Presidential Power and Congressional Cower

by Andrew Rudalevige on September 1, 2013 · 4 comments

in International Security,Legislative Politics,Presidency

A few years ago, I wrote a book called The New Imperial Presidency, in which I built on ongoing events and new scholarship to trace the growth of presidential power after Watergate. I argued that this increased authority was both taken (by presidents) and given (by Congress). In short, ”The fact is that we have had an invisible Congress as much as an imperial President.”

Today’s New York Times provides the lead quote for the next edition of the book, courtesy of Rep. Peter King (R-NY), member of Congress for more than 20 years and former chair of the House Homeland Security Committee. To wit: “I strongly believe that the commander in chief has the absolute right to take military action.”

Assuming King meant just that, his strong beliefs are contrary to those who designed the American constitutional framework. For example, James Wilson—one of the key architects of Article II and “unity” (not unitary-ness…) in the executive—told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention on December 11, 1787, that “This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives…”

James Madison, writing as “Helvidius” in a series of letters attacking the Washington administration, piled on. “The received and the fundamental doctrine of the constitution,” he argued, is “that the power to declare war including the power of judging of the causes of war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature: that the executive has no right, in any case to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.” (Emphasis in the original.) Indeed, “in no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department.”

A few years later, in a 1798 letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison reiterated that “The constitution supposes, what the History of all Govts. demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl.”  A few years later, in turn, Jefferson told that Legisl in a December 1805 special message that “considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force in any degree which could be avoided.”

Now, the story is of course not so simple – we can argue about the definition of “war,” to start with, and President Jefferson himself was not always so considerate of legislative sensibilities and authorities. On the other hand, the Helvidius letters were prompted by Washington’s proclamation of American neutrality in the interminable Anglo-French conflicts - so about a decision not to go to war! even this, Madison argued, needed congressional sanction. (Which, in the end, was given.)

The point is that those framing this process as a presidential gift to be given have it backwards— even leaving aside the niceties of the law (the topic of my next post, stay tuned). A Congress with institutional pride (with ambition aiming to counteract ambition, in Madison’s famous turn of phrase in Federalist #51) would have acted on its own. Indeed, legislators who signed on to letters to Obama demanding that he reconvene Congress and ask for authorization were given credit for being assertive. Yet why were those letters written to Obama in the first place, and not to the House and Senate leadership?  If Obama’s decision yesterday made Congress slightly more visible, little credit for that appears to go to Congress itself.

{ 4 comments }

james parker September 1, 2013 at 4:37 pm

But is it not true that POTUS can carry out acts for up to 90 days without Congressional approval? Playing devil’s advocate here.

Ronan Fitzgerald September 1, 2013 at 5:46 pm

What effect has this delegation of authority (from Congress to the executive) had, do you know? ie have there been more military interventions, more interventions of a specific type etc

Robert Spitzer September 3, 2013 at 2:30 pm

The War Powers Act of 1973, still on the books as good law, requires presidents to a) consult with Congress in every possible instance before sending troops somewhere, to b) provide a written report within 48 hours of the onset of hostilities, and said that c) troop involvement must end within 60 days (or 90 days if Congress so acts) unless Congress authorizes a continued troop presence. But all this is predicated on prior congressional authorization for use of the American military abroad. And thanks to Rudalevige for his post.

James.E. Hay September 3, 2013 at 6:00 pm

By The Most Explicit And Specific Reading Of The Constitution The House Of Represenatives Not The executive branch has the sole power to determine the necessity to go to war and to authorize it. It Should be Obama and his administration Requesting Authorization to Commit this country and it’s military to an foreign war And not the other way around. This sort of perversion of the Provisions of the constitution that pertain to War Powers has been on- going in the last four or five decades unabated and uncorrected for the sake of mainly political ambitions and conveniences and to the great detriment to this country and it’s governing system. Those who claims the war making powers are other than proscribed by the constitutions are complete and utter imbeciles or they are bold faced liars I say those in the congress and administration are both.

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