If the experience of the Great Depression is anything to go by, economic crises help the far right rather than the far left. In a recent paper, Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke find that
the Depression was good for fascists. It was especially good for fascists (based on the interaction effects between the period dummy and country characteristics) in countries that had not enjoyed democracy before 1914; where fascist parties already had a parliamentary base; and in countries on the losing side in World War 1.
In contrast:
the Depression was of no great help to Communist parties on average. In addition, the Communist vote was higher in countries without a pre-war democratic tradition and in countries that had been defeated in World War I.
Using a different model, the authors find a significant relationship between economic growth over time and support for fascism.
while growth had a large impact on voting for right-wing extremist parties in countries which had not been democratic prior to World War I, a history of prewar democracy almost completely eliminates this effect. (That is to say, the interaction term between growth and prewar democracy is positive, almost as large as the coefficient measuring the direct impact of growth, and strongly significant.) … in countries without a prewar history of democracy and with a pre-existing fascist party, a one standard deviation increase in growth is associated with a decline in the extreme right-wing vote share of 4.8%. In such countries, a decline in growth on the order of that experienced by Germany between 1928 and 1932 is associated with an increase in the fascist vote share of 12.9%. In countries that had not been democratic prior to 1914, a one standard deviation rise in growth is associated with a 61% decline in the probability of observing a positive fascist vote. These are large effects.
The currently available version of this paper was written in February 2012. Nonetheless, its findings have implications for current debates about austerity politics in the European Union, (in which both O’Rourke and Eichengreen have participated). The authors conclude:
Our analysis thus suggests that the danger of political polarization and extremism is greater in some national circumstances than others. It is greatest in countries with relatively recent histories of democracy, with existing right-wing extremist parties, and with electoral systems that create low hurdles to parliamentary representation of new parties. Above all, it is greatest where depressed economic conditions are allowed to persist.
Their argument anticipates more recent events, and in particular the rapid ascension of the neo-Fascist ‘Golden Dawn’ party in Greece. If they are correct, the austerity measures that the Greek government is implementing are likely to lead to increased support for fascism in Greece.
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Henry: But isn’t Syriza arguably benefitting the most in Greece now? So that would suggest in Greece – at least so far – it is far left who is getting the bigger boost. (Although I guess the question is whether Syriza is far enough left in this story.)
Yep – it’s an interesting question as to whether Syriza is ‘anti-system’ in this sense (or is alternatively one part of the system playing the other).
“Nonetheless, its findings have implications for current debates about austerity politics in the European Union…”
Do they? Two barely comparable contexts – and no sign of the radical right (who are not the same eaxctly as classical fascists) making progress in more than a couple of states (Hungary, Finland and yes Greece).
As noted above, even in Greece the most outlying and supposedly paradigmatically ‘Weimar’ case, most voters have swung left not to the far right (and Syriza – leaving aside the hair-splitting over whether they are ‘anti-system’ – are ex-Communists, ex-Trotskyists and (ex-) Maoists). More austerity in Greece = Syriza government more
I am dubious that the findings are as generalisable as claimed or as relevant.
The far-right is a favourite bogeyman of journalists – always ‘on the rise’ – and it is depressing to see political scientists using historical studies to play the same game.
I am all in favour of quantitiave analysis, but this gives it a bad name. 28 countries becomes 22 once you exclude those outside Europe – a small number. Events in these are not independent – they fall into several blocs where political trends in major countries will influence those in others (eg Germany/Austria, Sweden/Denmark/Norway) – a good many parties were cross-national. Exactly which European countries were fully democratic in 1920? France qualifies, but the UK would have to be qualified, as would most others. Losing side in World War 1? That means only Germany, Austria and Hungary only – all closely linked. In short, this does not take us even as far as a good modern secondary school textbook.
Interestingly, classical fascism was modernist, militarist and corporatist. I am not sure – from casual reading – that the modern right (eg in Hungary or Greece) is any of these.