Russia 2012 Presidential Election Post-Election Report

Displaying a predictive ability at a level of which my Americanist colleague can only dream, I think it is safe to say that most of the claims I made in my pre-election report on the 2012 Russian Presidential election have been substantiated:

  • Multiple allegations have been raised that the election was neither free nor fair and that it was marred by fraud. Consequently, there is uncertainty about how much support Putin truly enjoys among the Russian population, despite the fact that he won close to 64% of the vote.

Predictions aside, I do want to touch on what I think are two potentially interesting take-away questions from yesterday’s results, one of which is likely to be more important for Russia, and the other for political scientists.

First, it is worth noting that the only one of Russia’s regions in which Putin failed to secure a majority of the vote was Moscow (regional results available here). Moreover, in Moscow, independent candidate Mikhail Prokhorov, the ostensible candidate of the liberal opposition, received close to 20% of the vote. So there is real opposition to Putin to in Moscow (especially considering that these are the results after whatever “administrative resources” were brought to bear on improving support for Putin). This in turn raises what may turn out to be the defining question of Putin’s next term: how much support does he need in Moscow to continue to rule effectively? Regardless of whatever questions one may have about the extent to which official vote totals reflect Putin’s true popularity, it is probably uncontroversial to claim that he is less popular in Moscow than he is in the rest of the country. So the question remains: is there a limit to how far Putin’s popularity can plunge in Moscow, or is he somehow buffered by support in the rest of the country?

Second, apparently the government did manage to install webcams in almost all of the polling stations throughout the country. According to the Moscow Times, more than 2.5 million people registered with the website that was set up to allow citizens to view these feeds. To be best of my knowledge, this has never before been carried out anywhere in a national election, so what exactly these webcams accomplished should be an interesting subject for future research.

Why they were there in the first place is of course also an interesting question, and let me hazard a few potential guesses. First, it may be the case that the Kremlin legitimately wanted to crack down on electoral fraud in the election in the election, even including fraud that would benefit their candidate. The reasoning here would be that if the Kremlin believed Putin was going to win convincingly anyways – not an unreasonable assumption – then the fewer allegations of fraud during the election, the more Putin’s impressive vote total would be taken as a genuine signal of Putin’s popularity. In other words, the goal may have been to avoid exactly the kind of speculation I made in my second bullet point above, and instead to have 64% of the vote interpreted unambiguously as representing the support of 64% of the population.

An alternative explanation, however, might be that the Kremlin was seeking to avoid the mechanism by which fraud was revealed following the parliamentary elections, that is the use of individual of cell phones to capture visible fraud in polling places by polling workers who believed they were not being observed. If we assume that the motivation for local level officials to manipulate vote totals (e.g., to win the favor of the Kremlin) had not changed, then the webcams would provide a very powerful incentive for local officials to find other ways of manipulating results than the blatant forms of ballot stuffing that appeared online following the December parliamentary election.

Furthermore, with the webcams in place, the Kremlin now has the ability to respond to revealed instances of fraud as a defender of free and fair elections (“look, our webcams worked! We have caught the fraud!”) as opposed to being put on the defensive when YouTube videos of fraud go viral.

All of these explanations represent potential motivation for the webcam experiment. It will be interesting in the future to see if data supports any of these contentions, and also if other countries pick up the Russian example and run with it in the future.

3 Responses to Russia 2012 Presidential Election Post-Election Report

  1. Fredrik M Sjoberg March 5, 2012 at 4:16 pm #

    Great short summary. Concerning webcams I am currently working on a paper on another post-Soviet case, Azerbaijan, where webcams have been used in 10 percent of the polling stations since 2008. There is indeed a negative effect on digit fraud (anomalies in terms of the distribution of the last digit, see Beber&Scacco, 2012). There is also a 2% negative effect on turnout, which could mean that there is also less ballot box stuffing in webcam monitored polling stations. Since webcams were allocated to all 95,000 polling stations in Russia we cannot conduct a similar analysis in Russia. Would have been great with some variation. Damn!

  2. Erik Herron March 5, 2012 at 5:03 pm #

    Fredrik is right on Azerbaijan and the issues with Russia. I published a paper in Electoral Studies in 2010 on the use of webcams in Azerbaijan’s 2008 presidential election and 2009 referendum. The presence of webcams was associated with lower reported turnout and inconsistently associated with lower regime support.

  3. Andrew Little March 5, 2012 at 7:03 pm #

    Josh’s first argument for why the government installed the webcams–in short, to lower expectations of how much fraud there was–is very similar to an argument I make in a working paper:

    The paper focuses more on international monitors, but the logic applies to any kind of monitoring that increases the visibility of fraud, so webcams are a pretty perfect example.