Simon Jackman has an interesting post on Larry Bartels and political science’s relationship with broader public debates.
I think it is true that the end of political science focusing on American politics has dropped the ball somewhat, substantively and normatively. A political science colleague who shall remain nameless caricatures this type of political science (and the political scientists doing it) with a good imitation of a 1950s sci-fi robot going “Congress, congress…”, the idea being that the professional, academic study of American politics is largely dominated by a bunch of geeks doing technical analyses of “inside baseball” stuff that might not matter to anyone other than those doing it (and by the way, a good deal of my own work would probably fall under that characterization).
Larry’s book might be a little “academic” for the non-academic reader. He uses data (gasp) and statistical analyses to test propositions. But frankly, I welcome the jab in the ribs Larry is (implicitly?) giving to some of us in the political science profession, reflected in the tone of the review I quoted above: “there’s an awful lot of politics going on out there” (paraphrasing my colleague Josh Cohen).
Maybe this is more about my insecurities with my professional identity (and btw, Larry was my PhD adviser), but I see one of the big takeaways from the book as this: there are big topics like inequality to go take on under the heading of “American politics”, and we can and perhaps ought to risk normative neutrality, without giving up analytical rigor.
Jackman’s argument suggests both that many mainstream Americanist political scientists have been socialized to avoid writing about certain topics because they are ‘too political’ and that this is a rather odd thing in a discipline which is supposed to be about politics. I think that things are getting better, but I also think that there’s some truth to this claim (my co-bloggers may disagree). More precisely (and this may be more me than Jackman) – there is a space for political science that reaches sound empirical conclusions on questions that are hotly debated between partisans – but that this space is often unoccupied because talking about topics of partisan controversy makes political scientists nervous (as an aside, there is a real distinction between the kind of political science that could be conducted on partisan hot-button topics and partisan commentary of the sort that, say, I, sometimes indulge myself in the latter on the other blog that I contribute to).
I suspect that Matt Yglesias is pointing to a similar mechanism, which shapes the conscious decision of elite political commentators like Marc Ambinder to steer clear of persistently calling politicians on their lies, when they have in fact lied. One would presume that political commentators don’t like politicians to tell blatant lies and get away with it, but it may be easier for them not to criticize politicians for doing this, because they don’t want to become part of the controversy themselves. Both groups – political scientists and political commentators – have constructed professional identities which place them outside the partisan fray. In neither case is this a bad thing in itself – we want to have people who aren’t beholden to some group or another providing commentary on politics. But – and this is Jackman’s challenge as I understand it – this understandable desire not to become part of that which they study and comment on, may lead political scientists (and commentators) to fall down on the job of providing the complete understanding of politics that they are supposed to, by avoiding certain topics, not singling out certain kinds of bad behaviour &c&c..
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I’m one of those political scientists who has always been very much involved in practical campaign politics, and I must say I’m treated a bit strangely by both sides.
So, do political scientists feel themselves to be more vulnerable than economists, who more often than not, do take on political issues?
Naadir — what’s your evidence that economists more often than not take on political issues?
Well, I meant, more often than political scientists, and without much damage to their academic career.
What immediately came to my mind were some of the UK based economic geographers aligned with the right at the Policy Exchange think tank who publish controversial reports on geography and inequality.
Also, as an extreme case, how long would a Satoshi Kanazawa last as a political scientist?
He’d last as long as a Jacob Hacker maybe?
My point was: you can identify a few choice names and make the claim that economists are “braver” than political scientists. But I can easily name a similar set of political sceintists. Without some systematic evidence, it’s all just speculation.
I think that a major reason political scientists sound like robots is that the American political science subfield has become so focused on theory and that more theoretical work has little practical application. What “practical” difference does the debate between the attitudinal model and the legal model (or strategic model) make? (To offer one example.) I think that it’s less that political scientists seek to remain above the fray and more that the questions being asked are not really relevant to contemporary politics.
What “practical” difference does the debate between the attitudinal model and the legal model (or strategic model) make?
Seriously? What difference does it make whether Supreme Court Justices decide cases on the basis of which outcomes they like best, versus deciding cases on the basis of which side correctly interprets the Constitution and which side has the weight or precedent behind it?
Seriously?
Emery:
Don’t equate not focusing on “practical politics,” current affairs, or what appear to be the burning issues of the day with focusing on theory. Relatively few members of the American politics subfield focus on anything recognizable as theory.
It’s always worth remembering that once-famous, albeit perhaps not entirely fair, line about political science being a “device for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science.” I couldn’t remember the precise quotation, but managed to find it via Google: it’s from the historian Alfred Cobban, ‘In Search of Humanity’ (1960). (Still quoted occasionally, e.g. by B. Barber in APSR 100:4 p.539).
Seriously, Anonymous Coward. The debate b/w models of explaining/predicting judges’ decisions is completely irrelevant to political debates. Testing said models, even less relevant. Testing said models on large-n databases . . . becoming less relevant.
I don’t actually think that most voters are waiting to know how judges decide cases. I don’t think that they care how. I think that they care what. In my mind, theories of judging are interesting, but not terribly practical. I could be wrong. But, seriously, I think that most voters like SCt decisions they agree with and dislike SCt decisions they disagree with. If the court decides a case in a way that [Voter] agrees with, does [Voter] fret methodology? I think that Bush v. Gore proves NOT.
A few voters may, in a stray moment, think about what the Constitution calls “inferior” courts . . . but few voters are concerned with which model better predicts voting by court of appeals judges.
Seriously.
Lee: Few, in terms of number, political scientists may be concerned with “theory.” But as a former editor of the APSR, you would have to admit that articles short on “theory” don’t get published in the top journals. I’m guessing that, as APSR editor, you may have said to authors that their articles, in the American subfield, were short on theory. I could be wrong on this?
Not theory as in Plato, of course. But readers of this blog should know the difference b/w theory (Plato/Locke/etc.) and theory (PPT, formal theory, game theory, spatial modeling, etc.) . . . .
If the motivation of ambitious members of the field is to publish in such journals, then theory (formal modeling, e.g.) dominates the field even if most members of the field don’t share the ambition. Right?
If formal theory dominates a field, then that field will become less relevant to real-world debates. Does anyone really disagree with that statement?
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