I thought I would offer a few folllow-ups on my earlier post on reconciliation. I appreciate the many questions and corrections I have received since claiming expertise based on my collection of Budget Battle paraphernalia.
1. Can the majority bypass committee consideration of a reconciliation bill?
In response to the question raised in the comments by Jonathan about skipping the committee stage, this apparently remains an unsettled question in Congress. It is not clear whether circumventing the instructed committees is possible without encountering significant obstacles that would affect the contents of the bill.
2. Overturning rulings of the chair during consideration of a reconciliation bill
In response to Keith’s question in the comments about appeals of the chair’s rulings, I should be more explicit about the size of the majorities required to overturn a ruling of the chair on budget-related points of order (including points of order that stem from the Byrd Rule). Only a supermajority of 60 can overturn rulings of the chair on points of order that stem from the Byrd Rule. Similarly, a supermajority of 60 is required to waive the Byrd Rule. (Just an aside—There are a handful of points of order provided for in the Budget Act that require only a simple majority to waive. But the points of order to which a health care package could be vulnerable require 60 votes to waive or to overrule on appeal.) That remains one of the key barriers to Democrats’ deliberations over whether to pursue health care reform through reconciliation.
3. The 20-hour debate limit for reconciliation
A clarification of the time limitation for floor consideration of reconciliation bills in the Senate. I referred to a “time certain” for a vote. Because the Budget Act limits debate time (but not “consideration” time), time spent offering and voting on amendments (and motions and appeals, albeit none with debate) does not count under the 20 hour cap. (This is what gives rise to the “vote-a-rama” scene at the end of debate on the budget resolution in the Senate, when senators vote on often-times dozens of amendments at the close of the process.) In theory, if the minority kept offering amendments and refused to stop, the Senate would never get to a vote. Hence, “time certain” might not be so certain. Again, think Senate. Nothing is certain.
4. Expiration of committee instructions from the previous fiscal year
I suggested that the current parliamentary thinking appears to be that reconciliation instructions would only expire at the end of the Congress. Although the FY2010 instructions have not expired at this point, it is currently unsettled in the Senate as to when exactly in the current (111th) Congress they might expire — at the end of the Congress, or with the adoption of a new budget resolution.
5. Bottom line?
The bottom line, as I’ve tried to convey in the post and comments, is that reconciliation does not provide an easy vehicle for passing major policy change (and certainly less so when the parties are disposed to disagree strongly with each other). Sixty vote thresholds remain embedded in the fabric of reconciliation, even if the process is portrayed as a majoritarian work-around. I think it is also fair to say that the complexities and uncertainties about the application of reconciliation to health care reform raise innumerable questions that cannot be answered aprior (or easily in a blog post!).
I welcome your continued questions and objections!