote it. The argument of this paper elaborates on a simple insight to explain this variation.
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