Egypt’s Elections in Comparative Perspective: Looking to the Future

One of the ways to get a handle on the current Egyptian elections is to try to compare them to the first set of post-communist elections. Some similarities are immediately apparent. Turnout is high. The forces of the “Old Regime” are apparently doing badly. But perhaps more illustrative, however are the following differences:

First, the early post-communist elections were essentially dichotomous affairs: they were contested between forces supportive of the “Old Regime” (i.e., communist successor parties) and forces that wanted to lead to a transition to a more market based economic and a liberal-democrat political system, which I have elsewhere labeled “New Regime” parties. In Egypt, however, the contest appears to be trichotomous: between the Old Regime, liberal parties, and Islamist parties.

Second, while the first post-communist elections were often fought between unified “umbrella movements” of opposition forces (that later splintered after winning the first election) and the party of the old regime, in Egypt the opposition movements splintered before the first election. This is going to have a number of important effects. For the liberals, it appears that they are going to enter the parliament in a very weak state. But even the Islamists, who according to the NY Times received almost 2/3 of the vote in the first round of balloting, will not have a single majority party in the parliament.

Third, Egypt is employing a somewhat bizarre staggered electoral system, where different parts of the country vote in different periods of time. This presents an interesting opportunity for the liberals. In Poland, for example, when the New Regime forces splintered into lots of different parties to – disastrously – contest the 1993 parliamentary elections, they had to wait 4 years to try a different electoral strategy, and voters had to wait 4 years to deal with the fact that many of them had wasted their votes by voting for parties that did not get into the parliament. In Egypt, however, it is possible that these lessons could be applied as early as the next round of voting. The Washington Post presents some anecdotal evidence that this may already be occurring:

Liberal voters who will go to the polls in the next stages of voting said the worrying results were prompting them to rethink their choices. The biggest failing of liberal forces is that they are divided across dozens of parties. Some people said they would gravitate toward the strongest-performing liberal and leftist coalition, the Egyptian Bloc, to counter the Islamists’ success.

Should this kind of learning be documented more systematically, it would turn out to be very interesting, and indeed might have implications for how we think about designing initial elections in new regimes.

Finally, in the original post-communist elections splinter parties that left the ex-communist parties because they were not “extreme” enough tended to perform quite badly in the first round of elections. While the situation is not exactly analogous in Egypt, it is very interesting that the more extreme Islamist Salafist al-Nour party appears to be polling so well.

Why is all this important? Beyond the obvious questions of who is going to dominate the first Egyptian parliaments, these factors have implications for how we think politics may develop in Egypt in the future. As my own research has demonstrated, “New Regime” parties in post-communist countries tended to perform badly where the economy performed badly, which in part explains the return of ex-Communist parties to power in many post-communist countries in the second round of elections. Assuming that Egypt is in for a rough time economically once this political transition gets resolved, the incredibly interesting question is what effect this will have on the popularity of the different political forces. Will the Islamist parties play the role of the post-communist “New Regime” parties, essentially taking ownership of the economy once they come to power? Or will the liberal parties – like the actual liberal “New Regime” parties in post-communist countries – bare the brunt of an electorate discouraged about the state of the economy because of their association with market reforms? Or is it possible that if the military continues to meddle in politics “Old Regime” forces will be blamed for poor economic conditions out of a belief that the military is really still calling the shots?

Similarly, who benefits if the economy deteriorates under an Islamist watch? Old Regime forces linked to the military? Liberals because of their role in the opposition and perceived “technocratic” competence? Or the Islamists, who – much like ex-communist parties – may be perceived to be more concerned about the fate of the poor? Finally, how might this all be affected by a situation in which – as at Tony Karon at Time Magazine suggestions might be possible – the Muslim Brotherhood goes into a coalition with the some of the liberal secular parties instead of the other – more conservative – Islamist party?

Of course, one other important difference between Egypt and most post-communist countries is that we were pretty confident then that whatever the results of the initial elections, the military would not step in and either falsify or annul the results. It still remains to be seen whether this is the case in Egypt.

One Response to Egypt’s Elections in Comparative Perspective: Looking to the Future

  1. Ion December 4, 2011 at 12:32 am #

    Very interesting post. Up to a certain point I saw many similarities between Ceausescu’s fall and Mubarak’s fall. Similar stories: the people protest, the dictator resists, then he flees, is caught, put on trial and rapidly executed (the last part is not similar). Then the first democratic elections follow (in Romania five months after the dictator was shot). There is an explosion of political parties (the highest number of parties that participated in a Romanian election, around 180 parties registered in a few months same like in other former Communist countries) and in 1990, we have the legitimization of the revolutionary forces via elections.

    Of course, in retrospective, most political scientists would agree that Iliescu’s Salvation Front was not at all revolutionary, in fact a few years after, the party was already classified as a successor party (note that it took some time before many people realized that Iliescu was just a reformed Communist). No wonder that in the Romanian post-revolutionary situation, there were groups that contested the democratic credentials of the provisional authorities. So, just three months after the fall of the dictator, the new provisional authorities are challenged by students in Bucharest same as it was happening in Cairo. The new leader brings the miners in Bucharest, in Egypt – the army is doing what the miners were doing.

    Just as a curious fact: during the Romanian revolution of 1989 two revolutionary councils formed. One was led by Ion Iliescu and the second one by an army general. So the likelihood of a military takeover in Romania was pretty high during the Revolution, while afterwards the role of the army was insignificant. Part of the story is that the army had guarantees from the new government and also managed to rebrand itself as supporting the Romanian revolution. After all, it was a military tribunal that executed Ceausescu.

    Do you know by chance how did the Egyptians choose this formula of staggered elections? Did they get advice from somewhere or is that a genuine Egyptian idea?