What Should We Expect From International Human Rights Institutions?

by Erik Voeten on July 31, 2013 · 2 comments

in Institutions,International Relations,International Security,Law

As I announced yesterday, I plan to do a series of blog posts on what we know about how to improve the human rights of people abroad and how this knowledge can help us do a better job in the future. I will focus a lot on international human rights institutions, which are treaties, like the Convention Against Torture, in which states enter into legal obligations to protect a particular set of rights as well as the associated institutions that help enforce those obligations. These institutions vary from powerful international courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, to relatively toothless UN monitoring bodies.

Whenever I teach about international human rights institutions my first task is to lower expectations. International human rights treaties inevitably contain language that expresses lofty ideals and grand ambitions. The point is not just that these goals are unlikely to ever be fully attained but also that treaties are a very limited policy tool.  If we wished to give policy advice to governments interested in improving their human rights record, we should tell them to democratize, to develop economically, to create a strong independent legal system, and to stop having civil wars.  Signing treaties does not enter the top ten of most important things countries could do. Indeed, countries like the United States have a relatively good human rights record without ratifying many human rights treaties.

So, why do we care about international human rights treaties and associated institutions? To start with, it turns out that we have very limited foreign policy tools to help countries become economically developed stable constitutional democracies that do not have civil wars. Even very expensive and intrusive tools, such as military interventions, more often than not fail to achieve those goals. Violating human rights is often central to a government’s strategy for staying in power or it may be central to the domestic power of an agency over which the civilian government has imperfect control (police, military, paramilitaries, etcetera). This is not behavior that is easy to change.

A basic but fundamental insight from policy analysis is that policies are more likely to succeed when the problem is easy to solve and you have a lot of resources. Improving human rights in other countries is a hard problem for which there are few resources available. Human rights treaties are cheap and relatively unintrusive (compared to other foreign policy options). If these tools can marginally improve human rights in some countries, they may be well worth the investment.

Over the next two weeks, I will highlight some theories and empirical findings that seem to suggest that some treaties do indeed have those conditional effects; especially in countries that are democratizing but are not yet fully stable constitutional democracies (see here and here for earlier blog posts).  There are  inevitable tensions between these more realistic but lower expectations about when we may be satisfied with the effectiveness of treaties and  their grand and universal ambitions. Scholars sometimes lament that treaties matter most where they are needed least. How could we possibly be satisfied with a human rights regime that barely makes a dent into the practices of North Korea, Iran, or Saudi Arabia? Or that allows Libya, Syria, and the Sudan to play political theater in the UN Human Rights Council?

It is understandable that the neglect or even abuse of the international human rights regime by the worst offenders leads some to conclude that the entire regime is illegitimate. My interest is in how institutional design can help solve some of these problems. I believe that smart design may limit some of the ways countries like Syria use the system to their advantage but it can do little to change the behavior of a strong and powerful regime bent on violating rights in order to stay in power. Human rights treaties are simply not sufficiently powerful policy tools for that. This does not make them superfluous. Hundreds of millions of people live in countries where there are openings for international institutions to make a difference. A key question is whether our current human rights institutions are effective in positively changing the lives of those people.

 

{ 2 comments }

Tracy Lightcap July 31, 2013 at 11:43 am

Maybe the level of intervention is the problem.

I know of some scholars who are working hard on programs that try to alleviate torture by the actual agents who do it. Iow, they are working on trying to get the agents who actually lay on the hands to think twice about doing it. Of course, that requires a government that pays at least lip service to not torturing in the first place, as, for instance, a government that has ratified the Convention. Hence, even if the governments involved may not be sincere about reducing human rights abuses, you might be able to whipsaw them into allowing the establishment of programs that restrain their agents.

This is all pretty brand new. It also has some problems. We have a book in the works on torture. One of the chapters points out that getting governments who depend on intimidation of their populations to abandon torture may have the nasty unexpected consequence of leading the governments to substitute other human rights abuses for torture.

Susan Waltz July 31, 2013 at 9:50 pm

I’m glad to see this initiative and look forward to additional posts. Egregious offenders are often lifted up as evidence that human rights treaties don’t work, but as you note, treaties aren’t sufficiently powerful policy tools to stop a perpetrator bent on human rights abuse. What I want to add here is that weak enforcement provisions do not really distinguish human rights standards from other prominent multilateral treaties. Think Rio and the Kyoto Protocol, or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With few exceptions, UN treaties are based on voluntary compliance and have very little muscle. That’s the reality of our international system.

But the good news is that the story doesn’t end there. As you intimate, some excellent recent research points to conditional effects of human rights treaties. In part that’s because in civil law countries – which includes most of the European Union and Latin America — human rights treaty provisions are typically incorporated into domestic law. In such countries, enforcement of the international human rights law becomes a domestic responsibility and the treaty provisions are as strong as local courts make them. (By contrast, in the US most human rights treaties have been considered non self-executing, and generally do not enter into legal argumentation. That makes international standards easier to disregard.)

In addition, the two bedrock human rights treaties — the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights—now have Optional Protocols that allow individual citizens of states party to take their complaints to the relevant treaty monitoring bodies for review, once domestic remedies have been exhausted. As many as 114 countries have extended this option to their citizens by virtue of ratifying the ICCPR protocol (which entered into force quite a long time ago), and just this May the new ICESCR Protocol entered into force.

As you note, in many prominent cases, particularly in Europe, multilateral human rights law as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights has led to positive changes in domestic policy. Moreover, the well-known case of General Augusto Pinochet before UK’s highest court turned on the fact that torture had been committed after Chile had ratified the Convention Against Torture.

In the most fundamental sense, human rights treaties aren’t instruments of foreign policy: they set international standards for the relationship between governors and governed. Accountability is supposed to take place at the international level, but the basic dynamics of human rights play out within countries, not between them. The most pointed policy question thus is not how to make human rights law work as an instrument of foreign policy, but how to increase the chances it will have impact on domestic realities.

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